Alok Chaudhari vs State Of Uttarakhand And Others

Ramesh Ranganathan, CJ

This Special Appeal is preferred against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in WPSS No.1349 of 2017 dated 10.05.2019. A common order was passed by the learned Single Judge in WPSS No.374 of 2018 and batch dated 10.05.2018. Though the learned counsel for the appellant in the present case is Mr. Shobhit Saharia, we also heard Mr. Vinay Kumar, learned counsel, since he appeared for the writ petitioners in the other cases. We also heard Mr. B.D. Kandpal, learned Standing Counsel for the Uttarakhand Public Service Commission and Mr. S.S. Chaudhary, learned Brief Holder for the State.

The appellant herein filed Writ Petition (S/S) No. 1349 of 2017 seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the result of the Preliminary/Screening Examination dated 25.10.2016, declared by the Uttarakhand Public Service Commission (for short the "Commission") for the post of Review Officers/Assistant Review Officers in the Uttarakhand Secretariat/Uttarakhand Public Service Commission Examination-2016 in as much as there were a large number of candidates whose names figured in all four lists; a writ, in the nature of certiorari, to quash the averment in the online application form for the main examination for the post of Review Officer/Assistant Review Officer in Uttarakhand Secretariat/Uttarakhand Public Service Commission Examination-2016, wherein the petitioners have been held not qualified/not applied for the post of Review Officer; a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to revise and prepare a single select list for the Preliminary/Screening Examination for the post of Review Officer/Assistant Review Officer, Uttarakhand Secretariat/Uttarakhand Public Service Commission Examination-2016; and to hold the petitioners eligible for all the four categories of posts advertised for the main examination.

The Uttarakhand Public Service Commission issued an advertisement on 05.04.2016 inviting applications for 114 posts of Review Officers in the Uttarakhand Secretariat, 11 posts of Review Officers in the Uttarakhand Public Service Commission, 20 posts of Assistant Review Officers in the Uttarakhand Secretariat and 36 posts of Assistant Review Officers in the Uttarakhand Public Service Commission. In all 181 posts were advertised. Pursuant thereto, a large number of applications were received. Except for the post of Review Officer in the Uttarakhand Public Service Commission, the educational qualifications prescribed for selection and appointment to the post of Review Officer/Assistant Review Officer in the Uttarakhand Secretariat and the post of Assistant Review Officer in the Uttarakhand Public Service Commission were the same. The procedure adopted by the Commission resulted in the appellants-writ petitioners being held eligible only to participate for selection to the posts of, Assistant Review Officers in the Uttarakhand Secretariat and Assistant Review Officers in the Uttarakhand Public Service Commission, and as ineligible for the post of Review Officer either in the Uttarakhand Secretariat or in the Commission.

For the 114 posts of Review Officer in the Uttarakhand Secretariat, candidates were called by the Commission to appear in the main examination in the ratio of 1:15. As against the total number of 1710 candidates required to be called for the main examination, the Commission called upon 1739 candidates to appear, as 30 candidates had secured the same marks i.e. cut of marks prescribed for being permitted to appear in the main examination to the post of Review Officers in the Uttarakhand Secretariat. For 11 posts of Review Officers in the Uttarakhand Public Service Commission, and on the ratio of 1:15 being applied, 165 candidates were required to be called to appear for the main examination. Since the Rules enabled a candidate, who possessed the prescribed educational qualifications, to apply for more than one post, the Commission included candidates, from the list already prepared for Review Officers in the Uttarakhand Secretariat, who had also applied for these posts, again in the list of Review Officers in the Commission; and, in addition to them, called candidates in the ratio of 1:15 i.e. 165 candidates. In effect these 165 candidates, who were also called to appear in the main examination, were in addition to those who were included in the list of candidates to be called for the main examination for the post of Review Officers in the Uttarakhand Secretariat. Consequently, 1567 candidates formed part of the list of candidates eligible to appear for the main examination to the post of Review Officer in the Commission. Similarly, as against 20 posts of Assistant Review Officers in the Uttarakhand Secretariat, and on application of the ratio of 1:15, 300 candidates were required to be called for participation in the main examination. However, 1807 candidates were included in the list of eligible candidates, entitled to appear in the main examination for the post of Assistant Review Officer, Uttarakhand Secretariat, since candidates who had applied for the posts of Review Officers, both in the Uttarakhand Secretariat and in the Commission, had also applied for the post of Assistant Review Officers in Secretariat. It is in addition to these candidates that other candidates, in the ratio of 1:15, were called to appear for the main examination.

Likewise, as against 36 posts of Assistant Review Officer in the Commission, 550 candidates were required to be called to participate in the main examination applying the ratio of 1:15. However, 2547 candidates were included in the list of candidates eligible to appear in the main examination, since the remaining candidates (apart from 550) were those who had also applied for the other posts advertised by the Commission. The petitioner, admittedly, stood lower in rank in the preliminary examination, and did not fall within the list of candidates eligible to appear in the main examination for the said post, on application of the ratio of 1:15. The petitioner, and other similarly situated candidates, were therefore not included in the list of candidates eligible to appear in the main examination for the post of Review Officer in the Uttarakhand Secretariat.

The petitioners invoked the jurisdiction of this Court, under Article 226 of Constitution of India, contending that the Commission had violated the Rules in preparing four separate lists of candidates eligible to appear in the main examination on the ground that there were four different categories of posts; instead, only two lists should have been prepared i.e. one list of candidates eligible to appear in the main examination for the post of Review Officers in the Commission, and a second common list of eligible candidates to appear in the main examination for the remaining three categories of posts i.e. Review Officers, Uttarakhand Secretariat, and Assistant Review Officers, Uttarakhand Secretariat and Commission. The submission, in effect, is that if a common list had been prepared for all these three categories of posts, then, as against a total of 170 posts, (i.e. 114 posts of Review Officers in the Uttarakhand Secretariat plus 20 posts of Assistant Review Officers in the Secretariat plus 36 posts of Assistant Review Officers in the Commission), 2550 candidates should have been called to appear in the main examination, applying the ratio of 1:15; and while they did not secure enough marks in the written examination, to fall within 1739 candidates included in the list of candidates eligible to appear in the main examination, they would have been one among the 2550, and would have thereby been entitled to appear in the main examination and participate for selection and appointment to the 114 posts of Review Officers in the Uttarakhand Secretariat also.

It is the petitioner's case that, since the educational qualifications were common for the posts of Review Officer in the Uttarakhand Secretariat and for the posts of Assistant Review Officers in Uttarakhand Secretariat and the Commission, and only the educational qualifications prescribed for the post of Review Officer in the Commission were different, the Commission should have only prepared two lists based on the educational qualifications, and not four separate lists based on the four different categories of posts; and, if this procedure had been adopted, the petitioner would have also been eligible to be called to appear in the main examination for the post of Review Officer in the Uttarakhand Secretariat also.

In the light of the interim order passed by this Court, candidates, who had applied for more than one post, were permitted to appear in the main examination for all the post(s) for which they had applied, ignoring the list prepared by the Public Service Commission. Consequently, the petitioner also appeared in the main examination. However, their results were withheld in the light of the interim orders passed by this Court. After dismissal of the writ petitions, by the order under appeal, the Commission declared their results and he was held selected for the posts of Assistant Review Officers in the Uttarakhand Secretariat and the Commission. The petitioner, however, claims that the marks secured by him in the main examination would have, but for the procedure adopted by the Commission, sufficed for his selection and appointment to the post of Review Officer in the Uttarakhand Secretariat.

Both Sri Shobhit Saharia and Sri Vinay Kumar, learned counsel, would submit that, while the Commission may have been justified in preparing a separate list of candidates, to be permitted to appear for main examination, for the post of Review Officer in the, Commission, since the educational qualifications for the said post was different from the other three, a common list of candidates, eligible to appear for the main examination, should have been prepared for the vacancies available in the other three categories of posts clubbed together, in which event the appellant-writ petitioner would have been eligible to appear in the main examination for all the three posts; and, since the results now declared show that he was higher up in the merit list, he would have, if such a procedure been adopted, been entitled to be appointed as Review Officer in the Uttarakhand Secretariat on the basis of his merit, and the marks secured by him in the main examination.

As noted hereinabove, the procedure adopted by the Commission, in selecting candidates for the advertised posts, is to permit candidates to submit one application form even if they have sought to be considered for more than one post. While all eligible candidates are permitted to appear in the preliminary examination, a separate merit list is prepared, on the conclusion of the preliminary examination, with respect to each category of posts separately in the ratio of 1:15; and, depending on the number of vacant posts in each of the four categories, candidates are called strictly in the order of their merit, and in the ratio of 1:15, to appear for the main examination.

In the present case, since four different categories of posts were advertised, the Commission prepared four separate lists of candidates eligible to appear in the main examination; and, since the petitioner was not found meritorious enough to be included in the list of candidates eligible to appear for the main examination for the post of Review Officer, Uttarakhand Secretariat, and was found higher in the order of merit for the posts of Assistant Review Officer, his name was not included in the list of candidates called to appear for the main examination for the post of Review Officer in the Uttarakhand Secretariat.

It is, no doubt, true that a common paper is prescribed in the main examination for all the four categories of posts and, in view of the interim orders passed by this Court, the petitioner appeared in the main examination common for all the four categories of posts. The question which necessitates examination in this appeal is whether the Commission was justified in preparing four separate lists of candidates, eligible to appear in the main examination, as there were four different categories of posts, or whether, instead, they ought to have prepared only two separate lists of such candidates on the basis of their educational qualifications i.e. one list for Review Officers in the Commission, and a second common list for all the three categories of posts of Review Officers, Uttarakhand Secretariat, Assistant Review Officers, Uttarakhand Secretariat and Assistant Review Officers, Commission together, as the educational qualification prescribed for appointment to all these three categories of posts, was the same.

The submission, urged on behalf of the appellant-writ petitioner, is that if all the vacancies, with respect to the three posts of Review Officers Secretariat, Assistant Review Officer Secretariat and Assistant Review Officers in Public Service Commission were clubbed together, then a common list of 2550 candidates should have been prepared for the 170 posts (i.e. 114 posts of Review Officers Secretariat, 20 posts of Assistant Review Officer Secretariat and 36 posts of Assistant Review Officer for Public Service Commission) and consequently, applying the ratio of 1:15, a total number of 2550 candidates should have been called for the main examination, in which event the petitioner would have been eligible to participate in the main examination for all these three categories of posts as he stood within the top 2550 candidates.

In, examining whether the Commission was justified in following the procedure it did, it must be borne in mind that administrative or executive decisions of an authority are amenable to judicial review, if the impugned action is against the law or in violation of the prescribed procedure or is unreasonable, irrational or mala fide. (M.I. Builders (P) Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu : (1999) 6 SCC 464) . Judicial review of administrative powers exercised by the Government, or its instrumentalities, is made to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism. Judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision, but the decision-making process. The grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as (i) Illegality: This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. (ii) Irrationality: namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness and (iii) procedural impropriety. While the Government or its instrumentalities have the freedom to take decisions, and a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere, the decision must, however, not only be tested by the application of the Wednesbury principle of reasonableness, but must also be free from arbitrariness, and should not be affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. The duty of the Court is to confine itself to the question of legality. Its concern should be (1) whether a decision-making authority has exceeded its powers; (2) committed an error of law; (3) committed a breach of the rules of natural justice; (4) reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached; or (5) abused its powers. (Tata Cellular v. Union of India : (1994) 6 SCC 651).

The doctrine that powers must be exercised reasonably must be reconciled with the no less important doctrine that the Court must not usurp the discretion of the public authority appointed to take the decision. Within the bounds of legal reasonableness is the area in which the deciding authority has genuinely free discretion. It is only if it passes these bounds, does it act ultravires. The Court must, therefore, resist the temptation to draw the bounds too tightly, merely according to its own opinion. It must strive to apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority the full range of choices which the legislature/Rule making authority is presumed to have intended. If the decision is within the confines of reasonableness, it is no part of the court's function to look further into its merits. (Sterling Computers Ltd. v. M & N Publications Ltd. : (1993) 1 SCC 445; Administrative Law, Prof. Wade). Article 14 cannot be interpreted in a doctrinaire or dogmatic manner. Excessive interference by the judiciary in the functions of the executive is not proper. In view of the inherent complexities involved in modern society, some free play must be given to the executive. (Transport and Dock Workers Union v. Mumbai Port Trust : (2011) 2 SCC 575; Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Co. v. May : 48 L Ed 971; Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass : (2008) 1 SCC 683). While fair play in action is an essential requirement, "free play in the joints" is also a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere. (Fasih Chaudhary v. D.G., Doordarshan : (1989) 1 SCC 89).

If a decision has been taken in a bonafide manner, although not strictly following the norms laid down by Courts, such decisions are upheld on the principle that Courts, while judging the validity of executive decisions, must grant certain measure of freedom of "play in the joints" to the executive. (Sterling Computers Ltd. v. M & N Publications Ltd. :(1993) 1 SCC 445). The Government has, while taking its decisions, the right to "trial and error" as long as both trial and error are bona fide and within the limits of authority. (BALCO Employees' Union (Regd.) v.Union of India : (2002) 2 SCC 333). Mere errors of the government or its instrumentalities are not subject to judicial review. It is only its palpably arbitrary exercise which can be declared void. (Dhampur Sugar (Kashipur) Ltd. v. State of Uttaranchal : (2007) 8 SCC 418; Metropolis Theater Co. v. State of Chicago : 57 l Ed 730: 228 US 61 (1912); State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal : (1986) 4 SCC 566).

Courts should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it is illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or shocks the conscience of the court, in the sense that it is in defiance of logic or moral standards. Courts would neither go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator nor would it substitute its decision for that of the administrator. (Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank Vs. Munna Lal Jain : (2005)10 SCC 84 and V.Ramana v. A.P. SRTC : (2005) 7 SCC 338). The Court should decide, in the given facts and circumstances, whether the action complained of is unreasonable? How to do that is always a complex and complicated question. However, in law, context is everything. (Meerut Development Authority v. Association of Management Studies : 2009(3) Supreme 429). The Court will intervene where the facts, taken as a whole, would not logically warrant the conclusion of the decision-maker. If the weight of facts pointing to one course of action is overwhelming, then a decision the other way cannot be upheld. (Tata Cellular v. Union of India : (1994) 6 SCC 651).

Judges should exercise self-restraint while exercising powers of judicial review of administrative or legislative decisions. In view of the complexities of modern society, and the restricted scope of any man's experience, tolerance and humility in passing judgment on the worth of the experience and beliefs of others become crucial faculties in the disposition of cases. The successful exercise of such judicial power calls for intellectual disinterestedness and penetration, lest limitation in personal experience and imagination operate as limitations of the Constitution. It is misfortune if a Judge reads his conscious or unconscious sympathy with one side or the other prematurely into the law, and forgets that what seem to him to be first principles are believed, by half his fellow men, to be wrong. (Transport and Dock Workers Union v. Mumbai Port Trust : (2011) 2 SCC 575). As long as the procedure adopted by the Commission is not tainted with any of the aforesaid infirmities, and accords with law, no interference is called for in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

The submission, put forth by learned counsel on either side, mainly revolves around the construction to be placed on Rule 8(e) of the Uttarakhand Public Service Commission (Examination Result Preparation Procedure) Rules, 2012, as amended from time to time. Rule 8(A) thereof requires the Commission to call candidates, to appear in the main examination, in the ratio of 1:15. It is evident therefrom that, for each post, candidates are required to be called in the ratio of 1:15 i.e. 15 candidates for each post.

Rule 8(e) reads as under :-

"Selection where common examination is undertaken for posts in different departments, candidate shall submit one application form only, for more than one post on the basis of educational qualification. Candidate will be declared successful in preliminary/screening, mains and final selection on the basis of educational qualification and merit (if, there is, for final selection). In combined examination, through which, selection is to be made for posts in different department, there, preliminary/screening and main examination result, will be declared separately, on the basis of educational qualification fixed for the post and if, one candidate is having eligibility for more than one post, then he shall be declared successful for more than one post, in preliminary/screening and main examination in the prescribed ratio."

It is convenient to examine the ambit and purport of rule in parts. The first limb stipulates that in case of selection, where a common examination is undertaken for posts in different departments, the candidates shall submit one application form only for more than one post based on the educational qualification. Even though posts in four different departments were advertised, the applicants were permitted to submit one common application form. They were entitled to apply for any one or more of these four categories of posts.

The second limb of Rule 8(e) stipulated that candidates would be declared successful in the preliminary/screening, mains and final selection, on the basis of educational qualification and merit, if there is for final selection. It is unnecessary for us to analyse the second limb of Rule 8(e) as learned counsel on either side are in agreement on the construction to be placed thereupon. The dispute is, however, on the construction to be placed on the third and fourth limbs of Rule 8(e) whereunder in a combined examination, through which selection is to be made in posts in different departments, the Preliminary/Screening and the main examination result will be declared separately on the basis of the educational qualifications fixed for the posts. The fourth limb is that one candidate, having eligibility for more than one post, shall be declared successful for more than one post in the Preliminary/ Screening and the main examination, in the prescribed ratio (which, in terms of Rule 8(a), is 1:15).

The construction placed by the petitioners on the third and fourth limbs of Rule 8(e) is that the results of candidates in the preliminary examination are to be declared separately based on the educational qualifications fixed for the post; and, consequently, results should have been declared for the preliminary examination separately for 11 posts of Review Officers in the Commission, and a common list should have been prepared for the other 170 posts of Review Officer, Uttarakhand Secretariat, Assistant Review Officers, Uttarakhand Secretariat and Assistant Review Officers in the Commission.

While this submission, urged on behalf of the appellant-writ petitioner, appears attractive at first blush, the said Rule, on further examination, shows that selection is to be made for posts in different departments, and the results in both the Preliminary and the main examination are required to be declared separately for each department, however on the basis of the educational qualification fixed for the posts. The requirement of Rule 8(e) is not confined to the declaration of results in the main examination, but also to the declaration of results in the preliminary examination. Rule 8(e) requires that the result of the preliminary examination shall be declared separately for each department on the basis of the educational qualifications fixed for the posts. The Commission was therefore, justified in preparing four separate lists for four separate departments (i.e. for four different categories of posts) on the basis of the educational qualifications prescribed for each category of posts (i.e. for each department separately).

It is a cardinal principle of interpretation that the words of a statute must be understood in their natural sense and construed according to their grammatical meaning. (Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit v. State of Maharashtra : 2001(4) SCC 534). The legislature may be, safely, presumed to have intended what the words plainly say. (Bhaiji v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Thandla : 2003(1) SCC 692). A construction which requires, for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words, should be avoided. (Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of Vested Forests : AIR 1990 SC 1747, Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal Corpn : AIR 1966 SC 1678, A. R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak : (1984 (2) SCC 500, Dental Council of India v. Hari Prakash : (2001)8 SCC 61, J. P. Bansal v. State of Rajasthan : (2003)5 SCC 134; Unique Butyle Tube Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Uttar Pradesh Financial Corporation : (2003)2 SCC 455 and State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh : (2005)10 SCC 437).

A Statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. (Raghunath Rai Bareja v.Punjab National Bank : (2007) 2 SCC 230; Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers : AIR 2003 SC 2434). Statutory language must always be given, presumptively, the most natural and ordinary meaning which is appropriate in the circumstances, (Chertsey Urban District Council v. Mixnam's Properties Ltd. : (1964) 2 All ER 627), and must be construed according to the rules of grammar. The duty of the Court is to give effect to the intention of the legislature, and that intention is to be gathered from the language employed having regard to the context in connection with which it is employed. The legislature or the Rule making authority is deemed to intend and mean what it says. The need for interpretation arises only when the words used in the Statute are, on their own terms, ambivalent and do not manifest the intention of the legislature. (ITC Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi : (2004)7 SCC 591).

In construing a statutory provision (be it plenary or subordinate), the first and foremost rule of construction is the literal construction. If the provision is unambiguous and, if from that provision, the legislative intent is clear, the Court need not call into aid other rules of construction of statutes. (Raghunath Rai Bareja : (2007) 2 SCC 230; Hiralal Ratanlal v. STO :(1973) 1 SCC 216). A provision is ambiguous only if it contains a word or a phrase which, in that particular context, is capable of having more than one meaning. (Kirkness (Inspector of Taxes) v. John Hudson & Co., Ltd. : (1955) AC 696 (HL); M/s Ankamma Trading Company v. The Appellate Deputy Commissioner (CT) Guntur : Judgment of the Division Bench in W.P. No.13470 of 2009 dated 11.02.2011). On a plain and literal reading of Rule 8(e), the Commission cannot be said to have acted contrary thereto in preparing four separate lists for each of the four departments i.e. Review Officers in the Uttarakhand Secretariat, Review Officers in the Commission, Assistant Review Officers in the Uttarakhand Secretariat and Assistant Review Officers in the Commission.

Accepting the construction placed on Rule 8(e), by the learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner, would render the words "different departments" therein redundant and inapposite surplussage, and any interpretation which results either in addition or deletion of words or as rendering any statutory rule redundant must be avoided. (Banarsi Debi v. ITO : (1964) 7 SCR 539; Attorney-General v.Carlton Bank : (1899)2 QB 158). Courts have adhered to the principle that effort should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the legislature and it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words, in a statute or a statutory rule, as being inapposite surplussage, if they can have a proper application in circumstances conceivable within the contemplation of the Statute or the Rule. (Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit v. State of Maharashtra : 2001(4) SCC 534, Manohar Lal v. Vinesh Anand : (2001) 5 SCC 407). When the legislative intent is found specific mention and expression in the provisions of the Act or the Rule itself, the same cannot be whittled down or curtailed and rendered nugatory. (Bharathidasan University v. All India Council or Technical Education : (2001)8 SCC 676). Effect should be given to all the provisions, and a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a "dead letter" must be avoided. (Anwar Hasan Khan v. Mohd. Shafi : (2001) 8 SCC 540). Any interpretation which results either in addition or deletion of words, or as rendering any statutory provision or rule redundant, must also be avoided. (Banarsi Debi v. ITO : (1964) 7 SCR 539; Attorney-General v. Carlton Bank : (1899)2 QB 158). Courts should not, ordinarily, add words to a statute, or read words into it, which are not there, especially when a literal reading thereof produces an intelligible result. (Delhi Financial Corpn v. Rajiv Anand : (2004)11 SCC 625). There is a line, though thin, which separates adjudication from legislation. That line should not be crossed or erased. Courts expound the law, they do not legislate. (State of Kerala v. Mathai Verghese : (1986 (4) SCC 746, Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal : AIR 1992 SC 96).

Yet another reason why we must exercise restraint is because the scope of interference, in an intra-Court Appeal, is extremely limited. In the order under appeal, the learned Single Judge has observed that it was apparent, from the counter affidavit filed by the Public Service Commission, that the petitioner could make it only for two posts i.e. Assistant Review Officers in the Uttarakhand Secretariat and in the Commission as, for the post of Review Officers in the two organizations, the marks scored by them in the preliminary examination was less than the marks secured by the last successful candidate; although the petitioner's chance may be diminished on account of preparation of four separate lists by the Commission, the action of the Commission cannot be said to be contrary to the Rules; Rule 8(e) of the Rules required the Commission to prepare separate merit list in cases, where a combined selection is made for two or more posts having different qualifications; he did not find any illegality in the action of the Commission; and there was no scope for interference in the matter.

The learned Single Judge is not a Court subordinate, as both he and the Division Bench exercise the very same jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is only if the order under appeal is held to suffer from a patent illegality, would interference in an intra-Court Appeal be justified. We find no such infirmity in the order under appeal.

The Special Appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs.