Amal Kumar Ghosh and Others vs Bhagwan Shaw

P.K. Banerjee, J.—This Rule along with other Rules were heard together as the same question of law were involved. The question posed in these Rules is whether the suit was properly valued. The suit was brought by the plaintiff. The present Rule is at the instance of the defendant arising out of a suit filed by the plaintiff-opposite party for declaration of his title in respect of the suit property being 8/2, Plam Avenue, Calcutta and for perpetual injunction. The suit was valued at Rs. 100/-. In the plaint the plaintiff stated that the plaintiff had acquired title in the suit property by adverse possession. The right, title and possession of the owner was extinguished and no other person excepting the plaintiff had any right, title and interest when they are in exclusive possession in the suit property since 1959. But as the defendants are threatening the plaintiff from possessing the suit property in execution of a decree being Title Execution Case No. 5 of 1955 this suit was brought and the plaintiff has valued the suit at Rs. 100/- for declaration and injunction. Mr. Siddhartha Sankar Roy appearing for the petitioners contended that the suit was under-valued inasmuch as, one katha of land in the suit property cannot be less than Rs. 10 thousand as held by this Court in an earlier suit and which was affirmed also in appeal from the judgment of a Single Judge by the Division Bench. Mr. Roy contended that court fee should have been on the basis of Section 7 sub-section 4(B) of the Court Fees Act, or in other words, the suit should be valued at the market value of the property for which declaration is prayed for. Mr. Dipankar Gupta, following Mr. Roy contended that assuming the valuation of the suit should not be according to the subject matter but even if it is a case of valuing relief it may provide objective standard which is available so as to value the relief claimed. Mr. Dipankar Gupta, on behalf of the petitioners relied upon the decision reported in Tarai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Others, . Chhatu Lal Shaw Vs. Panchanan Shaw and Others, and Jitendra Nath Mukherjee Vs. Commissioners of Baduria Municipality and Another, , appearing for one of the opposite parties in one of these Rules contended that as the opposite parties are in possession of the suit premises, the relief claimed according to him has been valued properly. Mr, Sankar Ghose appearing for the opposite parties in C. R. No. 4461 of 1979 contended that if the possession is claimed the objective standard will be the market value. But when the person is in possession no objective standard is necessary and declaration of title and injunction as claimed is incapable of valuation. The plaintiff may value his relief according to subjective manner. He relied upon Jitendra Nath Mukherjee Vs. Commissioners of Baduria Municipality and Another, . Mr. Ranadev Chowdhury appearing for another set of the Rules contended that there was no prayer for possession and the possession being with the plaintiff, the suit has been properly valued. He relied upon a decision reported in 70 CWN 857.

Considering all these cases together I do not think that there can be any dispute on the question of law. If no objective standard of valuation is available the plaintiff can put his own valuation in respect of the relief he claimed in the Suit. The said relief is personal to him and is not related to the subject-matter of the suit. In the case reported in State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Ramkrishan Burman (Dead) by L. Rs. and Others, it has been held by the Supreme Court that a decree for declaration of title to money or other property is not a decree for money or other property. "Decree for money or other property means only a decree for recovery of money of other property. It does not include a decree concerning title to money or other property. A suit for a mere declaration that the plaintiff is a owner of certain properties does not fall u/s 7 (iv-A) of the Act. In a case reported in AIR 1958 S. C. 246 (Sathappa Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar) it has been held by the Supreme Court that if the scheme laid down for the computation of fees payable in suits covered by the several sub-sections of section 7 is considered, it would be clear that, in respect of suits falling under sub-section (iv), a departure has been made and liberty has been given to the plaintiff to value his claim for the purposes of court-fees. The theoretical basis of this provision appears to be that in cases in which the plaintiff is given the option to value his claim, it is really difficult to value the claim with any precision or definiteness. The effect of the provisions of section 8 is to make the value for the purpose of jurisdiction dependent upon the value as determinable for computation of court-fees. The computation of court-fees in suits falling u/s 7 (iv) of the Court-fees Act depends upon the valuation that the plaintiff makes in respect of his claim. Once the plaintiff exercises his option and values his claim for the purpose of court-fees, that determines the value for jurisdiction. The value for court-fees and the value for jurisdiction must no doubt be the same in such cases; but it is the value for court-fees stated by the plaintiff that is of primary importance. It is from this value that the value for jurisdiction must be determined. The result is that it is the amount at which the plaintiff has valued the relief sought for the purposes of court-fees that determines the value for jurisdiction in the suit and not vice versa. In a case reported in Chhatu Lal Shaw Vs. Panchanan Shaw and Others, it has been held by the Division Bench of this Court that in a suit by the plaintiff in possession with other co-sharers for a declaration that the sale deed executed by other co-sharer is void and for permanent injunction, the suit is one for declaration with consequential relief. There being no objective standard for valuing relief plaintiff can put his own valuation. In a case reported in Jitendra Nath Mukherjee Vs. Commissioners of Baduria Municipality and Another, it has been held by this Court that while determining the court-fees payable, one must not equate the subject-matter of the suit with subject-matter in dispute. The value of the relief claimed cannot be equated with the value of the subject-matter itself. The learned single Judge further held that the valuation given by the plaintiff, though arbitrary cannot be varied u/s 8-C of the Act by the Court in the absence of a standard sanctioned by law. In a case (reported in Bagala Nanda Dutta and Others Vs. Shrish Chandra Nandy, a ward of Court represented by the Manager, Court of Wards, it has been held by the Division Bench of this Court that as no objective standard of valuation was available in so far as the plaintiff''s claim was concerned he was entitled to put his own valuation. In the case reported in 70 C. W. N. 857 (Amritalal Chatterjee v. H. Chatterjee) it has been held by the Division Bench of this Court that the valuation of the relief sought, is not the same thing as valuation of the property itself or the subject-matter of the suit. The value of the relief is now the value of the suit. In a case reported in Tarai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Others, it has been held by the Division Bench of this Court that in a suit to obtain a declaratory decree or order if the Court is of the opinion that the subject-matter of any suit has been wrongly valued, it may refuse the valuation and for the purpose of determining the correct valuation, the Court may hold such enquiry as it may think fit. The plaintiff has stated the amount at which he values the relief he claims, the Court would not ordinarily interfere with the plaintiffs valuation unless the valuation is illegal, palpably absurd, manifestly illogical or arithmetically wrong.

From these cases it appears that the plaintiff in possession can value his suit if he asks for a declaration of title in respect of the property in question. It is clear from the decisions hereinbefore stated that it is only the subject-matter of the dispute, nor the subject-matter of the suit which is relevant. Only what is to be valued, is the relief claimed in the suit. It is clear that the relief claimed is to be valued. Applying this principle in the facts of this case it must be stated that the property involved in the suit was quite valuable but the opposite party defendant is not in possession of the property in question and the plaintiff is in possession thereof. In the body of the plaint it has been stated that the defendant was trying to disturb the petitioner''s possession. It is stated further before me by the affidavit-in-opposition that the relief claimed by the plaintiff was only for declaration and there is no objective standard in such declaration and therefore the plaintiff has properly valued the suit. In view of the cases discussed before me hereinbefore it cannot be said that the valuation claimed by the plaintiff is wrong. In my opinion as it has been held by the different judgments it is the plaintiff who is to value the relief claimed on the basis of the plaint. The plaintiff in the present case has asserted his title and admittedly he is in possession of the property in question.

I may further say as has been contended by the opposite party that the Court below has considered the matter and came to a particular conclusion about the valuation of the suit. In doing so, he has acted within the jurisdiction and the revisional application does not, in the facts and circumstances, lie. The Supreme Court in a case reported in Sri Ratnavaramaraja Vs. Smt. Vimla, held that whether proper court-fee is paid on a plaint is primarily a question between the plaintiff and the State. The jurisdiction in revision exercised by the High Court u/s 115 of the CPC is strictly conditioned by clauses (a) to (c) thereof. The defendant who may believe and even honestly, that proper court-fee has not been paid by the plaintiff has still no right to move the superior courts by appeal or in revision against the order adjudging payment of court-fee payable on the plaint. These Rules must fail and the Rules are, therefore, discharged. There will be no order as to costs.