Amar Nath Gautam vs The State and Another

P.C. Pandit, J.—This is a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution filed by Amar Nath Gautam, challenging the action of the Government in asking the Deputy Commissioner, Jullundur, respondent Mo. 2, to issue directions to the effact that the petitioner hid ceased to be a Member of Panchayat Samiti, Mukandpur, District Jullundur, u/s 15 of the Punjab Panchayat Samities and Zila Parishads Act, 1931 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), on account of his three years'' conviction in a criminal case involving moral turpitude.

The facts are not very much in disputes In 1961 the petitioner was elected as a Primary Member of the Panchayat Samiti, Mukandpur. On 9th of December, 1963 he was convicted under sections 109/466 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for three years by the Assistant Sessions Judge, Delhi. He immediately filed an appeal in the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court at Delhi and was released on bail on 11th of December, 1963 after he had been in jail for three days He is still on bail and the appeal is pending in the High Court. On the expiry of the period of the first elections, the second elections for Primary Members of this Block Samiti were held in 1964. On 16th of June, 1964 the petitioner filed his nomination papers for the said elections. Nobody raised any objections against his nomination within the prescribed period. Elections were then held and he was declared elected on 22nd of June, 1964 as a representative of the Cooperative Societies within the area of the Panchayat Samiti. His election was duly gazetted on 2nd of July, 1984. The petitioner then attended a meeting of the Primary Members convened by respondent No. 2 on 3rd of February, 1965 for the purpose of co opting members as required by section 5 of the Act. In the meantime, on 14th of July, 1964, the defeated candidate filed an election petition challenging the petitioner''s election and the same is pending before the prescribed authority, which is respondent No. 2. The election for the offices of the Chairman, Vice-chairman and Members of Zila Parishad was to take place on 16th of February, 1965, and respondent No. 2 had called a meeting for this purpose, which was to be presided over by his nominee Shri Teja Singh, P.C.S., Settlement Officer, Jullundur. The petitioner was also a candidate for election as a Member of the Zila Parishad. According to the petitioner, he had been having some differences with the Minister-incharge Community Development and his party-men. Since they apprehended that he might be might be elected to the Zila Parishad, the said Minister on 15th of February, 1965, while at Delhi, telephoned to the Deputy Secretary Development that the petitioner should forthwith be directed to cease to be a Member of the Panchayat Samiti. The Deputy Secretary informed respondent No. 2 and the Sub-Divisional Officer by telegram that the petitioner ceased to be a Member of the Samiti u/s 15 of the Act on account of his conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude and sentence of three years'' imprisonment and that he should not be allowed to take part in any proceeding whatsoever. Respondent No. 2 in turn sent a telegram on 16th of February, 1965 to the Block Development and Panchayat Officer, Mukandpur, who, on 22nd of February, 1965 forwarded a copy of the same to the petitioner for information and necessary action.

In the return it was denied that the Minister or his party-men had any differences with the petitioner or wanted to prevent his election to the Zila Parishad. The Minister, however, on receipt of a representation, dated 11th of February, 1965, from one Shri Hussan Chand, telephoned that since the petitioner had been convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years for an offence involving moral turpitude, action should be taken against him as warranted by law. The Government did net issue any directive to respondent No. 2 u/s 15 of the Act, but simply apprised him of the legal position and the consequences flowing therefrom. There was nothing abnormal about it. In spite of that the petitioner contested the election for membership to the Zila Parishad and also exercised his vote in the election of its Chairman and Vice-chairman.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two contentions before me-

(i) That section 15 of the Act comes into operation only if a Member of Panchayat Samiti, after and not before, entering upon his office becomes subject to any of the disqualifications specified in section 6, and

(ii) That in any case the petitioner had not become subject to any of the disqualifications specified in section 6 inasmuch as, though convicted, he had not been serving a sentence of imprisonment for an offence involving moral turpitute for not less than one year within five years from the date of his nomination as referred to in section 6 (1).

Taking the second contention first, the relevant part of section 6 runs thus-

No person shall be eligible for election as a Primary Member if such person- ment for an offence involving moral turpitude for not less than one year; or

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It is common ground that the petitioner had been convicted by the Assistant Sessions Judge, Delhi, on 9th of December, 1963 for an offence involving moral turpitude and had been sentenced to imprisonment for three years. His appeal against this conviction and sentence is pending in the High Court and he had been released on bail by the said Court on 11th of December, 1963, after he had undergone three days'' imprisonment. The date fixed for the nomination of candidates for election as Primary Members in the instant case was 18th of June, 1964, and, therefore, the conviction of the petitioner and the sentence of three days that he underwent in that connection were within five years from the date specified for the nomination of candidates. It is not necessary that the petitioner should actually have been serving a sentence of imprisonment on the date of the nomination as contended by the learned counsel, because, if that were so, then the words "within five years from the date specified for the nomination of candidates" in section 6 (1) would have no meaning. In my opinion if a person had at any time within a period of five years from the date of the nomination served a sentence of imprisonment in connection with on offence which involved moral turpitude and for which he had been sentenced to imprisonment for not less than one year, he would not be eligible for election as a Primary Member. In the instant case the petitioner had admittedly been in jail for three days in connection with his conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude and for which he was sentenced to three years'' imprisonment. He served this sentence within five years from the date of his nomination and consequently he had incurred the disqualification mentioned in section 6 of the Act. It is true that if the petitioner had merely been convicted but not sentenced to imprisonment and had not actually undergone any imprisonment, he would not have been ineligible for election as a Primary Member, After the petitioner was released on bail, his sentence of imprisonment would be deemed to have been suspended for the time being. In the instant case, however, he had actually undergone imprisonment for three days, because he had not been released on bail till he had actually suffered imprisonment for this period. There is thus no force in this contention.

Coming now to the first contention, section 15 of the Act runs thus -

(1) The Chairman, Vice Chairman or a Member of a Panchayat Samiti, after entering upon his office, shall forthwith cease to be the Chairman, Vice-chairman, or the Member, as the case may be, and his office shall become vacant if-

(a) he becomes subject to any of the disqualifications specified in section 6; or

(b) he absents himself without the permission of the Panchayat Samiti from more than three consecutive ordinary meetings of the Samiti.

(2) If any question, dispute or doubt arises as to whether or not a vacancy has occurred under this section, it shall be referred by the Executive Officer of the Panchayat Samiti to the Commissioner concerned, whose decision thereon shall be final.

(3) Pending such decision, the Chairman, Vice Chairman, or the Member of the Panchayat Samiti, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be duly qualified". It is quite apparent from the combined reading of sections 6 and 15 that the apparent purpose of the Act was that a person, who had at any time within a period of five years from the date of the nomination served imprisonment in connection with an offence which involved moral turpitude and for which he was sentenced for not less than one year, was not to become a Primary Member of the Panchayat Samiti. Although it could be argued with some force that the language employed in section 15, in its ordinary meaning, tends to show that in order to attract the provisions of this section a Member must incur the disqualification after he has entered upon his office, yet this construction would lead to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment referred to above. Such a construction is, therefore, to be avoided and it has to be held that section 15 by implication covers also those cases where a pre existing disqualification comes to notice after a Member had actually entered upon his office. It is not necessary that for the applicability of this section the disqualification must be incurred after a Member has entered upon his office. It was ruled by the Supreme Court in Tirath Singh Vs. Bachittar Singh and Others, -

Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship, or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence.

There is, therefore, no substance in this contention as well.

The result is that the writ petition fails and is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.