Amarjit Singh vs Pritam Singh

J.V. Gupta, J.—This is a landlord''s petition in whose favour an eviction order was passed by the Rent Controller but was set aside in appeal.

The landlord sought the eviction of his tenant on two fold grounds that the tenant has not paid the rent due and that the demised house is required by him for his own use and occupation. The tenant controverted the said allegations in his written statement.

Since the arrears of rent were tendered on the first date of hearing, the said ground was no more available. On the question of bonafide requirement, learned Rent Controller found that the landlord did require the house in dispute for his own use and occupation and consequently, an eviction order was passed. In appeal the learned Appellate Authority reversed the said finding of the learned Rent Controller with the following observations:

Sometime back the scope of inquiry to be conducted by the Rent authorities in cases, where the eviction was sought on the personal requirement of landlord, was limited one. Ordinarily the Rent Authorities were required to give weight to the statement on oath made by the landlord with regard to his personal requirement. It was his decision with regard to his personal requirement which used to be respected and prima facie allowed to prevail. The Rent Authorities were forbidden from becoming the judge of needs of the landlord. The landlord used to be considered the sole arbitrator of his requirement. Of late, the law on the point has undergone substantial chage. It is no more open to the landlord to approach the Rent Authorities and get the demised house vacated at his mere desire or wish to occupy the same for his personal use. According to latest view of the Supreme Court it has been enjoined upon the Rent Authorities to examine the need of the landlord and see for themselves whether the same is reasonable and genuine. Now instead of the mere desire or wish of the landlord the Rent Authorities also insist upon as element of need.

With this approach, the learned Appellate Authority further observed:

If we examine the circumstances of this case we will find no difficulty to conclude that there is no necessity for the applicant-landlord to shift his residence to the town. Applicant landlord is a farmer. He is owning some agricultural land and the same is cultivated by him. He is owning a tractor, in modern times agriculture has become more of a trade. On account of strain on land the agriculturists have resorted to intensive cultivation. Gone are the days when the farmers would be satisfied by growing one or two crops in a year. Now a days crop pattern has undergone a drastic change. New techniques have been developed Farmers are competing with each other. The farmers and the villagers in order to establish closest contact with their land have given up their residence in the village and constructed their houses over their lands. Here is a farmer who instead of getting closer to his farm land is planning to drift away. He has not come out with any special reason why on earth following the profession of agriculture he is desirous of living in the town. The shifting of residence from the village to the town can with no stretch of reasoning be regarded as prudent act. The applicant-landlord''s contention that he is owning a tractor and as such distance of 31/2 K. Ms. is neglible hardly makes any difference in the situation. Tractors are intended to be plied in the fields. They are not meant for running on the roads No intelligent farmer would like to waste his energy and wear his machinery and tyres and unnecessarily expose himself and the machinery to hazard of road accidents by daily going and coming to the town after working at the farm land.

I am of the considered view that whole approach of the learned Appellate Authority was misconceived, illegal and improper. While judging the need of the landlord the authorities under the Rent Restriction Act are not supposed to advise as to how the landlord should manage his affairs. In order to find the need of the landlord, the authorities under the Act are only to see that the application is bonafide one and is not actuated by mere desire. In this behalf the relevant observations of the Supreme Court in Baga Begum v. Abdul A had Khan 1979 (1) R. C. R. 170 are most relevant which reads as under:

The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire as the High Court has done in this case. It seems to us that the connotation of the term ''need'' or ''requirement'' should not be artificially extended nor its language so unduly stretched or strained as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for eviction. Such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. This appears to us to be the general scheme of all the Rent Control Acts, prevalent in other States in the country. This Court, has considered the import of the word ''requirement'' and pointed out that it merely connotes that there should be an element of need.''

Keeping in view the said observations of the Supreme Court and from the facts of the present case, learned Rent Controller rightly came to the conclusion that the landlord bonafide required the premises for his own use and occupation. Consequently, this petition succeeds. The order of the Appellate Authority is set aside and that of the Rent Controller directing the ejectment of the tenant is restored with costs.

Since the tenant has refused to give an undertaking for vacating the premises, he was not entitled to any further time for vacating the same.