Ambala Bus Syndicate (P) Ltd. vs M/s Indra Motors Kurali

A.N. Grover, J.—This petition for revision arises in the following circumstances. The Ambala Bus Syndicate Private Limited owned a building within the Municipal limits of Kurali. They gave a portion of this building on rent to the Indra Motors at the rate of Rs. 1200/- per month. The tenant did not pay any rent with effect from 1st April 1961. The landlord filed an application for ejectment before the Rent Controller. Before him, the tenant raised a plea that no relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties. The Rent Controller, however, gave a finding in favour of the landlord and against the tenant and ordered the tenant''s eviction. The order was upheld by the Appellate Authority. The Ambala Bus Syndicate Private Limited then filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 43, 200/- on account of the rent due for the period from 1st April, 1961 to 31st March, 1864. The defendant in the suit inter alia once again raised the plea that no relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties. One of the questions which arose in the suit for recovery of rent was whether the defendant could be allowed to take up the plea about the relationship of landlord and tenant. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 did not expressly authorise the Rent Controller to give a final decision as to whether the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties. Relying on a Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in Kishun Sah v. Harinandan Prasad Sah AIR 1963 Pat. 78 he held that the decision of the Rent Controller in the matter of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties was not res judicata and that the defendant was not barred from taking up the plea in question in the present suit in spite of an adverse finding given against it in the eviction proceedings before the Rent Controller.

Mr. H. R. Sodhi for the petitioner contends that the Rent Controller was competent to decide on a contest being raised whether the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties and that his decision would operate as res judicata even in a regular suit which was for recovery of rent between the same parties. He says that even if the matter is not covered by section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the general principles of res judicata would bar such a plea being allowed to be re-agitated. He has relied inter alia on certain decisions of the Supreme Court as also on the language of section 15 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, sub-section (4) of which provides that the decision of the Appelate Authority and subject only to that decision an order of the Controller shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of Law except as provided in subsection (5). Sub-section (5) confers revisional power on the High Court. In Rai Brij Raj Krishna v. Messrs S. K, Shaw and Brothers AIR 1961 S.C. 115, the appellants before their Lordships, who were the landlords, had filed an application for eviction against their tenants under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1917 to the House Controller on the ground of non-payment of rent. Subsequently, the respondents deposited the rent in the office of the House Controller but the House Controller made an order directing eviction of the respondents on the ground of non payment of rent. That order was confirmed by the Commissioner on appeal. The respondents then filed a suit in the Munsif''s Court for a declaration that the order of the Controller directing eviction was illegal, ultra vires and without jurisdiction. The first two Courts took the view that the House Controller was fully competent to decide whether the condition precedent to eviction bad been satisfied and once that decision bad been arrived at, it could not be questioned in a Civil Court. The High Court took a contrary view. After referring to the provisions of the Bihar Act, Fazl Ali J. delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court observed that the Act set up a complete machinery for the investigation of those matters upon which the jurisdiction of the Controller to order eviction of a tenant depended and it expressly made his order final and subject only to the decision of the Commissioner. The Act empowered the Controller alone to decide whether or not there was non-payment of rent and bis decision on that question was essential before an order could be passed by him u/s 11. The classic pronouncement of Lord Esher, M.R. in The Queen v. Commissioner for Special Purposes of the income tax (1888) 21 Q. B.D. 213 was then considered and it was held that the case fell within the second category mentioned by Lord Esher because the Act had entrusted the Controller with a jurisdiction which included the jurisdiction to determine whether there was nonpayment of rent or not. as well as the jurisdiction, on finding th"t there was non-payment of rent, to order eviction of a tenant. Even if the Controller wrongly decided the question of non-payment of rent, his order could not be questioned in a Civil Court. In Bibulal Bhuramal v. Nandram Shivram AIR 1958 S.C. 617, the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 came up for consideration. The question that had to be decided was whether the suit which had been filed by the appellants before their Lordships could have been entertained by the City Civil Court having regard to the provisions of section 28 of that Act. The first plaintiff in the suit before the City Civil Court was a tenant of the premises in question under the first defendant. The second and third plaintiffs were persons to whom the said premises were sublet by the first plaintiff. The first defendant as landlord of the premises gave notice to quit to the first plaintiff. This was followed by a suit in the Court of Small Causes, Bombay whereby he sought to evict the first plaintiff. To that suit the first defendant also made the second and the third plaintiffs parties alleging that they were trespassers and had no right to be on the premises. The Small Cause Court held that the second and third plaintiffs were not lawful sub-tenants and since the subletting by the first plaintiff to them was contrary to law he had been deprived of the protection of the aforesaid Act. A decree for eviction was made. The suit out of which the matter arose before their Lordships was then filed for a declaration that the first plaintiff was a tenant of the defendants and was entitled to protection under the Act and that the second and the third plaintiffs were lawful sub-tenants of the first plaintiff. The City Civil Court held that it bad jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The Bombay High Court affirmed that decision. Section 28 provided that the Courts mentioned in the section would have jurisdiction to entertain and try any suit or proceeding between a landlord and a tenant relating to the recovery of rent or possession of any premises and to decide any application made under the Act or to deal with any claim or question arising out of the Act or any of its provisions and no other Court would have jurisdiction to entertain any such suit, proceeding or application or to deal with such claim or question. In their Lordships'' opinion the assertion in the, plaint and the nature of the relief asked for showed that the plaintiffs based their case on the provisions of the Act. The plaintiffs, however, relied on section 29A of that Act and according to them, questions of title had been expressly allowed to be re-agitated in a competent Court even if such a question had been determined by a Court exercising jurisdiction u/s 28. It was held by their Lordships that in the suit filed in the City Civil Court the claim was one which arose out of the Act or its provisions. The Court had been called upon to decide whether the first plaintiff was a tentant of the premises within the meaning of the Act and whether he had lawfully sublet the same to the second and the third plaintiffs It had, therefore, to determine whether the plaintiffs had established their claim to be in possession of the premises in accordance with the provisions of the Act. In other words, the City Civil Court could not decree the suit of the plaintiffs unless their claim to remain in possession was established under the Act or any of its provisions. The suit did not cease to be a suit between a landlord and a tenant merely because the defendants denied the claim of the plaintiffs and further whether the plaintiffs were the tenants would be a claim or question arising out of the Act or any of its provisions. The following observations are noteworthy:

On a proper interpretation of the provisions of section 28 the suit contemplated in that section is not only a suit between a landlord and a tenant in which that relationship is admitted but also a suit in which it is claimed that the relationship of a landlord and a tenant within the meaning of the Act subsists between the parties. The Courts which have jurisdiction to entertain and try such a suit are the Courts specified in section 28 and no other.

Referring to the scheme of the Act, it was observed that it purported to amend and consolidate the law relating to the control of rents of certain premises and of evictions. It defined "landlord" and "tenant" to have a meaning wider in scope and concept then those words have under the ordinary law. Any one who was a landlord or a tenant, as defined in the Act, would have to conform to the provisions of the Act and all claims to such a status would have to be determined under the provisions of the Act as they would be claims arising out of it. Their Lordships found it difficult to accept that the Legislature intended, after setting up Courts specified in section 28 to deal with any claim or question arising out of the Act, that the same should be re-agitated and redetermined in another suit by a Court not specified in section 28.

Mr. Sodhi has placed a good deal of reliance on the above observations and contends that the scheme of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act is also similar in asmuch as it contains a much wider definition of the words "landlord" and "tenant" and that section 15(4) makes the decision of the Rent Controller or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, final There are certain points of distinction, how ever, which cannot be completely ignored. The provisions of the Bombay Act, including those contained in section 28, were much more exhaustive than what is to be found in the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. Moreover, the Bombay Act purported to amend and consolidate the law relating to the control of rents of certain premises and of evictions The East Punjab Act, according to its preamble, is meant to restrict the increase of rent of certain premises situate within the limits of urban areas and the evictions of tenants therefrom. At the same time the definition of "landlord" and "tenant" as given in the East Punjab Act is much wider in scope and concept than those words have under the ordinary law and, as stated before, section 15(4) puts a sea) of finality on the orders made under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. In the latest decision of the Supreme Court, which hap been cited, Om Parkash Gupta v. Dr. Rattan Singh (1963), 65 P.L.R. 643, it was held that although the Delhi Rent Control Act did not in terms authorise the authorities under the Act to determine finally the question of the relationship of landlord and tenant but if the relationship was denied, that question had to be determined by the authorities under the Act because a simple denial of relationship could not oust the jurisdiction of the tribunals established by the Act. It was observed that ordinarily it is for the Civil Courts to determine whether and, if so, what jural relationship existed between the litigating parties. But the Act had been enacted to provide for the control of rents and evictions of tenants avowedly for their benefit and protection Alter referring to the provisions of section 15(4) of the Delhi Act by which the Controller was authorised to decide the question whether the claimant was entitled to an order of payment for rent and if there was a dispute as to the person or persons to whom the rent was payable as also the provisions of the other subsections of section 15, it was said at page 547 -

Thus, any order passed by the Controller, either u/s 15 or other sections of the Act, assumes that the Controller has the jurisdiction to make the order, i.e., to determine the issue of relationship.

As regards the limited jurisdiction of the tribunals established by the Rent Control Act, it was observed at page 548-

The tribunals under the Act being creatures of the Statute have limited jurisdiction and have to function within the four-corners of the Statute creating them. But within the provisions of the Act, they are tribunals of exclusive jurisdiction and their orders are final and not liable to be questioned in collateral proceedings like a separate suit or application in execution proceeding. In our opinion, therefore, there is no substance in the contention that as soon as the appellant denied the relationship of landlord and tenant, the jurisdiction of the authorities under the Act was completely ousted.

In the Full Bench decision in Kishan Sah v. Harinandan Prasad Sah1 reliance was placed mainly on another Full Bench decision of that Court in Patna Municipal Corporation v. Ram Bachan Lal9 as also on the observations of Lord Esher in The Queen v. Commissioner lor Special Purposes of Income tax (supra) and Brij Raj Krishna v. S. K. Shaw and Bros.(supra), was held to be distinguishable. The later decision of the Supreme Court in Babulal Bhuramal v. Nandram Shivram (supra), was not considered, and Om Parkash Gupta v. Dr. Rattan Singh (supra), was decided subsequent to the decision of the Patna Court. It seems to me, with respect that the position that emerges after these pronouncements is somewhat different from what was settled by the decision of the Patna Court in the matter of the jurisdiction of the Rent Controllers to determine finally the question of the relationship of landlord and tenant, if agitated before them. As at present advised, I am of the view that it was not open to allow the reopening of the issue of relationship of landlord and tenant which had been finally decided by the tribunals established under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. However, as the decision of the Patna Court is of a Full Bench, I consider it proper that this point should be decided by a Division Bench. I would, therefore, direct that the necessary orders of the, Hon''ble the Chief Justice may be obtained for constituting a Division Bench for disposing of the present petition for revision. As the proceedings :in the lower Court in the suit would remain stayed until the revision petition is decided, it will be highly desirable if the Bench is constituted at a very early date.

JUDGMENT OF THE DIVISION BENCH

Mehar Singh, C.J. (10th July, 1968)

The petitioner having given on rent the building in question to the respondent at a monthly rental and the respondent having failed to pay the arrears of rent; the petitioner sought his eviction, u/s 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949 East Punjab Act 3 of 1949). The plea in detente by the respondent was that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The Rent Controller found against the respondent, a finding confirmed on appeal by the Appellate Authority and ordered his eviction.

Subsequently the petitioner sued the respondent to recover the amount of arrears of rent and in that suit the respondent raised the plea in defence that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. This was again controverted by the petitioner. The matter having been put in issue, the learned trial Judge decided the same, by his order of April 1, 1936, against the petitioner, who filed a revision application against that order, which on coming for hearing before Grover J., on March 17, 1967, the learned Judge, though being of the view that the conclusion reached by the learned trial Judge was not correct, referred the matter to a Division Bench. This is how this case comes before us

The previsions of East Punjab Act 3 of 1949 are exhaustive on all the aspects which the Act covers. It is an Act to restrict the increase of rent of certain premises and the eviction of tenants therefrom. The definitions of the terms ''landlord'' and ''tenant'' as given in section 2 (c) and (i) are in scope and meaning much wider than the meaning and scope of those terms in the ordinary law, for the term ''landlord'' has within its meaning and scope even a person who is entitled to receive rent on behalf of another person and the term ''tenant'' includes within its meaning and scope even a person whose tenancy has terminated but who continues to be in possession. Even certain classes of persons, some of whom might come within the meaning and scope of the word ''tenant'', are particularly excluded. The jurisdiction of the Rent Controller includes the power to order eviction but only subject to the conditions and restrictions as in section 13, sub-section (1) of which says that a tenant in possession of demised premises shall not be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of this particular section, and then in subsection (2) the grounds of eviction are given on the basis of which a landlord can seek tenant''s eviction. Sub-section (4) of section 16 makes the order of the Rent Controller final subject to the decision of the Appellate Authority, and the decision of the latter final subject to what the High Court may order in exercise of its powers of revision under sub-section (5) of this very section In this there is clear implication of the ouster of the jurisdiction of an ordinary civil Court on all matters and questions which the Rent Controller has to decide by his order, which is final subject only to the decision of the Appellate Authority, and the latter''s decision is final subject to what the High Court may do under sub-section (5) of section 15. It follows from this that what is a matter properly and pertinently within the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller and has been disposed of in the terms of this particular Act, it is outside the jurisdiction of an ordinary civil Court. So long as the authorities under East Punjab Act 3 of 1949 act within jurisdiction and within the four corners of this statute, no civil Court can interfere with their orders or decisions. No doubt, the Act does not say anywhere that when the tenant denies the relationship of landlord and tenant, this matter is to be decided by the Rent Controller, but it would be reading too much in the statute to say that on the mere raising of such a plea in defence by the tenant the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller in an eviction application is ousted and such application must be thrown out and dismissed off hand. In such a case dispute arises as to the relationship between the parties qua the demised premises, the landlord definitely alleging that the opposite side whose eviction he seeks is his tenant and the latter denying any such relationship. Mere such denial cannot oust the jurisdiction unless it is specifically provided in the statute, and there is no such provision in East Punjab Act 3 of 1949. In such acontingency the Rent Controller has no option but to try in the terms of the statute the eviction application of the landlord on merits. If he finds that the opposite party is not a tenant of the landlord, obviously he must dismiss the landlord''s application, but it on the other hand, he finds that such a plea by the opposite party is not true and that the opposite party is a tenant of the landlord, in that event, if the ground of eviction as in section 13 is proved, he must proceed, to order eviction of the tenant. So that for the matter of disposal on merits of the eviction application by the landlord, where the existence of the tenancy is denied by the opposite party, the Rent Controller has jurisdiction under the provisions of the statute to decide this matter, lor if he did not do so, be would be failing to exercise jurisdiction under the statute. This is. therefore, a matter within his jurisdiction and his order on this, subject to the decision of the Appellate Authority, is made final by the statute, except that there might be interference by the High Court under sub-section (5) of section 15. The finality which thus attaches to the order of the Rent Controller cannot be questioned in a separate suit in a Civil Court. Any such suit can only question an order of the Rent Controller if it is without jurisdiction or outside the four corners of the statute, otherwise not This is a matter which, as has been explained, is within the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller and his order in this case between the parties that there existed the relationship of landlord and tenant between them is final and not open to agitation by the respondent in his defence to the suit of the petitioner to recover arrears of rent from him. The very same question arose before Narula J. and myself in Muni Lal v. Chandu Lal 70 P.L.R. 478- : 1968 Cur L.J. (P&H.) 302, and we answered the question in the same manner. The decision in that case is binding on us. It proceeds on the basis of the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court reported as Om Parkash Gupta v. Dr. Rattan Singh5, which, though a case under the Delhi Rent Control Act of 1958, is, on facts pertinent to the facts of the present case. There it has been held by their Lordships that the Delhi Rent Control Act does not, in terms, authorise the authorities under it to determine finally the question of relationship of landlord and tenant, as the Act itself proceeds on the assumption of such relationship. If the relationship is denied, the authorities under the Act have to determine the question also, because a simple denial of the relationship cannot oust the jurisdiction of the Tribunals under the Act. If a person moves a Rent Controller for eviction of another person on the ground that he is his tenant who had, by his acts or omissions, made himself liable to be evicted on any one of the grounds for eviction, and if the tenant denies that the plaintiff, is his landlord, the Controller has to decide the question whether there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. So that it is the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller to decide such a question and where he makes an order on such a question, that order is made final by the statute, of which the obvious consequence is that such a final order is not open to question in any proceedings in any other forum outside the statute including an ordinary Civil Court.

In this approach, the revision application of the petitioner is accepted and the order of the trial Court is reversed, with a direction that it Will now proceed to dispose of the suit of the petitioner on merits and with expedition. There is no order in regard to costs.

B.R. Tuli, J.

I agree.