Amir Khan and Others vs Abdullah Khan and Others

Suryanarayana Rao, J.—Mr. Zakaullah''s contention in this second appeal on behalf of the Appellants is that the two lower Courts have not given due consideration to his clients'' plea that the compromise entered into, in. the previous litigation between the parties was not binding on the Appellants, since they were minors at the time the compromise was effected by their mother. He contends that in Mohommedan Law the mother is not the natural guardian of the property of her minor children. The contention of the Respondents is that by virtue of the compromise decree they were put in possession of the property; that they were subsequently dispossessed, and that they should be restored back to the possession. The piea of the Respondents has been held proved by the two lower Courts.

As regards the compromise in the earlier litigation I find the court before which the compromise petition was filed, sanctioned the proposed compromise. The object of sanction by the Court, of a compromise on behalf of a minor litigant, proposed to be entered into by the minor''s guardian representing the minor in the suit, is to ensure that the Court goes into the question as to whether the compromise is or is not for the benefit of the minor and it is only when the Court is satisfied that the proposed compromise is, in the circumstances, for the benefit of the minor, that it permits the compromise to be entered into. That being the position in law until that compromise decree is set aside on the ground of fraud or on grounds analogous to it, that decree is binding on the minor litigant, who was thus a. party to the compromise and was effectually represented before the Court.

The advocate for the Appellants admits that no other proceedings have been instituted to set aside or to declare the previous decree as not binding on the minors. 1 am, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the advocate for the Appellants that the compromise decree was not binding on them as against the other party to the compromise decree. As long as that, decree stands, it is, therefore, not possible to hold that the decree is not binding on the Appellants. This contention, therefore, fails.

As regard the cost of the Respondents that they were put in possession in pursuance of the compromise, that they were dispossessed and that they should be restored back tp the possession, I agree with the concurrent findings of the lower Courts in favour of the Respondents, being question of the face based on evidence on record. In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs.