Ammani Amma and Others vs Padmanabha Menon and Fifteen Ors.

Seshagiri Ayyar, J.—The suit is by a female member of a tarwad and her children for maintenance against the tarwad; the defence is that, as

the first plaintiff''s marriage has been registered under Act IV of 1896, she and her children should entirely look to the husband of the first plaintiff

for maintenance and not to the tarwad. The question is said to be one of first impression; the learned vakils on both sides have advanced to us very

full arguments on the question. In our opinion, the view of the lower Appellate Court is wrong.

At the outset, it might be mentioned that the expression ''maintenance'' is loosely applied to this class of cases. The allowance claimed by an

anandravan of a Malabar tarwad or by a junior member of a joint Hindu family is not as a dependant upon the owner of the property but as one

who in his own right is entitled to participate in the income. The common law in both cases having vested the management in the senior member,

the claim for separate allowance is an index of proprietorship and not founded upon moral or quasi-legal obligations or inability to maintain himself

or herself. The authorities to which Mr. Rozario drew our attention have established this position with practical unanimity. In P. Teyan Nair v. P.

Raghavan Nair ILR (1882) Mad., 171 it was held that the possession of separate property should not be taken into account in considering

whether a member of the tarwad was entitled to separate allowance. This decision proceeded on the theory that each member had a right to a

share in this income. Thayu v. Shungunni (I.L.R. 1882) Mad 71 has to some extent qualified the above decision by pointing out that where the

tarwad has not sufficient income to maintain all the members decently, the fact that one of them has other means of livelihood will be a factor that

can be taken into account. Here again the right to claim the allowance even where there are other means seems to have been accepted. In Achutan

Nair and Another Vs. Kunjunni Nair and Another, it was distinctly stated that the right to an allowance should be based on the right of co-

ownership of property. Maradevi v. Pammakka ILR (1913) Mad. 208 accepts this principle as well founded. In Naku Amma v. Raghava Menon

ILR (1915) Mad. 79 it was held that a member of a tavazhi was entitled to sue the tavazhi for an allowance even though he was being maintained

by the main tarwad. This is another illustration of the principle of co-ownership. This latter decision was affirmed by the Fall Bench in Chakkra

Kannan v. Kunhi Pokker ILR (1916) Mad. 317. Thus it is clear that the right of a member of a tarwad for an allowance is an incident of co-

proprietorship in the property of the tarwad and that consequently that right cannot be denied unless circumstances show that the tarwad is not in a

position to give a separate allowance.

In this appeal the question whether the plaintiffs were justified in living away from the tarwad house, whether there are circumstances which

would justify the allotment of an allowance when they do not choose to live with the other members and whether the claim for arrears is sustainable

have not been gone into. Those questions will have to be dealt with by the lower Appellate Court.

Mr. Anantakrishna Ayyar mainly relied upon Sections 17 and 18 of Act IV of 1896. The learned vakil argued that the term ''maintenance''

suggested that it is subsistence allowance and that if that subsistence is given by another who is bound by law to provide it, the tarwad is absolved

from liability. This argument ignores the weight of the consideration we have set out, namely, that the claim by a tarwad member is of the character

of proprietary right to a share in the income. It is true, as pointed out by the learned vakil, that Clause (2) of Section 17 only leaves unaffected the

customary right, if any, against the tarwad but the right secured by Clause (1) is a personal right, a right given by the statute against persons who

comply with certain formalities. Such a right cannot take away the right of property.

Section 18 was relied on as showing that the father or the husband is alone entitled to maintain the children or the wife. That section introduces

an exception to the general rule that the natural guardian of an anandravan is the karnavan. The legislature has recognized that the welfare of the

minor wife or the minor children would be safer in the hands of those who are more nearly connected by blood than the karnavan. It has at the

same time imposed a limitation upon the husband or the father by enacting it as a condition precedent to guardianship that they should manifest their

interest in the welfare of the minor by making some sacrifice. This section only provides for guardianship of person and leaves guardianship of

property untouched.

We do not think these provisions were intended to deprive a member of a tarwad of his or her rights in the tarwad.

For these reasons we must reverse the decree of the lower Appellate Court and remand the appeal for disposal on the merits.

Costs will abide the result.