Amolak Chand vs Mansukh Rai Mangan Lal

Ross, J.—This is an appeal against a decision of the District Judge of Bhagalpur, holding that certain properties vested in the Receiver in Insolvency.

The facts of the case are that one Lachmi Chand, who acquired considerable properties, movable and immovable, died leaving a son Jiban Ram who had four sons, two of whom are minors and two of whom had two sons who are minors. The appellants are these four minors. Jiban Ram and his two major sons embarked on business which proved unsuccessful and heavy debts having been incurred they were adjudged insolvent at the instance of the creditors and a Receiver was appointed. As the Receiver is selling the joint family property this objection has been raised by the minors that this is not property within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the Insolvency Act.

This contention was overruled by the learned District Judge. It is contended in appeal that as the property is admittedly the ancestral property of a joint Mitakshara family it cannot, be proceeded against at all or, if at all, only to the extent of the share of the major members of the family.

Two decisions of this Court have been cited in support of this contention Sahai Narayan Sahi v. Wajid Hussain (1919) 49 I.C. 848 and Sant Prasad Singh Vs. Sheodut Singh, . The principle was discussed in the latter decision. That decision, however, proceeded expressly on the authority of Sahu Ram Chandra''s case AIR 1917 P.C. 61. That case has been recently considered by the Judicial Committee and certain propositions laid down therein have been overruled.

Therefore the decision in Sant Prasad Singh Vs. Sheodut Singh, , cannot now be considered to be an authority on this subject. On the other hand there are the decisions in Fakirchand Motichand v. Motichand Hurrukahand (1883) 7 Bom. 438, Nunna Brahmayya Setti v. Chidaraboyina Venkitaswami (1903) 26 Mad. 214 and Bawan Das and Another Vs. O.M. Chiene, to mention only three of the decisions which have been referred to by the respondents; and, in my opinion, it is too late now to contend that property over which a person has a disposing power which he may exercise for his own benefit does not include ancestral property which may be sold for, the satisfaction of antecedent debts.

I would, therefore, dismiss this appeal with costs.

Das, J.

I agree.