Amrik Singh vs State of Punjab

V.S. Aggarwal, J.

Subsection (3) of Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure unfolds in the following words :

"If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them".

While it specifically bars filing of a second revision petition, Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure refers to the inherent powers of the High Court and reads as under :

"Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice."

The short question that comes up for consideration is as to if when a second revision petition is not maintainable in the High Court, the inherent powers contemplated under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be utilized or not.

The said question comes up for consideration on the following facts :

A vehicle namely a truck had been seized and it is alleged that 176 bags of poppy husk, each weighing 39 Kilogram of Poppy husk were recovered. The occupants were arrested for an offence punishable under Section 15 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. An application was filed by the petitioner seeking release of the said truck on superdari. The learned Judicial Magistrate, Barnala on 13.3.1995 dismissed the application primarily on the ground that huge quantity of contraband of poppy husk had been recovered. The petitioner filed a revision which came up for consideration before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Barnala. The revision, as such was dismissed on 18.4.1995. Hence, the present petition.

The learned counsel appearing for the State took up the plea that the present petition invoking the inherent powers of the High Court must fail because the petitioner has already availed the remedy under the Code of Criminal Procedure by filing a revision in the Court of Sessions and in such circumstances the inherent powers of the Court need not be invoked or exercised. It hardly needs to be mentioned that the learned counsel for the petitioner on the contrary urged that there is no restriction or embargo on the powers of the High Court to act in the interest of justice and to avoid the abuse of the process of the Court. It has further been argued that in any case the orders passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate and the learned Additional Sessions Judge are devoid of any merit.

In this connection the attention of the Court was drawn to certain precedents at the bar. Reference to some of them would be in the fitness of things. In the case of B.S. Rawat v. Shaikh Abdul Karim and another, 1989 Crl.L.J. 1988, amongst others one of the questions for consideration before the Bombay High Court was as to whether the order passed by the Magistrate for interim custody of the vehicle could be interfered with by the High Court while exercising its powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In paragraph 14 the Single Judge of the Bombay High Court concluded as under :

"As far as the present order is concerned, I am more than convinced that the learned Magistrate has decided the matter in an arbitrary manner inasmuch as the order does not disclose the arguments advanced on either side and there is no discussion about the documents produced before the learned Magistrate. Under Section 457(1) Criminal P.C. the learned Magistrate has a discretion to pass an order ranting interim custody or to decline. But in either case, the discretion has to be exercised judicially, and not in a cavalier fashion. It is in this sense, the order deserves to be set aside. It is true that the present petition has been styled as Criminal revision application. But I do not find that the petitioner has sought to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the Court under Section 482 Criminal P.C. In such circumstances the title of the petition becomes immaterial."

It is patent and obvious from the perusal of the cited judgment that the question that arises for consideration in the present petition was not before the Single Judge of the Bombay High Court. Therein no revision petition had been filed against the order of learned Judicial Magistrate in the Court of Sessions. Otherwise also, the Bombay High Court concluded that the order was totally arbitrary and it was in that background that inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were pressed into service. The cited decision is totally distinguishable.

The scope of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure visavis Section 397 of the said Code was considered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Charanjit Singh v. Smt. Gursharan Kaur, 1990(2) Recent Criminal Reports 584 : 1990 Crl. L.J. 1264 . The conclusions arrived at were that Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is not a bar to the exercise of powers by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But a line of caution had been drawn that such powers should be used very sparingly and cases would be few and far between. The legal position thus concluded was in the following words :

"The legal position that thus emerges is that the provisions of Section 397 of the Code do not constitute or operate as a bar to the exercise by the High Court of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. The limitation here, as observed in Raj Kapoor''s case (supra) is selfrestraint and no more. It must, of course, be observed that where an order is amenable to revision, the order of the revisional court should be interfered with very sparingly and that too only for the purposes as envisaged by Section 482 of the Code. Such cases would clearly be few and far between."

Two decisions of the Supreme Court also throw light on this controversy. In the case of Dharampal and others v. Smt. Ramshri and others, 1993(1) Judgments Today 61 : 1993(1) Recent Criminal Reports 696 , the Supreme Court considered a similar fact in line with the facts of the present case. While allowing the appeal where the High Court had exercised the inherent powers after the revision petition had been filed and an order passed, it was concluded.

"The Sessions Judge had dismissed the said application on 14th May, 1979. Section 397(3) bars a second revision application by the same party, It is now well settled that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilised for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code. Hence the High Court had clearly erred in entertaining the second revision at the instance of 1st respondent. On this short ground itself, the impugned order of the High Court can be set aside."

The latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court is in the case of Ganesh Narayan Hegde v. Shri S. Bangarappa and others, 1995(2) Recent Criminal Reports 373(SC) : JT 1995(4) SC 124 . In the cited case a complaint was filed by Ganesh Narayan Hegde against the respondents under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code. After receiving the evidence, the learned Magistrate framed the charge against the respondents under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code. S. Bangarappa filed the revision petition before the First Additional Sessions Judge, Hubli against the order of Judicial Magistrate. The revision petition was dismissed. The petition was filed in the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the same was allowed. The question that came up for consideration before the Supreme Court was identical, as to if the High Court was justified in exercising its inherent powers and setting aside the orders of the Judicial Magistrate and that of the Additional Sessions Judge, dismissing the revision petition. The conclusions after taking note of the judicial precedents were drawn in the following words :

"In our opinion, while acting under Section 482 and that too after the learned Sessions Judge had declined to interfere in the matter, the High Court ought not to have entered the arena of a appreciation of evidence nor should it have recorded a finding that the complaint was the result of political differences or that it was more a matter of prestige than a genuine proceeding. The lastmentioned conclusion is drawn from the averments in the complaint, from the fact that the complainant is pursuing the complaint and from the ipse dixit of the accused; we are unable to appreciate this reasoning."

Having pondered these facts with some precedents, it becomes necessary to draw the ratio of the decisions. It is obvious that even if in the first blush there appears to be inconsistency but in fact the law is consistent and all these precedents refer to the facts as in the case of Charanjit Singh (supra), and such powers in an appropriate case under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be exercised. It would be in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary; then notwithstanding anything contained in Section 397(3) Cr.P.C. can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between. High Court must exercise the power sparingly. It could do so if proceedings are initiated illegally, vexatiously or without jurisdiction. In other words the Court would be slow to act. Merely because if the High Court feels that it would have arrived at different conclusions, that would not permit the High Court to interfere unless it becomes necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice.

Reverting back to the facts of the present case, it is clear that the vehicle in question was not given on superdari to the petitioner. His revision petition failed in the Court of Sessions. These are the conclusions arrived at by the learned courts below. Merely because it is urged or felt that the order could have been passed otherwise, is no ground to exercise the inherent powers. If that was so, it would almost tantamount to putting an end to the intent of Subsection (3) of Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by again interfering in the impugned orders, as if a second revision petition was maintainable. This is not a fit case for exercising the inherent powers.

For these revisions, the petition fails and is dismissed.