Amritpal Singh and Others vs Pushpa Malhotra

Sabina, J.—Petitioners have filed this petition u/s 482 for quashing of complaint No. 276/1/25.4.2009 (Annexure P-1) and all the consequential proceedings arising therefrom including the summoning order dated 11.7.2011 (Annexure P-2). Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner No. 1 Amritpal Singh got married to Mamta on 17.9.2004. Thereafter, Mamta left for England on 23.7.2005. No child was born to the parties out of the said wedlock. Thereafter, petitioner No. 1 filed a petition u/s 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (''Act'' for short) seeking a decree of divorce. The said petition was allowed vide judgment/decree dated 27.2.2008. The decree of divorce granted by the Trial Court was upheld by this Court in FAO No. M-111 of 2009 vide Annexure P-4. The complaint in question had been filed by the mother of Mamta levelling false allegations. Mamta is residing in England.

Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, has opposed the petition and has submitted that criminal proceedings against the petitioners were liable to continue.

In the case of State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, , the Apex Court has held as under:-

The following categories of cases can be stated by way of illustration wherein the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers u/s 482, Cr.P.C. Can be exercised by the High Court either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised:-

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complainant/respondent No. 2, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers u/s 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do no disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a Police Officer without an order of Magistrate as contemplated u/s 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of aggrieved party.

Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceedings is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.

Admittedly, in the present case, petitioner No. 1 got married to Mamta on 17.9.2004. Mamta applied for job in United Kingdom and got a visa in this regard. Mamta left for England on 23.7.2005. Petitioner No. 1 filed a petition u/s 13 of the Act seeking a decree of divorce. In the said petition, Mamta appeared before the Court and her examination-in-chief and part cross-examination was recorded. However, Mamta did not appear again for her further cross-examination. The Trial Court allowed the petition filed by petitioner No. 1 and a decree of divorce was passed in favour of petitioner No. 1 on 27.2.2009. The said judgment and decree were challenged by Mamta by way of FAO No. 111 of 2009. The said appeal was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 3.2.2011 Annexure P-4.

A perusal of the order dated 3.2.2011 Annexure P-4 reveals that it was admitted fact that Mamta had gone to England on 23.7.2005 and had returned back to India only once i.e. in March 2008. Thereafter, there was no communication between the husband and wife. The allegations levelled by the wife that there was demand of dowry could not be established. In her part cross-examination, Mamta had admitted that she had withdrawn Rs. 1,50,000/- on 19.2.2005 from the joint account and had invested the same in a fixed deposit in her own name. A perusal of the said order further reveals that in her passport, Mamta had left the column of her surname blank and she had also left the column of name of the spouse as blank. Thus, while going abroad, Mamta had not disclosed the factum of her marriage. A perusal of the order further reveals that in the divorce proceedings, petitioner No. 1 had proved on record inquiry report of the Deputy Superintendent of Police and as per the said inquiry report, both the parties had settled their dispute. The said settlement was signed by the mother and brother of Mamta. However, later on respondent had approached the Women Cell making a complaint regarding harassment meted out by petitioners to her daughter. The police after inquiry had reported that the allegations of demand of dowry and harassment were not made out. Hence, the appeal filed by Mamta was dismissed.

Thus, it is evident that in the divorce proceedings, the allegations of demand of dowry/harassment were not proved by the wife. The complaint in question was filed in April 2009 after the divorce petition filed by petitioner No. 1 was allowed. Presently also, Mamta is residing abroad. In these circumstances, continuation of criminal proceedings initiated by the mother of Mamta against the petitioners are nothing but an abuse of process of law. Accordingly, this petition is allowed. Complaint No. 276/1/25.4.2009 (Annexure P-1) and all the consequential proceedings, arising therefrom, including the summoning order dated 11.7.2011 (Annexure P-2), are quashed.