High CourtsSingle Bench

Amulya Singh vs Marwari Relief Society

Jharkhand High Court · Decided on 22 January 2026 · Citation: (2026) 01 JH CK 1686

HON’BLE JUDGES
Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Second Appeal No.16 Of 2026
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Judgment

36 paragraphs · 2,986 words

Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J

1.

This appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 23.12.2024 (decree signed on 02.01.2025) passed in Civil Appeal No. 143 of 2020 passed by learned Additional Judicial Commissioner-II,  Ranchi,  whereby  the  learned  1st appellate  court  has upheld the judgment dated 13.03.2020 (decree sealed and singed on 21.03.2020) passed in Eviction Title Suit No. 05 of 1991 now Original Suit No. 2343 of 2019 passed by learned Civil Judge, Junior Division- I, Ranchi whereby the Title Suit seeking eviction was allowed with charges  of  Rs.  22,464  as  well  as  present,  future  pendentelite  charges on account of maintenance charges or electricity charges.

2.

The arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant on framing the substantial question of law for admission of this appeal has recorded in order dated 15.01.2026.

3.

The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that though there are concurrent findings recorded by both the courts, still the appeal is fit to be admitted for final hearing on the proposed substantial question  of  law  mentioned  in paragraph  (c)  and  (d) which is quoted as under:-

(C)  Whether  the  Judgment  of  the  Trial  Court  as  also the First Appellate Court are perverse, having failed to appreciate that the said power of attorney has not been exhibited/proved and hence the suit of the Plaintiff being a juristic person was not maintainable for want of valid authority and lawful representation, thereby both  the learned Trial Court and the 1st Appellate Court have committed gross jurisdictional error in view of Order XXIX CPC.

(d) Whether the Judgement of the learned Trial Court and the 1st appellate court are perverse for having given the finding of default in payment of charges in favour of plaintiff without any evidence, thereby being perverse, going to the root of the basis of relief in the Suit?

4.

The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the suit was  filed  through  the  alleged  power  of  attorney  holder  Ram  Nandan Prasad but the power of attorney was never exhibited before the court and therefore the suit filed at the instance of Ram Nandan Prasad  was itself not maintainable. The learned counsel submits that both the courts  have  not  taken  into  consideration  this  aspect  of  the  matter.  He has  relied  upon  the  judgment passed  by  the  Hon’ble Supreme  Court reported  in (2009)  10  SCC  601  (Rishab  Chand  Bhandari  (dead)  by LRS. And Another versus National Engineering Industry Limited paragraph 8 and 9 which is quoted as under:-

“8. If we interpret the definition of “landlord” in the Act literally it will result in strange consequences. It will mean that even if the owner, who is the natural landlord, does not want to evict a tenant, his  agent  may  do  so. Surely  this  is  an  absurd  situation.  It  is  well settled that if a literal interpretation leads to absurd consequences, it should be avoided and a purposive interpretation be given.

9.

In the present case the respondent has not been able to show that it was authorised in writing to act on behalf of the Trust either by a power  of  attorney  or  any  other  written  document.  Unless  there  is some documentary proof that the Trust had authorised its agent to file a suit for eviction on its behalf, it cannot be said that the respondent had any right to file such a suit, even though it had actually let out the premises to the appellant and collected rent. The respondent is admittedly not the owner of the premises, and only claims to be the agent of the Trust.”

5.

He has also relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2011) 11 SCC 524 (State Bank of Travancore versus Kingston Computers India Private Limited) paragraph 14 which is quoted as under: -

“14. In our view, the judgment under challenge is liable to be set aside because the respondent had not produced any evidence to prove that Shri Ashok K. Shukla was appointed as a Director of the Company and a resolution was passed by the Board of Directors of the Company to file a suit against the appellant and authorised Shri Ashok K. Shukla to do so. The letter of authority issued by Shri Raj K. Shukla, who described himself as the Chief Executive Officer of the Company, was nothing but a scrap of paper because no resolution was passed by the Board of Directors delegating its powers  to  Shri  Raj  K.  Shukla  to  authorise  another  person  to  file  a suit on behalf of the Company.”

6.

The learned counsel has further submitted that decree has also been passed with respect to the payment of Rs. 22,464 against the alleged dues. He has further submitted that the learned courts have failed to take into consideration the exhibits B series and also D series while quantifying the dues. He submits that these exhibits show payment to the electricity department and to Ranchi Municipal Corporation.

7.

After going through the records of this case, this court find that the Eviction Title Suit no. 5 of 1991 was filed by the plaintiff namely Marwari Relief Society, a company registered under Indian Companies  Act  through  Sri  Ram  Nandan  Prasad (Assistant  Manager of the company). A prayer was also made for decree of Rs. 22,464/- as arrears  of  maintenance  charges  as  well  as  mesne  profit  @ Rs,  3000/- per month from the  date of  institution of  the  suit  till eviction of the defendant. However, the verification of the plaint was verified by Ram Nandan Prasad, in the capacity of constituted agent and attorney of the plaintiff.

8.

During the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff sought to introduce additional document by which power of attorney dated 11.01.1990 executed by the General Secretary of the plaintiff was taken  on  record  vide  order  dated  21.11.2011. Some  more  documents were also taken by way of additional evidence by order dated 08.09.2010. These two orders i.e. order dated 08.09.2010 and order dated  21.11.2011 by  which  power  of attorney  dated  11.01.1990  was taken on record, were challenged by the defendant in the writ petition being  W.P.  (C)  No.  430  of 2012.  The  writ  petition  was  allowed  and the order of the writ court was challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 3048 of 2019 by the plaintiff.

9.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court while setting aside the order of the learned writ Court held that the plaint was filed by the power of attorney holder who is  a ‘duly constituted agent’ and the order of the writ court was set-aside. The ultimate finding of the Hon’ble Supreme Court which is in paragraph 9 of the judgement which quoted as under: -

“Considering  the  averments  made  in  the  plaint,  in  our  view the learned Single Judge was not right in observing that there are no averments made in the plaint in respect of the documents sought to be produced through the said applications. As pointed out earlier, there is clear reference to the documents viz. agreement dated 4-8-1982 and the notice issued by the appellant-plaintiff on 19-8-1987 to the respondent for payment of arrears and calling upon him for vacating the quarters. Though the cause-title of the plaint does not state that the appellant, Marwari Relief Society is represented through Ramnandan Prasad, however, the verification of the plaint clear states that Ramnandan Prasad is a “constituted agent and attorney of the plaintiff” which in our considered view  is  sufficient  to hold  that the plaint has been filed by the power-of-attorney holder who is a duly“constituted agent”. The learned Single Judge fell in error in not keeping in view the averments made in the plaint and due verification of the plaint.” (emphasis supplied)

10.

This court is of the considered view that once the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that in their considered view that the plaint has been filed by the power-of-attorney holder who is a duly“constituted agent”, there is no scope for the appellant to argue that in the absence of power of attorney being exhibited, though taken on record by a judicial order , the suit at the instance of Ram Nandan Prasad, the constituted agent and power of attorney of the plaintiff, was not maintainable.

11.

This court finds that both the learned courts have considered the aforesaid aspect of the matter and the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme  Court  in  Civil  Appeal  No.  3048  of  2018  arising  out  of  SLP (C) No. 28208 of 2018 order dated 14.03.2019 to hold that point of the defendant with respect to power of attorney has already been decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Accordingly, the power of attorney having been taken on record,  though not formally exhibited, it cannot be said that suit was not maintainable at the instance of Ram Nandan Prasad. In view of the concurrent findings by both the courts with respect to power of attorney in the light of the judgement in Civil Appeal  No.  3048  of  2018  arising  out  of  SLP  (C)  No.  28208  of  2018 order dated 14.03.2019, arising out of the present suit, the 1st substantial  question  of  law  as  suggested and  quoted  above, does  not arise for consideration in this case.

12.

With  respect  to  the  proposed  2nd substantial  question  of  law  as quoted above, the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the learned courts have failed to take into consideration Exhibit-B series and Exhibit-D series while quantifying the dues.

13.

So far as the proposed 2nd substantial question of law is concerned, it would be relevant to refer to paragraph 34 of the trial court’s judgement wherein the learned court observed that the defendant is defaulter in making payment of maintenance charges. Paragraph 34 of the Trial Court judgment is quoted as under:-

“ 34. ISSUE NO. 1, 2,3 & 10: While deciding the main issues, this court has already held that the defendant was  inducted  on  the  premises  in  suit  as  per  leave  and license dated 04.08.1982 only for two months on payment of maintenance charges of Rs. 500/- and electric charges of Rs. 100/- and other establishment charges and the defendant after expiry of the said specific period i.e. from 04.08.1982 neither pay the maintenance charges nor vacated the premises and accordingly, the plaintiff issued legal notice dated 19.08.1987 by registered post with A/D. Despite the notice when the defendant neither paid maintenance charges  nor  vacated  the  premises  in  the  suit,  then  the plaintiff has no option but to file the present suit. This court also finds that the defendant violated the terms of leave and license and not paid the maintenance charges to the plaintiff since 01.05.1984  and as such he is liable to pay the arrears of maintenance charges and also liable to vacate the premises in suit. Accordingly, I find that the suit is well maintainable in its present form. The plaintiff got valid cause of action for the present suit and the suit is not barred by the principles of Waiver, Estoppel, Acquiescence and limitation. Further plaintiff is entitled to a decree of eviction as claimed.”

14.

The learned trial court has considered the evidence of the defendant examined as D.W-4 in paragraph 20 and recorded that -

a. In the main examination, this witness has admitted the fact that on 04.08.1981, he had acquired cottage no. 22 on monthly maintenance charge of Rs. 250/-.

b. In cross-examination, he deposed that he is paying Rs. 300/- as maintenance  charge  to  the  plaintiff  on  the  basis  of  which  he  is residing therein.

c. He deposed that he took electric and water connection on his own desire in the premises being cottage no.22. This witness has further admitted the fact that he has not taken any permission from the plaintiff society for taking water and electric connection on the premises.

15.

Thus, the defendant himself admitted that he was staying in the premises upon payment of maintenance charges on monthly basis and had  taken  water  and  electricity  connection  directly  from  the  supplier, without any permission of the plaintiff. The learned court has recorded a  finding  that  the  defendant  was  liable  to  pay  electric  charges  of  Rs. 100/- and other establishment charges to the plaintiff which did not pay to the plaintiff.

16.

This court finds that non -payment of electric charges of Rs. 100/- and other establishment charges by the defendant to the plaintiff stood admitted by the defendant in his deposition. Further the defendant has exhibited certain electricity bills raised upon him and paid to the supplier of electricity with respect to the electricity connection taken by him and is not relatable to payment to the plaintiff.  The  exhibits  are  exhibit  B  series.  So  far  as  exhibit-B  series are  concerned,  they  are  the  electricity  bills  and  it  was  the  case  of  the defendant that he had taken the electricity connection and water connection  in  his  own  name.  Therefore,  it  was  an  admitted  fact  from the  side  of  the  defendant  that  electric  charges  of  Rs.  100/-  and  other establishment charges  were not paid by the  defendant to  the plaintiff. This aspect of the matter has been duly considered by the learned court while holding that the plaintiff was a defaulter.

17.

So far as the payment of fixed maintenance charges are concerned,  the learned trial court has discussed exhibit A  series and held  that  from  these  receipts,  the  defendants  wanted  to  prove  that  he was regular for payment of the maintenance charges but on perusal of these receipts, the court held that all these receipts were not issued by Ram Nandan Prasad, some receipts have been issued by Prashidh Narayan  Pandey  and  some  receipts  have  been  issued  by  the  stranger persons and held that the defendant failed to establish the facts that he was regular for payment of the maintenance charges during the period he claimed. Paragraph 21 is quoted as under

21.

In addition to the oral evidence, the defendant has also filed and proved exhibits. Ext. A is the receipt issued by Marwari Arogya Bhawan in favour of the defendant Amulya Kumar Singh in which the defendant had paid maintenance charge for the period of 01.02.1984 to 30.04.1984 of Rs. 975/-. Likewise, Ext. A/I is the same receipt dated 31.03.1984 by which the defendant paid maintenance charge from the period of 01. 09.1984 to 31.01.1984. Ext. A/2 is the receipt dated 06.09.1990 by which the defendant paid maintenance  charges of Rs. 300/-. In the said receipt, the word without prejudice has been mentioned. Ext. A/3 to A/12 are the receipt by which the defendant paid maintenance charge for the period of 20.10.1982 to 19.11.1982, 20.11.1982 to 03.12.1983 and likewise till 06.09.1990. From these receipts, the defendants sought to brought fact and wanted to prove that he was regular for payment of the maintenance charges but on perusal of these receipts, 1 find  that all these receipts are not issued by Ram Nandan Prasad, some receipts have been issued by Prashidh Narayan Pandey and some receipts have been issued by the stranger persons. As such on my anxious consideration, the defendant failed to establish the facts that he was regular for payment of the maintenance charges during the period he claimed.

18.

So far as exhibit D to D/3 are concerned, they were issued much after institution of the suit and they are the municipal receipts by the Municipal Corporation on 24.04.1998 and 16.06.1996 and the learned  Trial  Court  in  paragraph  24  of  the  judgement  held  that  these receipts are no relevance in the present lis.

19.

In view of the aforesaid discussions, this court finds that exhibit B series are primarily the payment of electricity bills which the defendant had taken directly from the electricity board in his individual capacity without the consent of the plaintiff, and has nothing to do with the fixed electric charges of Rs. 100/- and other establishment charges payable to the plaintiff by the defendant. Further Exhibit D series were issued much after institution of the suit and they are the municipal receipts issued by the Municipal Corporation on 24.04.1998 and 16.06.1996 and it has been rightly held that these receipts are no relevance in the present lis.

20.

This court finds it was the specific case of the plaintiff that the defendant was liable to pay maintenance charges @ Rs. 500 per month and further electric charges of Rs. 100/- and other establishment charges  and  the  defendant  had  not  paid  the  charges  since  01.05.1984 and  therefore  a  sum  of  Rs.  54,288/-  was  due.  Since  the  dues  till  the period  of  August,  1988  was  time  barred,  therefore  the  suit  was  filed for only Rs. 22,464/- in connection with the dues. This fact is apparent from  paragraph  3  of  the  trial  court’s  judgment.  This  court  also  finds that  the  learned  Trial  Court  after  considering  the  materials  on  record held that the defendant was a defaulter since 01.05.1984  and directed payment of only 22,464/-.

21.

The learned 1st appellate court also held that the defendant was a defaulter after 01.04.1984. The learned 1st appellate court has discussed  all the materials on record and come to concurrent findings on facts.

22.

This court finds that oral and documentary evidences have been taken into consideration to come to a finding of default since 01.05.1984. This court finds no perversity in the matter of appreciation of evidences placed on record. In the light of the arguments made, no question of law, much less any substantial question of law including the two proposed questions as suggested by the  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  during  the  course  of  arguments and also recorded in the order dated 15.01.2026 arises for consideration  in  this  case.  This  court  has  gone  through  the  impugned judgements of concurrent findings and is of the view that no substantial question of law arises for consideration.

23.

Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.

24.

Let this order be communicated to the court concerned through FAX.