AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
No AI summary yet
Generate an eight-section analysis of this judgment — facts, issues, reasoning, ratio and a plain-language gist.
Judgment
42 paragraphs · 916 wordsThe only substantial objection raised in this second appeal by the appellant is that the Subordinate Judge who heard the appeal in the Court
below had no jurisdiction.
The case was originally tried in the District Munsif''s Court of Tinnevelly and the appeal was entered and came on for hearing before the District
Judge and certain, documents were put in at the appeal. The District Judge thereupon remanded the suit u/s 56(5, Civil Procedure Code, to the
District Munsif for findings upon fresh issues and ordered that fresh evidence might be taken and the findings returned. When the findings had been
returned the District Judge transferred the appeal to the Subordinate Judge who, after hearing the parties, reversed the decree of the District
Munsif and dismissed the plaintiffs suit.
It is contended that the District Judge had no power to transfer an appeal which had been part heard by the District Judge to the Subordinate
judge u/s 13 of the Civil Courts Act (Act III of 1873) and that it is only when an appeal has been properly transferred u/s 13 of Act III of 1873
that a Subordinate Judge has any jurisdiction.
The only inherent jurisdiction that a Subordinate Judge has is in original suits u/s 12 of the Civil Courts Act (Act III '' of 1873), and he acquires
jurisdiction under the last clause of Section 13 of that Act which enables a District Judge to transfer appeals to him, and unless that section is legally
complied with he has no jurisdiction to hear or determine any appeal. The question, therefore is whether when a case has been commenced and
part heard by the District Judge he can legally transfer the further hearing of it to a Subordinate Judge.
It has been held u/s 6 of Act VIII of 1859, which is an analogous enactment, that a part-heard case pending before a District Judge cannot be
transferred--see Moulvie Abdool Hye v. J. Macrae (11874) 23 W.R. 1 and Dumree Sahoo v. Jugdharee (1870) 13 W.R. 398
In Second Appeal No. 863 of 1898 Kotaiyya v. Lakshmaiyya 9 M.L.J.R. 297 it was held by this Court that u/s 13 of the Civil Courts Act a
District Judge, who had himself partheard an appeal, could not thereafter transfer the appeal to the Subordinate Judge and the judgment of the
Subardinate Judge was set aside.
On behalf of the respondents it was argued that, at the most, the transfer of the appeal after it had been part-heard by the District Judge was a
mere irregularity and did not affect the jurisdiction of the Subordinate judge and I.L. R., 7 A., 342were cited.
Bandhu Naik v. Lakhi Kuar (1885) L.R., 7 A. was a case u/s 25, Civil Procedure Code, which is a somewhat analogous section. There the
case had been part-heard by the Subordinate Judge and was then transferred by the District, Judge to his own file. The Court held that, though he
had power to transfer and try it, inasmuch as he had not taken the evidence he had not tried the case, and set aside his decree. This case,
therefore, does not assist the respondents'' contention, for it only decides at the most that a District Judge has power to transfer and'' try, u/s 25.,
Civil Procedure Code, a case which was pending in a Court subordinate to itself even though it might have been part-heard. But it also decided
that it could not act upon what had been already done in the Subordinate Court.
Sankumani v. Ikoran I.L.R(1889) . . M. 211 was also a case u/s 25 of the Civil Procedure Code. This case had been transferred without notice
having been given, as the section directed, to the defendants. The defendants did not? however, object to the want of notice but appeared and
submitted to the jurisdiction and even appealed without taking any objection to the jurisdiction. The Court held that as the Court had inherent
jurisdiction and as notice was intended for the benefit of the parties, they could waive it and so cure any defect in the order conferring jurisdiction.
They acted on the principles laid down by the Privy'' Council in Led-gard v. Bull I.L.R(1886) . 9 A., 191 and in Minakshi Naidu v. Subramania
Sastri I.L.R.(1887) 11 M., 26 that where a Court has no inherent jurisdiction waiver will not confer jurisdiction, but in cases where the Court has
inherent jurisdiction but there has been some irregularity in the initial proceedings upon which it exercised jurisdiction, the defect is one which can
be cured by waiver.
It has already been pointed out that in appeals a Subordinate Judge has no inherent jurisdiction, so that any waiver by the parties would not
confer jurisdiction upon him if the transfer was not legal.
We are of opinion that Section 13 of the Civil Courts Act does not authorise a District Judge to transfer to a Subordinate Judge an appeal
which is partheard and pending before the District Judge and it would be contrary to public policy to put such an interpretation upon the section
and that the fact that the appellants did not object to the jurisdiction does not confer Jurisdiction upon the Subordinate Judge.
We must, therefore, allow the appeal and reverse the decree of the Subordinate Judge and remand the case to the District Judge for hearing
and disposal according to law. Costs will abide the event.
