Anakapally Rural Electric Cooperative Society Limited vs OKS Reddy and Others

L.N. Reddy, J.—This application is filed by the appellant/petitioner in W.A. No. 146 of 2010 with a prayer to review the judgment, dated 21.10.2013, rendered by the Division Bench.

Briefly stated the facts are as under:

The 1st respondent (for short ''the respondent'') joined the service of the petitioner as Lower Division Clerk, in the year 1974. He earned several promotions. By 1999, he was working as Administrative Officer. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him on certain allegations, and he was also placed under suspension. Six charges were framed, and the explanation submitted by the respondent was found not satisfactory. Departmental enquiry was conducted and the Enquiry Officer submitted a report dated 09.11.2001, holding that all the charges are proved. Taking the same into account, the petitioner herein issued a show cause notice, dated 09.07.2002, and after considering the explanation submitted by the respondent, an order, dated 22.11.2002 was passed, imposing the punishment of reversion to the post of Assistant Accounts Officer.

The order of reversion was challenged by the respondent by filing W.P. No. 7328 of 2003. One of the grounds urged by him was that he was not issued any notice in the departmental enquiry, and thereby, he was denied the opportunity to present his case. The writ petition was opposed by the petitioner. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition, through order 30.12.2009 and has set aside the order, dated 22.11.2002. W.A. No. 146 of 2010 filed by the petitioner herein was dismissed by the Division Bench through judgment, dated 21.10.2013.

Sri N. Jayasurya, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench have not taken into account, the purport of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad, Vs. Karunakar, etc. etc., , and the entire disciplinary proceedings were set aside by pointing out a technical defect without leaving anything to be done. He contends that assuming that the enquiry was conducted without giving opportunity to the respondent, the only relief that have been granted in the writ petition was to set aside the order of punishment and to remand the matter to the stage of departmental enquiry or to the disciplinary authority, for appropriate steps.

Sri J. Sudheer, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that the scope of review is very limited and none of the recognized grounds are available in this case. He contends that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Karunakaran''s case (supra) was cited before the Division Bench, and the writ appeal was dismissed only after taking the same into account. He submits that the mere fact that a second view is possible on the same set of facts, would not be a ground to review an order, which is otherwise based on merits.

The charges framed against the respondent have been extracted by the learned Single Judge, in the order passed in the writ petition. Irrespective of the truth or otherwise of it, the allegations touch on the integrity of the respondent. It may be true that the respondent was not given an opportunity in the departmental enquiry. The lapse committed in this regard would certainly constitute the basis to interfere with the order of punishment. At the same time, the disciplinary proceedings cannot be terminated in that manner. The only course open to the Court would have been to set aside the order of punishment and to remit the matter to the Enquiry Officer, for fresh enquiry. In certain cases, the direction need not be in so many words. After setting aside the punishment, granting liberty to the disciplinary authority to take necessary steps in accordance with law, would serve the purpose. That, however, was not done in this case.

In Karunakarn''s case (supra) the Hon''ble Supreme Court explained the concept of prejudice. It was held that it is only when an employee, who complains of any lapse in the departmental proceedings, proves prejudice caused to him, that the proceedings to that extent can be set at naught and even where the prejudice is proved, the same does not result in wiping away the entire disciplinary proceedings. The matter has to be resumed from the stage at which the lapse or detriment has occurred.

In the instant case, the petitioner did cite the judgment in Karunakarn''s case (supra), before the Division Bench. However, no discussion whatever was undertaken in relation to that. Strictly speaking, the order passed in the writ appeal deserves to be reviewed and the order passed in the writ petition deserves to be modified in such a way that the petitioner herein is given an opportunity to conduct enquiry afresh in accordance with law.

It is brought to our notice that the respondent has since retired from service. At that length of time, it is difficult to expect the evidence, to be in the same shape. Therefore, we are of the view that the imposition of punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect, in the place of reversion, would meet the ends of justice.

We accordingly review the order in the writ appeal, upholding the order passed in the writ petition, to the extent of setting aside the order of punishment, but adding a clause to the effect that instead of leaving it open to the petitioner herein to conduct disciplinary enquiry, afresh; the punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect, shall stand imposed.

The petitioner shall settle the amount payable to the respondent, duly taking the punishment, referred to above, and complete the process within a period of two months from today.

The Review W.P.M.P. is accordingly disposed of.