Anar Kali & Others vs Deputy Director of Consolidation & Others

D.P. Mohapatra, C.J.—Pursuant to the order passed on 3.4.1995 by a Division Bench (B.K. Royand R.R.K. Trivedi, JJ.) referring the case for decision by a Full Bench this case has been listed before us.

Initially the case was listed before a single Judge of this Court (B.K. Roy. J.). The question referred by the single Judge to the Division Bench was formulated as under:

�Whether it is open for the Consolidation authorities to review/recall their final orders exercising inherent powers even though the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 does not vest them any review jurisdiction?�

The Division Bench, on consideration of the question, was of the view that the point should be decided by a Full Bench, since there are some decisions of Division Benches of this Court taking the view that the consolidation authorities could review the final orders passed by them in exercise of inherent powers. The Division Bench seized of this case referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1964 SC 430 (Laxman Purshottam Pimputkar v. The State of Bombay and others). AIR 1960 SC 641 (Harbhajan Singh v. Karan Singh and others) and AIR 1965 SC 1457 (Patel Chunibhai Dajibhai v. Narayanrao Khanderao Janbekar) and also the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Lachmana alias Hubraja v. Deputy Director of Consolidation. U.P. Lucknow and others (1966 RD 419) and some other decisions and felt that the matter should be decided by a Full Bench as observed by the Apex Court in the case of Rakesh Kumar Verma v. State of M.P. (1995) 2 SCC 129; hence the order dated 3.4.1995.

The factual back drop of the case leading to the present proceeding, sans unnecessary details, may be stated thus. Respondents 3 to 7 filed, an application for mutation of their .names in respect of Chak No. 55 of village Semri, Taluka Purwa, Pergana Arail, district Allahabad on the ground that respondent no, 8, Khilari son of Gaya Din had executed sale deeds in their favour transferring his share in the chak. The writ petitioners raised objection to the said application on several grounds including the absence of permission from the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) (respondent no. 2) before execution of the sale deeds and that there was statutory bar against execution of the sale deeds. The Consolidation Officer, after considering the oral and documentary evidence on record, rejected the application for mutation filed by respondents 3 to 7. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, respondents 3 to 7 filed an appeal before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), who by his order dated 31.1.1978 allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Consolidation Officer. The petitioners filed a revision petition before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad (respondent no. 1), who by his order dated 12.11.1979 allowed the revision. Thereafter, the contesting respondents filed an application for review of the order. The petitioner filed objections against the review petition, inter alia, on the ground that the consolidation authorities have no power to review their order and, therefore the application for review is not maintainable. However, the Deputy Director of Consolidation (respondent no. 1) by his order dated 15.2.1980 overruled the objection against maintainability of the review petition, allowed the review petition and reversed his previous order. The said order is under challenge in the present writ petition. On the factual matrix of the case discussed above, the question quoted earlier arises for determination.

Concededly there is no specific provision in the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Consolidation Act) vesting power of review in the consolidation authorities, particularly the Deputy Director of Consolidation, with whose power we are concerned in the present proceeding. Therefore, a contention has been raised that the consolidation authorities while discharging quasi judicial functions as Courts or Tribunals have inherent power to review their orders.

At the outset it would be convenient to refer to some of the statutory provisions relevant for determination of the issue raised. Chapter II of the Consolidation Act contains provisions relating to revision and correction of maps and records. Section 9A makes provision regarding disposal of cases relating to claims to land and partition of joint holdings. In subsection (1) of the said Section the Assistant Consolidation Officer is vested with power to settle the disputes, correct the mistakes and effect partition as far as may be by conciliation between the parties appearing before him and pass orders on the basis of conciliation. In subsection (2) of the said Section it is laid down that all caseswhich are disposed of by the Assistant Consolidation Officer under subsection (1) and all cases relating to valuation of plots and ail cases relating to valuation of trees, wells or other improvement for calculating compensation therefor and its apportionments amongst coowners, if there be more owners than one, shall be forwarded by the Assistant Consolidation Officer to the Consolidation Officer, who shall dispose of the same in the manner prescribed. In subsection (3) of Section 9A it is laid down that the Assistant Consolidation Officer, while acting under subsection (1) and the Consolidation Officer, while acting under subsection (2), shall be deemed to be a court of competent jurisdiction, anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force notwithstanding.

Section 11, which makes provision for appeals by any party to the proceeding under section 9A, who is aggrieved by an order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer or the Consolidation Officer, and such an appeal is to be filed before the Settlement Officer, (Consolidation) within 21 days of the date of the order and the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) shall be final and not be questioned in any court of law. In subsection (2) of Section II it is laid down that the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), hearing an appeal under subsection (1), shall be deemed to be a court of competent jurisdiction, anything to the contrary contained in any law for the time being in force notwithstanding.

Chapter III of the Consolidation Act contains provisions relating to the preparation of the consolidation scheme. Section 21, which comes in the said Chapter, deals with the disposal of objections to the provisional consolidation scheme. Under the provisions therein, all objections received by the Assistant Consolidation Officer shall, as soon as may be, after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed therefor, be submitted by him to the Consolidation officer, who shall dispose of the same, as also the objections received by him, in the manner hereinafter provided, after notice to the parties concerned and the Consolidation Committee. Any person aggrieved by the order of the Consolidation Officer may, within 15 days of the date of the order, file an appeal before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) whose decision shall, except as otherwise provided by or under this Act, be final. Subsection (3) of said Section vests power in the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) to make local inspection of the plots in dispute after notice to the parties concerned and the Consolidation Committee. Subsection (4) of the Section vests power in the Consolidation Officer to revise the provisional consolidation scheme after giving opportunity of being heard to the tenureholders concerned, or to remand the same to the Assistant Consolidation Officer, with such direction as the Consolidation Officer may consider necessary; the Settlement Officer (Consolidation)is similarly vested with power to revise the provisional consolidation scheme after giving opportunity of being heard to the tenureholders concerned or to remand the same to the Assistant Consolidation Officer, or the Consolidation Officer, as he may think fit, with such direction as he may consider necessary.

Section 38, which comes in Chapter V (Miscellaneous), vests power to enforce attendance of witnesses in certain matters, Subsection (1) of the Section lays down that the Director of Consolidation and Deputy Director of Consolidation, Settlement Officer (Consolidation), Consolidation Officer and Assistant Consolidation Officer shall have all such powers and rights, and privileges as are vested in a Civil Court on the occasion of any action in respect of the following matters (a) the enforcing of the attendance of witnesses and examining them on oath, affirmation or otherwise and the issue of a commission or request to examine witness abroad; (b) compelling any one for the production of any document; and (c) the punishing of a person guilty of contempt. A summon signed by such officer may be substituted for and shall be equivalent to any formal process capable of being issued in any action by a Civil Court for enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of document.

Section 39 vests power in the aforementioned statutory authorities for ''production of document etc.'' In Section 40 of the Consolidation Act it is provided that a proceeding before a Director of Consolidation, Deputy Director of Consolidation, Settlement Officer (Consolidation), Consolidation Officer and Assistant Consolidation Officer shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 and for the purposes of Section 196 of the Indian Penal Code.

In Section 41 it is provided that unless otherwise expressly provided under the Act, the provisions of Chapters IX and X of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, shall apply to all proceedings including appeal and applications under the Act.

Section 42A, which vests powers of correction of clerical or arithmetical errors reads:

�Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, If the Consolidation Officer or the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, is satisfied that a clerical or arithmetical error apparent on the face of the record exists in any document prepared under any provision of this Act, he shall, either on his own motion or on the application of any person interested, correct the same.�

In Section 47 it is specifically provided that no appeal and no application for revision shall lie from any order passed under the provisions of this Act except as provided by or under this Act.

Section 48, which makes provision for revision and reference, provides, inter alia, that the Director of Consolidation may call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings ; or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order, other than interlocutory order, passed by such authority in the case or proceedings and may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, make such order in the case or proceedings as he thinks fit. In subsection (2) of the said Section it is laid down that powers under subsection (1) may be exercised by the Director of Consolidation also on a reference under subsection (3). Under subsection (3) any authority subordinate to the Director of Consolidation may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, refer the record of any case or proceedings to the Director of Consolidation for action under subsection (1). In Explanation (1) to the said subsection it is provided that for the purposes of this section, Settlement Officer, Consolidation, Consolidation Officers, Assistant Consolidation Officers, Consolidator and Consolidation Lekhpals shall be subordinate to the Director of Consolidation. Explanation (2) of the said Section is not relevant for the present purpose.

As noted earlier, Chapters IX and X of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, have been made applicable to the Consolidation Act under section 41 of the said Act. Chapter IX of the U.P. Land Revenue Act contains provisions relating to procedure of revenue courts and revenue officers. Section 201 in the said Chapter provides, inter alia, that no appeal shall lie from an order passed under Section 200 ex parte or by default; but in all such cases, if the party against whom judgment has been given appears either in person or by agent within the time specified in the Section and shows good cause for his nonappearance and satisfies the officer making the order that there has been a failure of justice, such officer may, upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as he thinks proper, revive the case and alter or rescind the order according to the justice of the case. In the proviso it is laid down that no such order shall be reversed or altered without previously summoning the party in whose favour judgment has been given to appear and be heard in support of it.

�Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if the Consolidation Officer or the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, is satisfied that a clerical or arithmetical error apparent on the face of the record exists in any document prepared under any provision of this Act, he shall, either on his own motion or on the application of any person interested, correct the same.�

In Section 47 it is specifically provided that no appeal and no application for revision shall lie from any order passed under the provisions of this Act except as provided by or under this Act.

Section 48, which makes provision for revision and reference, provides, inter alia, that the Director of Consolidation may call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings; or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order, other than interlocutory order, passed by such authority in the case or proceedings and may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, make such order in the case or proceedings as he thinks fit. In subsection (2) of the said Section it is laid down that powers under subsection (1) may be exercised by the Director of Consolidation also on a reference under subsection (3). Under subsection (3) any authority subordinate to the Director himself as to the legality or propriety of the order passed and as to the regularity of proceedings, and, if he is of opinion that the proceeding taken or order passed by such subordinate officer should be varied, cancelled or reversed, he shall refer the case with his opinion thereon for the orders of the Board and the Board shall thereupon pass such order as it thinks fit. Section 219 makes provision for revision of an order by the Board. It lays down, inter alia, that the Board may call for the record of any case decided by any subordinate court and if the subordinate court appears to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it in law; or to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or to have acted in the exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the Board may pass such order as it thinks fit.

Section 220 of the Land Revenue Act, on which strong reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for respondents, reads as follows :

�220. Power of Board to review and alter its order and decrees. (1) The Board may review, and may rescind, alter or confirm any order made by itself or by any of its members in the course of business connected with settlement.

(2) No decree or order passed judicially by it or by any of its members shall be so reviewed except on the application of a party to the case made within a period of ninety days from the passing of the decree or order, or made after such period if the applicant satisfies the Board that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period.

(3) Members not empowered to alter each other''s orders A single member vested with all or any of the powers of the Board shall not have power to alter or reverse a decree or order passed by the Board or by any member other than himself.�

It is relevant to notice here that the ''Board'' as defined in Section 4(1), means ''the Board of Revenue.''

The main contention raised by Sri H.R. Misra, learned counsel for the petitioners, is that the Deputy Director of Consolidation, while deciding a revision petition, exercises judicial or quasi judicial power and in the absence of any express power of review vested under the Consolidation Act he cannot reconsider the order passed by him and, therefore, the order dated 15.2.1980 is ultra vires. Sri Radhey Shyam, learned counsel for the contesting respondents, on the other hand, supported the impugned order contending that the Deputy Director of Consolidation, who is empowered to dispose of revision petitions under the Consolidation Act, is a court and, therefore, has inherent power to review his own order.

The position of law, which has to be accepted, as well settled is that a statutory authority like the Deputy Director of Consolidation while disposing of a revision petition exercises judicial or quasi judicial power. Such authority can exercise power of review only if such power is vested in him under the statute. If any authority is necessary in support of the point, we may notice a few decisions of the Apex Court. In Laxman Purshottam Pimoutkar v. The State of Bombay and others (AIR 1964 SC 436) the Apex Court ruled that when an authority exercise its revisional power under section 79 of the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act (III of 1874) it necessarily acts in a judicial or quasi judicial capacity; that such an order cannot be set aside or revised or modified just as an administrative order can be under Section 74; that finality attached to the Government Order under section 79 and in the absence of any express provision empowering it to review the order, the subsequent order made by the Government reviewing its earlier order under section 79 is ultra vires and beyond its jurisdiction.

In the case of Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar and another (AIR.1965 SC 1457) the Supreme Court held that the orders passed by the Collector under section 76A of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (67 of 1948) in the exercise of his revisional powers were quasi judicial, and were final; that the Act does not empower the collector to review an order passed by him under section 76A ; that in the absence of any power of review, theCollector could not subsequently reconsider his previous decisions and hold that there were grounds for annulling or reversing the Mahalkari''s order. A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh and others (Al R1966 SC 641) in which the Court, referring to several decisions of different High Courts, (AIR 1919 Mad 244, Anantharaju Shetty v. Appu Heqade) and of the Supreme Court, held that since there is no provision in the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act granting express power of review to the State Government with regard to an order made under section 42 of the Act hence the subsequent review order of the Director is ultra vires and without jurisdiction.

In the case of Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinqhji reported in AIR 1970 SC1273, the Apex Court categorically ruled that the power to review is not an inherent power; it must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. Construing the provisions of Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, 1951 (25 of 1951) the Court observed that no provision in the Act was brought to its notice from which it could be gathered that the Government had power to review its own order and if the Government had no power to review its own order, it is obvious that its delegate could not have reviewed its order. The Court further observed that the question whether the Government''s order is correct or valid in law does not arise for consideration in these proceedings so long as that order is not set aside or declared void by a competent authority. Hence the order cannot be ignored and the subordinate tribunals have to carry out that order.

In the case of Dr. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur and others (AIR 1987 SC 2186) the Court held:

�It is now well established that a quasi judicial authority cannot review its own order, unless the power of review isexpressly conferred on it by the statute under which it derives its jurisdiction. The Vice Chancellor in considering the question of approval of an order of dismissal of the Principal, acts as a quasi judicial authority. It is not disputed that the provisions of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 or of the Statutes of the University do not confer any power of review on the Vice Chancellor. In the circumstances, it must be held that the Vice Chancellor acted wholly without jurisdiction in reviewing the order dated January 24, 1986 by her order dated March 7, 1987. The said order of the Vice Chancellor dated March 7, 1987 was a nullity.�

Learned counsel for contesting respondents laid strong reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of S. Nagaraj and others v. State of Karnataka and another JT 1993 (5) SC 27) in which the Court was seized of a controversy relating to appointment of stipendiary graduates under the Karnataka Civil Services (Special Recruitment) Rules, 1982. The Court also considered the power of recall or review of the order of the Court. Construing the provisions of Articles 137 and 145 read with Order XL, Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules it was held by majority that the court is not precluded from recalling/reviewing its own order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for the sake of justice. This decision, in our considered view, is distinguishable from the case in hand. Herein, we are not concerned with power of review of court but a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial powers under the Statute. There is no provision pari material to Articles 137 and 145 or Order XL, Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules to enable the consolidation authorities to exercise power of review. We may further add that the subject matter of controversy in the case before the Supreme Court arose from an administrative proceeding and not judicial or quasi judicial proceedings. For these reasons we hold, with respect, that the principles laid down and the observation made by the Supreme Court in S. Naqaraj''s case do not provide any guideline for deciding the question that arises in the case in hand.

A single Judge of this Court in the case of Shafiq and others v. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, Ballia and others (1994 RD 59) relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Nagraja''s case in support of the view that the Deputy Director of Consolidation had limited power of review as of necessity and expediency. As we have said that Nagraj''s decision has no application to the present case, it follows as a natural consequence that the learned single judge was not right in applying the principles laid down in that case to a case arising from a consolidation proceeding. Therefore, the decision of this Court in Shafiq and others v. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, Ballia and others has to be overruled.

On the authoritative pronouncements made by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned decisions, the legal position which is manifest is that the Deputy Director of Consolidation while exercising the power of revision vested in him under the Consolidation Act exercises quasi judicial powers and in the absence of any provision in the Consolidation Act, which expressly or by necessary implication vests in him the power of review, he cannot exercise such power. It follows that the Deputy Director of Consolidation is not competent to revive a revision proceeding disposed of by him by a final order on a review application filed by one of the parties.

The question that remains to be considered is whether the Deputy Director of Consolidation as a Court or Tribunal has an inherent power of review and in exercise of such power he can reconsider the previous order passed by him? A further question that arises ancillary in this connection is whether the Deputy Director of Consolidation is a Court and, therefore, has inherent power of review? In the case of Associated Comment Company Limited v. P.N. Sharma and another (AIR 1965 SC 1895) the Supreme Court, construing the meaning of Tribunal'' for the purposes of Articles 136 (1) and 227 of the Constitution, held that judicial functions and judicial powers are one of the essential attributes of a sovereign State, and on consideration of policy, the State transfers its judicial functions and powers mainly to the Courts established by the Constitution; but that does not affect the competence of the State, by appropriate measures, to transfer a part of its judicial powers and functions to Tribunals by entrusting to them the task of adjudicating upon special matters and disputes between parties. The Court further observed that it is really not possible or even expedient to attempt to describe exhaustively the features which are common to the Tribunals and the Courts and features which are distinct and separate; that the basic and fundamental feature which is common to both the Courts and the Tribunals is that they discharge judicial functions and exercise judicial powers which inherently vests in a sovereign State. In considering the question about the status of any body or authority as a Tribunal under Article 136 (1) the main test to be applied is whether the body or authority has been constituted by the State and has been clothed with the State''s inherent judicial power to deal with disputes between parties and determining them on the merits fairly and objectively. In order to be a tribunal, it is essential that the power of adjudication must be derived from a statute or a statutory rule. An authority or body deriving its power of adjudication from an agreement of the parties, such as a private arbitrator or a tribunal acting under section 10A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, does not satisfy the test of a tribunal within meaning of Article 136, It matters little that such a body or authority is vested with the trappings of a Court. The Arbitration Act, 1940 vests an arbitrator with some of the trappings of a court, so also the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 vests an authority acting under section 10A of the Act with many of such trappings, and yet, such bodies and authorities are not tribunals. The Supreme Court further held that the word ''tribunal'' in Article 227 of the Constitution also has the same meaning as in Article 136.

In the case of Sri Dadu Dayal Mahasabha v. Sukhdev Arya and another (1989 (15) ALR 871, a two Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held that the position is well established that a court has inherent power to correct its own proceeding when it is satisfied that in passing a particular order it was misled by one of the parties. Referring to a decision of the Patna High Court in Sadho Saran Rai and others v. Anant Rai and others (AIR 1923 Patna 483) with approval the Court held that the principle was correctly discussed in the judgment pointing out the distinction between case of fraud practised upon the court and fraud practised upon a party. The Supreme Court, held that the same principle applies where a suit is permitted to be withdrawn on the basis of prayer purported to have been made on behalf of the plaintiff. The decision was rendered by the Supreme Court in a civil appeal arising from a suit (Suit No. 116 of 1974) which was disposed of by the Additional District Judge, Jaipur. The Supreme Court considered the case in the light of section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Next we may consider some of the decisions rendered by this Court on the point. In the case of Smt. Lachmana alias Hubraja v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, U.P. Lucknow and others (1966 RD 416) a Division Bench of this Court (Lucknow Bench) held that every Court or Tribunal has inherent jurisdiction apart from statutory jurisdiction to correct any error committed by itself; this power is based on a legal maxim which is to the effect that no party shall suffer because of the fault of a Court or the Tribunal. This Court further held that there is a clear distinction between a statutory review and a review under the inherent powers of the Tribunal to rectify the wrong that has been committed by itself.

In the case of Gaon Sabha Nibi v. Dy. Director of Consolidation of Holdings, Lucknow (1969 RD 135) a single Judge of this Court held that even if the Tribunal or the Court had not been provided under Statute to review its judgment, they can do so under the inherent power provided the act of the Tribunal or the Court is not likely to cause injustice to some one else.

In the case of Bijai Narain Singh and others v. State of U.P. reported in 1969 ALJ 362, a Full Bench of this Court construing the provisions of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, held that the various authorities constituted under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act can neither be held courts of civil jurisdiction nor be governed by the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore Oath Commissioners appointed by District Judges under section 139 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not competent to verify affidavits desired to be filed before the various authorities constituted under the said Act and further held that the consolidation authorities mentioned in section 9A of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act have the full status of courts for the limited purpose of that section.

A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Jamila Khatoon and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, U.P. Lucknow at Moradabad and others (1971 ALJ 843) held that Assistant Consolidation Officer, Consolidation Officer, Settlement Officer and the Deputy Director of Consolidation are ''courts'' within the meaning of Evidence Act and the provisions of that Act are applicable to the judicial proceedings before them. In support of the view reliance was placed on sections 9A, 11 (2), 38 and 40 and other sections of the Consolidation of Holdings Act.

Another Full Bench of this Court Avdhesh Singh and another v. Bikarma Ahir and others (AIR 1975 Alld. 324) construing the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951 (1 of 1951) held that the use of the word ''final'' in section 240J of the Act does not debar the compensation officer from rectifying any clerical error in the Compensation Statement; though the Act does not specifically confer any such power on him, there is inherent right in all courts and tribunal to review their orders under certain limitations. If the decision on an objection under Section 240 H (2) (a) or (b) has not been correctly recorded in the Final Compensation Statement signed and sealed by the Compensation Officer there is no reason to hold that the Compensation Officer is powerless to rectify the error because of the use of the word ''final'' in Section 240J (2) of the Act.

In the case of Surya Narain Tripathi v. State of U.P. and others (1991 (17) ALR 131) A Division Bench of this Court held that even though there in no statutory power of review, but every court, authority or tribunal called upon to decide rights of the parties or to make an order relevant under the circumstances of the case, has got inherent power to review, so that justice may be done and incorrect orders obtained by concealment of facts, may be corrected.

Another Division Bench of this Court in the Case of Jagdish Prasad Dubey and others v. Allahabad Vikas Pradhikaran, Allahabad (1993 All. LJ 1120) taking a different view held that power of review cannot be exercised by a judicial or quasi judicial authority, unlike administrative officers under section 21 of General Clauses Act; that in case of judicial authority, the power of review should be expressly conferred upon it; thus, where under the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act (1973) a review of its earlier order of sanctioning a plan by the sanctioning authority was not provided, the order cannot be reviewed and that every judicial or quasijudicial authority has an inherent power of review under special circumstances, where some order has been obtained by concealment of material facts, by fraud or by misrepresentation.

The aforementioned decisions of this Court, as we read them, do not support the proposition of law that any tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power, which in not vested with power of review under the statute expressly or by necessary implication, has an inherent power of review of its previous order in any circumstances. In our view the decisions only lay down the proposition that a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power has the inherent power to correct a clerical mistake or arithmetical error in its order and has the power to review an order which has been obtained by practising fraud on the court, provided that injustice has been perpetrated on a party by such order. Therefore, these decisions should not be construed as laying down any proposition of law contrary to the well settled principle of law that any order delivered and signed by a judicial or quasi judicial authority attains finality subject to appeal or revision as provided under the Act and if the authority passing the order is not specifically vested with power of review under the statute, it cannot reopen the proceeding and review/revise its previous order.

Coming to the provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, it is our considered view that the consolidation authorities, particularly the Deputy Director of Consolidation while deciding a revision petition exercises judicial or quasi judicial power and, therefore, his order is final subject to any power of appeal or revision vested in superior authority under the Act. The consolidation authorities, particularly the Deputy director of Consolidation, is not vested with any power of review of his order and, therefore, cannot reopen any proceeding and cannot review or revise his earlier order. However as a judicial or quasi judicial authority he has the power to correct any clerical mistake/arithmetical error, manifest error in his order in exercise of his inherent power as a tribunal.

In the case of Paras Nath Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others (1985 RD 71), a single Judge of this Court after discussing various decisions, including Pater Narshi Thakershi and others v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji (AIR 1970 SC 1273) and several decisions of this Court, held that there can be no dispute with the proposition of law that unless authorised by statute, the Court or Judge, except in some exceptional matters as noted in the decisions, has no inherent power to set aside or modify any final order once made, merely because it is wrong; that there is no provision contained in the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act conferring power of review, except in matters covered by Section 42A of the Act, and, as such, the Deputy Director of Consolidation cannot be taken to be vested with the power of review under the said statute. Proceeding further, this Court observed that in the absence of any statutory provision contained in the Act conferring power of review on the Deputy Director of Consolidation, it cannot recall an order passed on merits in purported exercise of inherent power of recall of a wrong order because power of review is not an inherent power as held in Patel''s case by the Supreme Court. It may, however, be mentioned that if the case falls in one or the other ground stated in Debi Prasad''s case (AIR 1957 Alld. 67), which have been referred to above, and also in those cases as well where the order suffers from an apparent error occurring in the judgment due to own mistake of the court, the error or mistake in the judgment and order can be corrected by it, even if there is no express statutory power of review on the principle that act of court should do no harm to litigant. Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Jang Singh v. Brij Lal and others (AIR 1966 SC 1631) in which it was held that there is no higher principle for guidance of the Court than the one that no act of Court should harm a litigant and it is the bounden duty of Court to see that if a person is harmed by a mistake of the Court he should be restored to the position he would have occupied but for that mistake, the learned single Judge observed that if the mistake is due to the error on the part of the Court itself while rendering judgment, it can be rectified by the Court.

The question that remains to be considered relates to vesting of power of review in the Deputy Director of Consolidation by application of Section 220 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901. Sri Radhey Shyam, learned counsel for the contesting respondents, strenuously urged that in view of the provisions of Section 41 of the Consolidation Act and Section 220 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act it should be held that power of review is vested in the Deputy Director of Consolidation who is the final revisional authority under the Consolidation Act. No doubt, Section 41 of the Consolidation Act makes provisions of Chapters IX and X of the U.P. Land Revenue Act applicable to all proceedings, including appeals and applications under the former Act. Section 220, which is a part of Chapter X, vests power of review in the Board of Revenue subject to certain conditions/restrictions specified in the Section. The question is, in the absence of any specific provision of review in the Consolidation Act, can it be said that the power of review vested in the Board of Revenue can be exercised by the consolidation authorities, particular/the Deputy Director of Consolidation? In our considered view, the question has to be answered in the negative. There is no provision in Section 41 or in any other Section of the Consolidation Act which empowers modification of any provision of the Land Revenue Act for the purposes of application to consolidation proceedings. Further Section 41, as we read it, merely provides that the procedures prescribed under Chapters IX and X of the Land Revenue Act will be applicable to all proceedings including appeals and applications under the Consolidation Act. Substantive provisions in the aforementioned Chapters of the Land Revenue Act, which have no pari material provisions in the Consolidation Act, cannot have any application to proceedings under the said Act. If a proceeding cannot be initiated under the Consolidation Act, the question of application of the provisions of Chapters IX and X of the Land Revenue Act to such a proceeding does not arise. In the absence of any specific provision vesting power of review in the authorities under the Consolidation Act, such a proceeding cannot be initiated at all. Therefore, Section 220 of the Land Revenue Act is of no assistance for the purposes of the proceedings under the Consolidation Act. Alternatively, assuming that Section 220 applies to consolidation proceedings and an analogy is drawn between the proceedings under the two Acts, it is the Director of Consolidation, being the highest authority under the Consolidation Act, who can inferentially be said to have a power of review as provided in Section 220 of the Land Revenue Act and not the Deputy Director of Consolidation, who is one of the revisional authorities under the Consolidation Act. This question was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Qadam Singh and another v. Ganqa Saran and Ram Saran (1960 (58) ALJ 836) in which this Court, construing Section 41 of the Consolidation Act, made the following observation :

�Chapter X of the Land Revenue Act includes Section 220 which confers upon the Board of Revenue the power to review its own orders in certain circumstances, and it is contended that in applying this Section to proceedings under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act a power of review must be deemed to be conferred upon the Deputy Director of Consolidation who corresponds to the Board of Revenue in so far as he is the final court of Revision. In our opinion this argument in not well founded, for section 41 makes no provision for the modification, alteration or adaptation of any of the Sections in Chapters IX and X of the Land Revenue Act in their application to proceedings under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Section 220 specifically confers the power to review its own decision on the Board of Revenue and on no other authority, and it is not possible for this Court to hold that under that Section read with Section 41 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act a power to review its own decision is conferred upon all Deputy Directors of Consolidation.�

Another Division Bench of this Court considered the same question in the case of Ram Pyare v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, and others (AIR 1973 Alld. 347). The Court observed:

�In our opinion Section 41 of the Act only makes applicable the provisions of Chapters IX and X of the U.P. Land Revenue Act to proceedings initiated under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, including proceedings of appeal and revision. Once the proceedings are initiated under this Act, the procedure laid down in Chapter IX and X shall apply. Section 41, however, does not authorise the initiation of proceedings not contemplated or authorised by the Act. The power of review has to be specifically conferred and unless there is a provision in the Act permitting initiation of such proceedings the question of applicability of procedure laid down in Chapters IX and X of the U.P. Land Revenue Act does not arise. In the case of Qadam Singh v. Ganga Saran (1960 All. LJ 836) this Court had taken the view that no review lies. We are also of the same view.�

On consideration of the entire matter, we are of the considered view that the aforementioned Division Bench decisions of this Court lay down the correct legal position. They have our concurrence.

On the discussions in the foregoing paragraphs it is our considered view that it is not open for the consolidation authorities to review/recall their final orders passed in proceedings under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act in exercise of inherent powers. Thus, the question formulated earlier is answered in the negative. The writ petition will be placed before the appropriate Bench for disposal in the light of this judgment.

(Reference answered)