Anchanoori Rajesh vs State of Telangana

Juvvadi Sridevi, J

This Criminal Petition is filed by the petitioner-accused seeking to quash the proceedings against him in C.C.No.222 of 2023 pending on the file of the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Medak (for short ‘the learned trial Court’) registered for the offences under Sections 507, 506, 504 of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’).

Heard Sri Gundaram Manoj Goud, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri M.Ramachandra Reddy, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State-respondent No.1 as well as Sri K. Laxmi Manohar, learned counsel for the respondent No.2. Perused the record.

The brief facts of the case are that the respondent No.2 has been working as the Mandal Parishad President (MPP), Narsingi, while the petitioner-accused has been serving as the Mandal Secretary. Both of them belong to the Bharat Rashtra Samithi (BRS) political party. It is alleged that on 20.01.2023, when the Member of Parliament was scheduled to visit Kudavelli Village, the respondent No.2, along with others, went to meet the Member of Parliament in the morning to submit a requisition seeking sanction of an intermediate examination centre at Narsingi Village. It is further alleged that, on the said occasion, the petitioner–accused made a phone call to one Sri K. Raghavender and, referring to LW1 (respondent No.2), stated, “adhi naaku cheppakunda mimmulanu theesukuni etla pothadi”. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent No.2 lodged the present complaint seeking necessary action against the petitioner–accused and the Police filed charge sheet for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 504, 506, 507 of the IPC.

Learned counsel for the petitioner–accused submitted that the petitioner has no connection whatsoever with the alleged offences. It is contended that all the allegations levelled in the charge sheet are false, frivolous and baseless. It is further submitted that the police, without conducting any proper or fair investigation, have mechanically filed the charge sheet. There is an unexplained delay in lodging the complaint. The words allegedly used by the petitioner-accused, even if taken at their face value, do not constitute any offence. The contents of the charge sheet, on their entirety, do not disclose the essential ingredients necessary to attract the offences punishable under Sections 504, 506, 507 of IPC. Hence, he prayed to quash the proceedings against the petitioner-accused.

On the other hand, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State-respondent No.1 as well as the learned counsel for the unofficial respondent No.2 contended that there are triable issues and factual aspects to be examined by the learned trial Court and it is not a fit case to quash the proceedings against the petitioner at this juncture and the matter is to be decided after conducting full-fledged trial by the learned trial Court and prayed to dismiss this Criminal Petition.

In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, it is relevant to refer Sections 504, 506 and 507 of the IPC, which reads as under:

“504. Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace. Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

Punishment for criminal intimidation: Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprison-ment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both;If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.— And if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute, unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.

Criminal intimidation by an anonymous communication: Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation by an anonymous communication, or having taken precaution to conceal the name or abode of the person from whom the threat comes, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, in addition to the punishment provided for the offence by the last preceding section.”

A plain reading of the above penal provisions, in order to attract those penal provisions there shall be allegation of intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace and criminal intimidation by an anonymous communication, against the petitioner-accused. A careful perusal of the record discloses that the respondent No.2 and the petitioner-accused belong to one political party. The sole allegation against the petitioner-accused is that he telephoned one Kuchamgari Raghavender and uttered the words ‘adhi naaku cheppakunda mimmulanu theesukuni etla pothadi’ towards the respondent No.2. It appears that the above words uttered by the petitioner-accused are not in the nature of causing criminal intimidation or filthy. In order to invoke the above penal provision the essential ingredient is ‘criminal intimidation’. Upon careful scrutiny of the record, there are no specific averments as to the manner in which the petitioner-accused caused criminal intimidation to the respondent No.2.

A plain reading of the aforesaid penal provisions indicate that, in order to attract their applicability, there must be specific allegations of intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace and criminal intimidation by anonymous communication against the petitioner-accused. A careful perusal of the record discloses that both the respondent No.2 and the petitioner-accused belong to the same political party. The sole allegation against the petitioner-accused is that he made a telephone call to one Kuchamgari Raghavender and uttered the words “adhi naaku cheppakunda mimmalni theesukuni etla pothadi”, allegedly referring to the respondent No.2. The said words, on their face, do not appear to be either obscene or of such a nature as to cause criminal intimidation. To invoke the aforesaid penal provisions, the essential ingredients constituting the offence of criminal intimidation must be clearly made out. However, upon a careful scrutiny of the record, there are no specific averments indicating the manner in which the petitioner-accused is alleged to have intimidated or threatened the respondent No.2. Admittedly, the alleged incident is said to have occurred on 20.01.2023, whereas the FIR came to be registered on 03.02.2023, thereby causing a delay of more than twelve days in lodging the complaint. No plausible explanation is forthcoming from the prosecution for such delay, which casts a serious doubt on the veracity and genuineness of the allegations levelled against the petitioner-accused.

In State of Haryana and others v. Ch.Bhajan Lal and others 1992 SCC (SUPP) 1 335 the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held that:

“In the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the following categories of cases are given by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guide myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised:

(1) where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused;

(2) where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code;

(3) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or 'complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused;

(4) where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code;

(5) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;

(6) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party;

(7) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

In the present case, as observed supra, primarily there is unexplained delay of more than twelve days in lodging the FIR and that the averments or words do not show any explicit threat to cause death, grievous hurt, destruction of property or commission of any grievous offence. There is no specific averment that the words were used in a threatening tone intended to alarm the complainant or to provoke a breach of the public peace. There is also no allegation that the call was anonymous or that the petitioner-accused took any steps to conceal his identity so as to attract the offence under Section 507 of IPC. The charge sheet does not set out any circumstances showing that the respondent No.2 was intimidated as to suffer any real or reasonable fear for life or limb or property. There is nothing on record to indicate that the words used were filthy, obscene or fell within any recognised category of language which would by itself amount to an offence under Section 504 IPC. Therefore, the essential ingredients of criminal intimidation and anonymous intimidation are not made out. The prosecution has also not pointed out any independent act or conduct which coupled with the words would transform the communication into criminal intimidation. Even if the allegations made in the complaint are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, they do not, prima facie, constitute any of the alleged offences against the petitioner-accused, and the material collected during the course of investigation, as reflected in the charge sheet, does not disclose the commission of any offence so as to make out a case against him. Hence, the present case falls within the ambit of point Nos.1 and 3 of Ch.Bhajan Lal’s case cited supra. Therefore, the continuation of the criminal proceedings against the petitioner-accused amounts to abuse of process of law and the same is liable to be quashed.

Accordingly, this Criminal Petition is allowed and the criminal proceedings against the petitioner-accused in C.C.No.222 of 2023 pending on the file of the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Medak, are hereby quashed. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.