Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation vs Labour Court and Another

Lakshmiah, J.—This is an application filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the insurance of a writ of a certiorari seeking the quashing of the order dated 14th December, 1978, passed by. the Labour Court, Hyderabad, the first respondent herein, in I.D. No. 132 of 1975.

Sri Gulam Mohammad, the second respondent herein, was a conductor in the service of the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the A.P.S.R.T.C.). It was found on scrutiny of the statistical returns maintained by the 2nd respondent that he issued on 5th and 6th of May, 1972 in all 92 fake tickets of the value of Rs. 2-10 each to the passengers instead of issuing the tickets of same value actually supplied to him for issue while he was conducting a bus on the route Narkatpalli to Nagarjunasagar on the said dates and appropriated the amount of the said tickets. For this misconduct, three charges were framed against him and after due enquiry in accordance with the A.P.S.R.T.C. (CCA.) Regulations, he was removed from service with effect from 7th September, 1973.

On a Representation made by him to the Government the matter was referred to Labour Court u/s 10(i)(C) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour Court, the 1st respondent herein, held that all the three charges levelled against the second respondent were proved, but it set aside the order of removal of the second respondent on the ground that the Depot Manager has no power to pass the impugned order and directed the reinstatement of the second respondent. It is that order that is now sought to be quashed in this writ petition.

Sri Ananda Rao, the learned counsel appearing for the District Manager, A.P.S.R.T.C Narkatpalli Bus Depot, the petitioner herein, submitted that the Labour Court erred in relying upon the decision reported in Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Sh. Ram Pratap Singh, . and as such the decision of the Labour Court is ''liable to be set aside.

Sri Ramachandra Rao the learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent submitted that the decision of the Labour Court is quite correct and the reliance by the Labour Court on the Supreme Court decision was quite warranted having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case.

The point that arises for consideration, therefore, in this case is whether the Depot Manager is competent to impose the penalty of removal under Regulation 8 on the conductor.

6A. The entire situation pertaining to the removal of the conductor is governed by the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Employees (Classification, Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1967. The second respondent belongs to Class III service as defined in Regulation 4 of the aforesaid Regulations. The expression "service" was defined in Regulation 3 to mean one of the services mentioned in Regulation 4 of these Regulations. Regulation 8 provides for penalties and it reads in so far as it is material thus

8 (1). The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reason and as hereinafter provided be imposed upon an employee; namely

(viii) removal from the service of the Corporation which does not disqualify from future employment,

Regulation 7(2) provides that appointments to posts in Class III and Class IV services shall be made by the authority authorised in that behalf by the Corporation by a resolution or by any other authority to which such authority is administratively subordinate, subject to such conditions and limits, if any, as it may specify. The post from which the second respondent was removed is a Class III post which was defined by Regulation 4. Regulation 10 deals with the subject-matter of authority competent to impose penalties and it reads in so far as it is material thus:

(1) The Corporation may impose any of the penalties specified in Regulation 8 on an employee.

(2) Without prejudice to the provisions of Clause (1), any of the penalties specified in Regulation 8 may be imposed on an employee by the appointing authority or any other authority authorised by a regulation or resolution of the Corporation, subject to such conditions and limitations, if any, as may be specified.

The explanation appended to the aforesaid Regulation is material and it reads thus:

The expression appointing authority means the authority competent to make substantive appointment to the post held by the employee for the time being.

In the context of the aforesaid regulations the point that arises for consideration is whether the Depot Manager is competent to impose the penalty of removal as contemplated under Regulation (viii) of the Regulations on the conductor belonging to Class III service. The penalty of removal specified in Regulation 8 can be imposed on a conductor by the appointing authority or any other authority authorised by a regulation or resolution of the Corporation and such appointing authority means the authority competent to make a substantive appointment to the post held by the employee for the time being. The expression "appointing authority" in the context of Andra Pradesh Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1963, "for the time being" occurring in the aforesaid Explanation has to be construed having regard to the time when the authority is competent to make a substantive appointment to that post from which the person concerned was removed from service.

The learned counsel appearing for the Corporation placed before us a copy of the Resolution No. 122 of 1965, dated 17th July, 1965, whereby sanction was accorded to the Depot Managers authorising them to exercise the powers detailed in the annexure to the order that is now place before us. As per that Annexure as against serial No. 16 powers to make appointments to posts in Class III service were delegated to the Depot Manager and that power includes the power of making an appointment to the post of a conductor. Therefore at the time of the removal in question, the post of a conductor can be filled up by an appointment by a Depot Manager as per the aforesaid Resolution 122 of 1965. The appointing authority, therefore, in terms of Regulation 10(2) is the Depot Manager, who is competent to make a substantive appointment to the post held by the conductor. He who is competent to make a substantive appointment to the post held by an employee, will be the person that was constituted as the appointing authority and it is that appointing authority that was empowered to impose the penalties Specified in Regulation 8. Judged by that criteria it is necessary to refer to the expression "competent authority" also as defined in Regulation 3(iv). "Competent authority" as defined therein relation to the exercise of any power conferred by these regulations means the Corporation or any other authority authorised in that behalf by a regulation or a by resolution of the Corporation. Confining our attention to what is contained in Regulation 10 read with Resolution 122 of 1965 passed by the Corporation on 17th July, 1965, we are of the view that the. authority competent to make a substantive appointment to the post of a conductor on the date of the removal in question is in the authority that is valid with a power under Regulation 10(2) to impose any penalties specified in Regulation 8.

The second respondent was removed from service with effect from 7th September, 1973. By then the resolution passed by the Corporation, i.e., Resolution No. 122 of 1965, was in force. As per that resolution the power to appoint was delegated to the Depot Manager and as such he will be the competent authority empowered to remove the conductor. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Depot Manager is competent to impose a penalty of removal under Regulation 8.

Sri Ramachandra Rao, the learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent, contended that any power of removal exercised by an authority subordinate to one by whom a person concerned was appointed is bad in law and in support of that he relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in D.T.U. v. B.B.L. Hajetay AIR 1972 S.C. 2452. Section 95 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act LXVII of 1957 was interpreted by the Supreme Court in that case. Sub-section (1) of Section 95 there reads thus:

Provided that no such officer or other employee as aforesaid shall be reduced in rank, compulsorily retired, removed or dismissed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed.

It is by placing reliance upon this proviso the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that a removal of an employee which was brought about by an authority subordinate to one by whom such a person was appointed was bad in law. The learned counsel on both sides frankly conceded that no such provision is there either in the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Employees (CCA.) Regulations, 1967 or in the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950, We are of the view that the entire situation pertaining to disciplinary action is governed by the aforesaid regulations. Regulation 10, as has already been noticed, provides for the definition of an authority and the powers of such an authority to impose the penalties are specified in Regulation 8.

But Sri Ramachandra Rao, contends that the 2nd respondent was appointed long prior to these regulations and Resolution No. 22 of 1965 came into force and therefore the case of the 2nd respondent shall have to be considered in the light of the rules or regulations obtaining before them. Regulation 37 of the aforesaid Regulations deals with savings and provides that any rules, orders governing the classification, control and appeals of employees corresponding to these Regulations in force immediately before the commencement of these Regulations are hereby repealed.

Regulation 37(3) reads thus:

Any resolution passed by the Corporation and in force immediately before the commencement of these Regulations delegating its powers in respect of matters specified in these Regulations or authorising the exercise of such powers, shall, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of these Regulations, continue in force until altered, rescinded or amended by resolution of the Corporation and until it is so altered, rescinded or amended, the authorities to whom such powers have been delegated or authorities who have been so authorised have shall be deemed to be the competent authorities under the relevant provisions of these Regulations.

The Depot Manager, as per Resolution No. 122 of the Corporation made in the year 1965, was constituted by way of delegation as the authority competent to impose the penalties specified in Regulation 8. Any reference in the context of this repealing provision, to a Rule or Regulation obtaining prior to making of these Regulations is of no avail to the 2nd respondent. Nor the general principle emanating from the provisions of the Constitution that an authority is not competent to impose the penalty of removal who is subordinate to the authority by whom such a person was employed is applicable to the facts of the case as the situation in the present case is governed essentially and exclusively by these Regulations. We are supported in the view we have taken by a Division Bench of his Court in Writ Petition Nos. 1294 and 1928 of 1978 dated 3rd April, 1978 and the judgment of our learned brother Chinnappa Reddy, J., (as he then was) in W.P. No. 3244 of 1973 dated 6th of December, 1973.

The Labour Court proceeded upon the assumption that an employee cannot be removed by an authority subordinate to the one by whom such an employee was appointed. In support of that contention the Supreme Court decision rendered in the context of Section 95 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act was referred. As has already been noticed the language obtaining in that section does not find a place either in the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Act or in the Rules. The Labour Court therefore erred in applying the decision of the Supreme Court to the facts of this case.

We are in agreement with the contention of Mr. Ananda Rao, that the Depot Manager is competent to impose the penalty of removal on a conductor and as such the view taken by the Labour Court is not connect in law. The decision of the Labour Court is therefore, set aside.

The writ petition is, therefore, allowed, but in the circumstances without costs. Advocate''s fee Rs. 150.