Angat Singh and Narain Singh vs Dhan Kaur

This is a Regular First Appeal by Angat Singh Defendant from a judgment and decree dated the 16th of November, 1960, passed by Subordinate Judge First Class, Muktsar, on a suit filed by his daughter-in-law, Dhan Kaur Plaintiff-Respondent u/s 19 of the Hindu. Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, for recovery of maintenance Dhan Kaur claimed to be the widow of Guran Ditta, admittedly a deceased son of Angat Singh.

The suit was filed in forma pauperis and in the plaint with which we are concerned it was alleged by Dhan Kaur that she had married Guran Ditta son of Angat Singh, about 20 or 22 years prior to the filing of the suit and had remained with him for three years. On the death of Guran Ditta after three years of her marriage, she continued to remain in the house of Angat Singh but after a year Angat Singh refused to give her food or garments or to look after her and thereupon she started living with her own parents. It was alleged that she had not inherited any property from her deceased husband nor from her parents and having no son or daughter she was unable to maintain'' herself. She alleged that the Defendant. Angat Singh owned land measuring about 288 Kanals and 14 marias. It was further alleged that the Defendant had his ancestral property the annual income of which was about Rs. 20,000/, and she therefore claimed Rs. 100/- per month as maintenance. She prayed that her maintenance should be made a charge on this land.

The Defendant in his written statement denied that Dhan Kaur had ever been married to his son Curdan Ditta or had lived with him. He further pleaded that Gurdan Ditta had, during his lifetime, separated from him and had never cultivated any ancestral, land nor was he joint with him. The rest of the allegations in the plaint were controverted. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issue were framed:

Whether the Plaintiff is the widow of the son of the Defendant?

Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to maintenance from Defendant, if so, to what extent? And the parties went to trial.

After recording evidence, the learned Subordinate Judge First Class, Muktsar, came to the conclusion that the Plaintiff was the widow of Gurdan Ditta who was the son of the Defendant. It appears, from the judgment that the Defendant ''urged before the learned Subordinate Judge that the Plaintiff being the widow of Guran Ditta was not a Hindu "wife" within the meaning of Sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, and therefore, she could not bring the suit. The learned Subordinate Judge found that there was nothing in the wording of Sub-section (1) of Section 19 to indicate that the case of a widow whose husband had died before the enforcement of the said Act was not covered by the provisions of the sub-section and the, therefore, came to the conclusion that an old widow could claim u/s 19 of the Act.

Another argument repelled by the learned ''Subordinate Judge was that as the Defendant was not possessed of any "coparcenary" property of the family of which her husband was a coparcener therefore also the Plaintiff was not entitled to get any maintenance from the Defendant. The learned Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that the property in the hands of the Defendant was ancestral, the income of which was about Rs. 4,000/- a year, and the mere fact that the Defendant did not allege in the plaint that the "property in the hands of the Defendant was "coparcenary was no ground to hold that the property was, in fact, not "coparcenary" property of the family. Consequently, he decreed the suit and granted Rs. 40/- a month as maintenance to the Plaintiff. The Defendant feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree has come in appeal.

Learned Counsel for the Appellant has urged that on the record as it stands, the marriage between Dhan Kaur and Guran Ditta has not been proved. (Their Lordships discussed the rele-vant evidence and concluded:)

We are, therefore, of the view that it is established on the record that Dhan Kaur was the widow of the deceased Guran Ditta, who admittedly was the son of Angat Singh Appellant.

The next and the main point urged by the learned Counsel was that the widow of a predeceased son was only entitled to maintenance it her father-in-law had any "coparcenary" property. He relied upon the wordings of the Act and urged most vehemently that there was no proof that the Defendant Appellant had any "coparcenary" property and, in fact, amongst the Jats, according to him there would be no "coparcenary" property and, therefore, Dhan Kaur was not entitled to claim any maintenance from her father-in-law. Now it may be remembered that this was not the basis on which the suit was fought in the lower Court. There is no ground taken by Angat Singh in his written statement to the effect that there was in fact, no "coparcenary" property. From pleadings it is obvious that parties went to trial on the basis that "coparcenary" property and ancestral property in the context meant the same thing. We have carefully perused the grounds of appeal and find that this point is also not taken therein. Learned Counsel for the Appellant maintains that his ground No. 7 which is in the following terms:

That the finding of the trial Court on issue No. 2 is also erroneous. The maintenance amount fixed is excessive and not justified in the circumstances of the case.

is a ground which covers his argument. We are of the view, however, that the argument now urged by the learned Counsel was never urged before. In any case, we are of the view that this argument of the Appellant is fallacious. Learned Counsel argued that "coparcenary" property has acquired a special meaning and the legislators in using this word in the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act of 1956 must have intended to give it the same meaning as is given to it in the Oxford Dictionary. He argued that the conception of "coparcenary" property is foreign to the customary law by which the parties were governed.

Now if this restricted meaning is given to "coparcenary" property, then the whole object of the Act could be nullified in the greater part of India and in respect to majority of the people who" may not be governed by Mitakshara law. The Act applies in specific terms to any person who is a Hindu by religion in any of its forms or developments including a Virashaiva, a Lingayat or a follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya Samaj, or to any other person who is a Budhist, Jaina or Sikh by religion, and to any other person who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion etc. etc. By Section 4 of the Act, it is provided that any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect with respect of any matter for which provision is made in this Act; and further that any other law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to apply to Hindus in so fat as it is inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act. Section 19 provides that:

(1) A Hindu wife, whether married before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be entitled to be maintained after the death of her husband by her father-in-law. Provided and to the extent that she is unable to maintain herself out of her own earnings or other property or, where she has no property of her own, is unable to obtain maintenance:

(a) from the estate of her husband or her father or mother, or,

(b) from her son or daughter, if any, or his or her estate.

(2) Any obligation under Sub-section (1) shall not be enforceable if the father-in-law has not the means to do so from any coparcenary property in his possession out of which the daughter-in-law has not obtained any share, and any such obligation shall cease on the remarriage of the daughter-in-law.

The question is whether in using the word "coparcenary" property in Sub-section (2) of Section 19, the Parliament intended to use that word in the strict sense in which it is used in the Mitakshra school of Hindu law or whether by this word they meant property inherited by her father-in-law from his father or grand-father, in other words, which has come down by inheritance from a common ancestor. It is contended that the words "coparcenary" and "coparcener" are not words of article and when the legislators were using these words they were using them in their ordinary meaning. The Oxford Dictionary says that coparcenary means "joint share in inheritance; joint heirship; copartnership; joint ownership; and hence property pertaining to co-parceners". "Corparcener" is defined in the said Dictionary as "one who shares equally with others in inheritance of the estate of common ancestor." It is, therefore, urged that all that is meant by "coparcenary" property in this context is property which is ancestral i.e. inherited from a common ancestor.

No authority has been cited on either side in which this particular section of the Act has been interpreted. In any case, in the present appeal we have already held that the parties went to trial on two issues. Angat Singh had denied that Dhan Kaur was his daughter-in-law or that he had any ancestral property from which Dhan Kaur could claim maintenance. Both these issues have been decided against Angat Singh. We agree, therefore, that in the context the word "coparce-nary" property cannot mean coparcenary property as understood in Mitakshara law because that would nullify, to a great extent, the very purpose of the statute and as the word "coparcenary" property in this context is not a word of article we are of the view that Parliament was using this word to give it the ordinary meaning, that is the property which has been inherited from a common ancestor.

In our opinion the expression "corparcenary property" contained in Section 19, Sub-section (2) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act,1956 is included to mean property in which the deceased husband had an interest as a joint owner during his life time. It may be remembered that in Hindu law the term "joint family property", is used as synonymous with "coparcenary property". The term "coparcenary property" therefore, in our view, includes "ancestral property" as that term is understood in the Punjab Customary Law. So understood it would effectuate the legislative intent and advance the purpose of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act of 1956.

This appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs.