Anil Kumar vs Shri Avtar Singh

S.S. Sodhi, J.—The challenge here is to the order of ejectment passed against the tenant on the ground of change of user. The demised premises being a booth in Sector 29, Chandigarh.

According to the letter of allotment pertaining to the said booth issued by the Estate Officer, Chandigarh to the landlord the permitted use of this booth was the running of a barber shop and this was also the specific purpose mentioned in the rent note Ex. A-1 executed by the tenant in favour of the landlord. The tenant has been and is admittedly running instead a Pan and Confectionery shop there. Change of user is thus, writ large.

Faced with this situation counsel for the tenant sought to put forth the wholly untenable contention that the business being carried in the booth was to the knowledge and with the consent of the landlord. It was, at any rate, not such as would cause any damage to the booth.

In the context of the provision of Rule 9 of the Chandigarh (Sale of sites and building) Rules, 1966, such change of user clearly puts the landlord in jeopardy of resumption of the booth in terms of Section 8A of the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulations) Act, 1952). The likelihood of damage and loss to the landlord is, thus, apparent and real.

As regards the knowledge and consent of the landlord to the business being carried on, it deserves note that the reference here is not to any written consent. It was merely sought to be implied and this, as the law stands, cannot suffice to provide any immunity to the tenant from an order of ejectment on the ground of change of user. This was precisely what was held in the recent judgments of the Division Bench in Dharam Raj and another Vs. Roshan Lal and another, , where it was held that mere knowledge of the landlord of the change of user, may be even from the very inception of the tenancy, would not absolve the tenant from liability for ejectment on that ground in the absence of any written consent of the landlord to such change of user."

No occasion is, thus, provided for interference with the impugned order of the Appellate Authority affirming the order of ejectment passed by the Rent Controller.

Revision Petition is consequently, hereby dismissed. The petitioner is, however, given the time on or before August 31, 1993, to vacate the demised premises.