Anil Kumar vs The Patna Regional Development Authority & Ors.

“26. Basically, the laws of limitation are founded on public policy. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 28, p. 266, Para 605, the policy of the Limitation Acts is laid down as follows:

“605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitation, namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove the stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.”

27.

Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as “statutes of peace”. An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. This Court in Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705] has observed: (SCC p. 712, para 18)

“18. The object of law of limitation is to prevent disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches.”

28.

In Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1 SCC 110] this Court observed that this principle is based on the maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium”, that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression.

29.

It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.

30.

Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts' discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the landlosers facilitating their rehabilitation/resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the landlosers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the landlosers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest.”

“6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the miscellaneous first appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs.”

“28. Since the Respondents assigned the very same reasons in I.A. No. 1 of 2022 in Unnumbered A.S. No… of 2022 as raised in I.A. Nos. 462 of 2018 and 119 of 2019 that had already been dismissed by this Court vide S.L.P. (C) Nos. 2054 & 2055 of 2022, the application for condonation of delay of 1116 days cannot be sustained. This Court in S.L.P. (C) Nos. 2054 & 2055 of 2022, after going through the evidence placed on record, rightly held that the delay has not been properly explained. The relevant portion of the order is reproduced hereunder:

“5. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. Once it was found even by the learned trial Court that delay has not been properly explained, and even there are no merits in the application for condonation of delay, thereafter, the matter should rest there and the condonation of delay application was required to be dismissed. The approach adopted by the learned trial Court that, even after finding that, in absence of any material evidence it cannot be said that the delay has been explained and that there are no merits in the application, still to condone the delay would be giving a premium to a person who fails to explain the delay and who is guilty of delay and laches. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Popat Bahiru Goverdhane v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 10 SCC 765 is required to be referred to. In the said decision, it is observed and held that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.

5.1

In the case of Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157, in paragraph 14, it is observed and held as under:

“The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The Limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the legislature. At the same time, the courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation.”

6.

In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, we are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. The Special Leave Petitions stand dismissed. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.”

29.

Therefore, this Court, having previously adjudicated upon the application for condonation of delay filed in I.A. Nos. 462 of 2018 and 119 of 2019, and having rendered a reasoned order passed in S.L.P. (C) Nos. 2054 & 2055 of 2022, after a thorough perusal of the evidence & materials on record, held that the grounds put forth were insufficient to constitute ‘sufficient cause’ under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. An order of this Court, passed upon judicial consideration, attains finality unless set aside through appropriate appellate or review mechanisms.

30.

In the present appeal, the Respondents seek to raise the very same reason to condone the delay as were previously canvassed, without placing any fresh or additional material to distinguish the current reason from the one already discussed and dismissed. This Court is of the considered view that such a repetition of grounds already scrutinized and held untenable amounts to an abuse of the process of law. Although the applications for condonation of delay are filed under different provisions of the law but the said provisions provide for concurrent remedies through different mechanisms and if the application filed under one provision has already been dismissed by a court of competent jurisdiction, by applying its judicial mind and held that the reasons for delay were not sufficient, a subsequent application filed under different provision, reiterating the same contentions or grounds of delay, cannot be entertained.

31.

It is a well-settled law that while considering the plea for condonation of delay, the first and foremost duty of the court is to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation rather than starting with the merits of the main matter. Only when sufficient cause or reasons given for the delay by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced or stand on equal footing, the court may consider the merits of the main matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.

32.

Further, this Court has repeatedly emphasised in several cases that delay should not be condoned merely as an act of generosity. The pursuit of substantial justice must not come at the cost of causing prejudice to the opposing party. In the present case, the respondents/defendants have failed to demonstrate reasonable grounds of delay in pursuing the matter, and this crucial requirement for condoning the delay remains unmet.

33.

Therefore, in the case at hand, once it has been established that the reasons provided for condoning the delay in the application filed are not sufficient, we are not inclined to go into the merits of the contentions raised by the learned counsel of Respondents regarding Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

34.

In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Impugned Order dated 25.04.2023 passed by the High Court is liable to be set aside and is, accordingly, set aside.”

“20. In B. Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy [(2012) 12 SCC 693] the Court referring to earlier decisions reversed the decision of the learned Single Judge who had condoned delay of 1236 days as the explanation given in the application for condonation of delay was absolutely fanciful.

21.

From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:

21.1.

(i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

21.2.

(ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.

21.3.

(iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

21.4.

(iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

21.5.

(v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

21.6.

(vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

21.7.

(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

21.8.

(viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

21.9.

(ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

21.10.

(x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

21.11.

(xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.

21.12.

(xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.

21.13.

(xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.

22.

To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:

22.1.

(a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.

22.2.

(b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective.

22.3.

(c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.

22.4.

(d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.

23.

Presently to the assertions made in the application for condonation of delay and the asseverations in oppugnation of the same. It may be stated here that the Division Bench while dealing with the application for condonation of delay has also adverted to the legal tenability of the interim order in a matter of appointment and approval of a teacher, and condoned the delay. It does not require Solomon's wisdom to perceive that the delay was colossal.

24.

In the application for condonation of delay the appellant before the High Court had stated about the circumstances in which the order came to be passed by the learned Single Judge, the order in the earlier contempt petition and the second petition for contempt, the extinction of right of the respondent employee to continue in the post and thereafter proceeded to state the grounds for condonation of delay. We think it apposite to reproduce the grounds:

“14. That from the record it appears that the order impugned was communicated to the then Managing Committee including the headmaster in question and the said fact is totally unknown to the newly elected Managing Committee as they have been elected on 20-9-2009 and they have been handed over charge on 21-11-2009 and to the teacher in charge who has been handed over charge on 1-3-2010. It is pertinent to mention in this context that after having received the notice and the contempt application the applicants entrusted the learned advocate for taking appropriate steps and they have been advised to defend the case but due to miscommunication the applicant herein again handed over the brief from Mr Banik, learned advocate to Mr Baidya, learned advocate. After having received the said papers and after perusing all the records he opined to prefer an appeal before the appeal court or to prefer an application for vacating the interim order and ultimately the same was filed on 7-6-2010 after several pursuance in spite of taking the application for vacating the interim order the court below day to day is proceeding with the contempt application.

15.

Having got no other alternative applicant have been advised to prefer an appeal without certified copy and the leave has been prayed for & the same was allowed. The photocopy of the receipt for application of xerox certified copy is annexed herewith and marked with letter ‘A’.

16.

That the delay occasioned in presenting the said mandamus appeal has taken place due to the aforesaid reasons which was beyond the control of the applicants and was completely unintentional.”

25.

Thereafter, the applicant therein stated about the duty of the court while dealing with the application for condonation of delay and in that context, proceeded to state as follows:

“Nonetheless adoption of strict standard of proof may lead to grave miscarriage of public justice apart from resulting in public mischief by skilful management of delay in the process of filing the appeal, the appellants/ applicants do not stand to benefit from the delay of about 2449 days occasioned in preferring the said mandamus appeal, nor is it a fact that the writ petitioners/respondents will be immense/prejudiced if such non-deliberate delay is not condoned. There has not been deliberate delay as would be evidenced from the foregoing paragraphs. Refusing to condone such non-deliberate delay may result in meritorious matters like the instant case, being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen in the instant case is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.”

26.

The said grounds were opposed by the contesting respondent therein by stating, inter alia, that the school authorities were very much aware of the order dated 25-2-2004 [Esha Bhattacharya v. State, WP No. 6124 (W) of 2004, order dated 25-2-2004 (Cal)] as the same was communicated to them by her counsel as well as by the District Inspector of Schools. That apart, an undertaking was given before the learned Single Judge by the Managing Committee. Quite apart from the above, in any case, the new Managing Committee that had come into being in 2009 was aware of the order but it chose not to assail the order till there was a direction for personal appearance of the Secretary and the teacher-in-charge. It was further put forth that the grounds urged did not justify condonation of such enormous delay and the plea of prejudice was not at all tenable.

27.

On a perusal of the grounds urged in the affidavit and the stand put forth by the respondents herein for condonation of delay are that they were not aware of the order passed by the learned Single Judge till they received the notice of the contempt application and thereafter because of miscommunication between the counsel and the parties no steps could be taken and, eventually, an application for vacation of stay was filed and thereafter, the appeal was preferred. That apart, it has been urged that if delay is not condoned there will be great miscarriage of public justice resulting in public mischief and cause of justice would be defeated if the meritorious matter like the present one is thrown at the threshold.

30.

At this juncture, we are obliged to state that the persons who are nominated or inducted as members or chosen as Secretaries of the Managing Committees of schools are required to behave with responsibility and not to adopt a casual approach. It is a public responsibility and anyone who is desirous of taking such responsibility has to devote time and act with due care and requisite caution. Becoming a member of the committee should not become a local status syndrome. A statutory committee cannot remain totally indifferent to an order passed by the court and sleep like “Kumbhakarna”. The persons chosen to act on behalf of the Managing Committee cannot take recourse to fancy & rise like a phoenix & move the court.

31.

Neither leisure nor pleasure has any room while one moves an application seeking condonation of delay of almost seven years on the ground of lack of knowledge or failure of justice.

32.

The plea of lack of knowledge in the present case really lacks bona fides. The Division Bench of the High Court has failed to keep itself alive to the concept of exercise of judicial discretion that is governed by rules of reason and justice. It should have kept itself alive to the following passage from N. Balakrishnan [N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123]:

“11. … The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.” We have painfully restated the same.

33.

Ex consequenti, the appeals are allowed and the order passed by the Division Bench condoning delay is set aside. As a result of such extinction the appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court shall also stand dismissed…….”

“As the right of possession which the petitioners claims is based on a contract, it is difficult for this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction to give adequate relief to the petitioner. Realizing that difficulty Mr. Mazhar Hussain, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner sought permission to withdraw this application. This application is accordingly permitted to be withdrawn.”