Anil Mittal vs State of Punjab and Ors.

G.S. Chahal, J.

Anil Mittal, by means of this petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C., seeks quashing of complaint instituted by respondent3 for offence u/ss 77, 78 and 79 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (for short the Act) pending in the Court of JMIC Batala.

Respondent3 filed a complaint for offences u/ss 77, 78 and 79 of the Act claiming that his firm was the registered owner of Trade Mark ''Taj Mahal'' and carrying on the business of Basmati Rice. He had learnt that some businessmen and firms were manufacturing, selling, distributing, exporting Basmati Rice in the name of Taj Mahal at various places. They were, however, not authorised to use their Trade Mark. In that complaint, a general search warrant u/s 93 Cr.P.C. was issued and ASI Sadhu Ram of PS City Batala seized and took into possession 332 rice bags carrying the marking of Taj Mahal. The order issued by the Magistrate in that complaint were the subject of challenge in Cr.M. 6994M/89 which was dismissed on Feb. 3,1992. In SLP before the Hon''ble Supreme Court, it was represented that the complaint had also been challenged as malafide. This question having not been covered by the judgment of this Court it was directed to move the High Court for review if the statement made by the petitioner was accurate.

In the present petition, though various pleas were taken, but Sh. Bindra, who appears for the petitioner, has only urged that in view of the civil litigation pending between the parties, the complaint should be quashed or atleast stayed.

On the basis of the observations of their Lordships of Supreme Court in M/s Karamchand Ganda Pershad and another v. Union of India and others, AIR 1971 SC 1244 that the decisions of the Civil Courts are binding on Criminal Courts, he has urged that whatever decision will come in the civil litigation will have to be binding on the Criminal Court, as such the proceedings should not be allowed to be continued. It has to be noted that the civil litigation started subsequent to the criminal complaint filed by the respondent. If this principle is to be applied, then in most of the cases, it shall be convenient for an accused person to start civil litigation and ask forestalling of the criminal prosecution. I may further observe that there is not an absolute bar on the continuation of civil and criminal litigation simultaneously.

In support of my conclusion, I may refer to the following observations of their Lorships of Supreme Court in Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar & anr., 1985(1) Recent Criminal Reports 539 (SC) : 1985(1) CLR 666 :

"There are a large number of cases where criminal law and civil law can run side by side. The two remedies are not mutually exclusive but clearly coextensive and essentially differ in their content and consequence. The object of the criminal law is to punish an offender who commits an offence against a person, property or the State for which the accused, on proof of the offence, is deprived of his Liberty and in some cases even his life. This does not, however, affect the civil remedies at all for suing the wrong doer in cases like arson, accidents etc. It is an anathema to suppose that when a civil remedy is available, a criminal prosecution is completely barred. The two types of actions are quite different in content, scope and import."

The prayer of the petitioner for quashing of the complaint or staying of the proceedings on the basis of the pendency of civil litigation, thus, cannot be allowed. No other point has been urged. There is no merit in this petition and the same is hereby dismissed.