Anirban A Chowdhury vs State Of Goa And Others

Ashwin D. Bhobe, J

Heard, Mr. Parag Rao, learned Advocate for the Applicant, Mr. Nikhil Vaze, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the Respondent/State and Mr. S. Sardinha, learned Advocate for Respondent No. 3.

By the present Application filed under Section 483 of the BNSS Act, 2023, the Applicant seeks bail in connection with Women P. S. Crime No. 01/2026, registered with the Women Police Station at Panaji, Goa, for offences punishable under Sections 115, 351(3), 117(2) and 109 of the BNS. The App2licant is the sole Accused in the said crime, which is now registered as Sessions Case No. 37/2026 and is pending before the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge at Merces ("Sessions Court").

On 21.02.2026, Respondent No. 3 (victim) filed a complaint with Respondent No. 2. In her complaint, Respondent No. 3 alleged that on 10.02.2026, at approximately 09.30 p.m., at "Casa Edmarelia" (house of the Applicant), during an argument, the Applicant assaulted Respondent No. 3 by slapping her head and hitting it against the floor, causing head injuries. After the assault, the Applicant took Respondent No. 3 to Manipal Hospital, Dona Paula, Goa, where she received treatment. After treatment, Respondent No. 3 returned to the house of the Applicant, "Casa Edmarelia". Based on the complaint dated 21.02.2026, the crime was registered on 25.02.2026 for offences punishable under Sections 115, 351(3) and 117(2) of BNS 2023. Section 109 of the BNS was added subsequently on 05.03.2026.

The Applicant was arrested on 07.03.2026 and remains in custody.

The bail application at Exhibit D-6, filed by the Applicant before the Sessions Court, was rejected by the Sessions Court on 20.05.2026.

Mr. Parag Rao, learned Advocate appearing for the Applicant, submits that the Applicant and Respondent No. 3 were in a live-in relationship and were residing together at "Casa Edmarelia". He submits that on 10.02.2026, a verbal argument between the Applicant and Respondent No. 3 arose from a disagreement and escalated into an altercation, during which Respondent No. 3 fell on the sofa, sustaining head injuries. He submits that the Applicant rushed Respondent No. 3 to the Manipal Hospital and administered first aid. He submits that after treatment, Respondent No. 3 and the Applicant continued to reside together at "Casa Edmarelia" till 13.02.2026. He submits that the Applicant, Respondent No. 3 and other friends of the Applicant were partying on 14.02.2026. He submits that the Applicant was fit and enjoying the party. He submits that Respondent No. 3 filed a complaint after almost 11 days, making false allegations against the Applicant. He submits that upon registration of the crime, the Applicant was issued a notice under Section 35(3) of BNSS, which the Applicant complied with and further cooperated with the investigation. He submits that even after the Applicant extended cooperation, the Applicant was called on 07.03.2026 and arrested by Respondent No. 2. He further submits that the investigation is complete and the chargesheet has been filed. He submits that the injury sustained by Respondent No. 3 was accidental. He submits that the material collected, along with the chargesheet, does not indicate any offence, much less any offence under Section 109 of BNS. He submits that, apart from Section 109 of BNS, all other offences are bailable. He submits that the Applicant has roots in Goa and would cooperate and attend the trial. He submits that the documents forming part of the charge sheet will indicate the conduct and manner in which Respondent No. 3 has behaved before the Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC) 'D' Court at Mapusa ("Magistrate"). He submits that the Applicant has made out the case and is ready to abide by all the conditions that this Court may deem fit to impose in the event bail is granted.

Mr. Nikhil Vaze, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State, submits that the investigation is complete and the chargesheet is filed. He submits that there are no recoveries to be made. He submits that the Applicant has cooperated with the investigation. He submits that the Respondent No. 2 reserves its right to further investigate the Applicant in the event that the occasion arises. He submits that the prosecution has the right under Section 193 of BNSS to investigate the Applicant, subject to permission of the Court.

Mr. Shalom Sardinha, learned Advocate for Respondent No. 3, fervidly opposes the bail application. He submits that Respondent No. 3 and the Applicant were in a live-in relationship and Respondent No. 3 was residing with the Applicant at "Casa Edmarelia" (i.e., the house of the Applicant). He submits that the assault on Respondent No. 3 occurred at "Casa Edmarelia". He submits that the injuries inflicted on Respondent No. 3 were to a vital part of the body (i.e. the head of Respondent No. 3). He refers to the Medical Certificate issued by the Manipal Hospital, Dona Paula and submits that the injuries referred to therein indicate the seriousness of the injury. He submits that the nature and manner in which the injuries were caused to Respondent No. 3 clearly demonstrate the Applicant's intention to kill Respondent No. 3. He refers to the documents, particularly the WhatsApp messages, the complaint dated 21.05.2026 and other documents placed along with the chargesheet, to submit that the offence under Section 109 of the BNS against the Applicant is clearly made out. He submits that the Applicant initially threatened the Doctor who treated Respondent No. 3. He submits that though the Applicant is in jail, threats are being issued to Respondent No. 3 at the instance and behest of the Applicant. He submits that, even before the arrest of the Applicant, the Applicant was issuing constant threats to Respondent No. 3.

Mr. Shalom Sardinha, learned Advocate for Respondent No. 3, submits that although the Applicant filed the complaint on 21.02.2026 regarding an incident dated 10.02.2026, according to Mr. Shalom Sardinha the criminal law was already set in motion by the Medico-Legal Certificate issued by the Manipal Hospital at Dona Paula to the Police Station. He submits that the Medico-Legal Certificate itself must be treated as an FIR. He further submits that the injury to the Respondent No. 3 referred to in the Medico-Legal Certificate indicates the ingredients of Section 109 of the BNS. He opposes the grant of bail, submitting that the Applicant might also be a flight risk.

Mr. Shalom Sardinha relies on the decision in State of U.P. V/s Amarmani Thripathi[(2005) 8 SCC 21] and the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Virupakshappa Gouda & anr V/s State of Karnataka & anr.[ (2017) 5 SCC 406]

Perused the records with the assistance of the learned Advocates.

The Applicant and Respondent No. 3, being in a live-in relationship and staying together, is not disputed by Mr. Shalom Sardinha. The records reveal that the incident complained of by Respondent No. 3 on 21.02.2026 occurred on 10.02.2026 at "CasaEdmarelia". The Applicant is said to have immediately taken Respondent No. 3 to Manipal Hospital, Dona Paula, for treatment. After treatment at Manipal Hospital, Dona Paula, Respondent No. 3 and the Applicant stayed together at "Casa Edmarelia" till 13.02.2026. As stated by Mr. Parag Rao, learned Advocate for the Applicant and not disputed by Mr. Shalom Sardinha, learned Advocate appearing for Respondent No. 3, the Applicant, along with their friends, had a party on 14.02.2026.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Roshanlal V/s The State of Haryana and anr.[ 2026 SCC OnLine SC 921] in paragraph Nos. 24 to 31 has held as follows:

"24. The principal question that arises for consideration before this Court is whether the accused persons can be held guilty of the offence punishable under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, and, in particular, whether the es-sential ingredients of the said provision stood satisfied on the basis of the materials brought on record.

Section 307 IPC reads as below:

Attempt to murder.-Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.

In order to constitute an offence under Section 307 IPC two elements are essential to be established. First, the intention or knowledge to commit murder. Secondly, the actual act of trying to commit the murder. Thus, it must have both the necessary mens rea and actus reus. Hence, to sustain a conviction under this section, it is necessary to establish that had the accused succeeded in his attempt and had the victim met his death because of such act, the offence of murder punishable u/s 302 IPC would be established.

However, an accused charged u/s 307 IPC cannot be acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of simple hurt, as the determinative factor is intention or knowledge and not the nature of the injury. This principle was discussed by this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Saleem @ Chamaru, (2005) 5 SCC 554, the relevant paragraph of which reads hereunder:

"12. To justify a conviction under this section, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases in which the culprit would be liable under this section. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. What the court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof."

Nevertheless, the nature of injury actually caused does render considerable assistance to the court in ascertaining the intention of the accused. However, courts may also ascertain the intention from other circumstances, even without reference to actual wounds. The aforesaid principle stands reiterated in the case of Bipin Bihari v. State of M.P. (2006) 8 SCC 799, as follows:

"9. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof"

Keeping in mind the above principles, what falls for determination before this Court is whether the appellants caused the injuries in question, and whether such act ac-companied by the requisite intention or knowledge, was committed in circumstances which, if resulting in death, would render the act culpable as murder.

The evidence of eye-witness Rama Nand (PW4) is un-wavering and consistent. PW4 has specifically named all the accused persons with specific acts attributable to each appellant-accused, in his testimony. Further, the evidence of the informant Amar Singh (PW3) itself clearly describes the specific roles played by each of the accused-appellants herein. The appellants have also not led any evidence to disprove the testimonies of Amar Singh (PW3) and Rama Nand (PW4). Hence, it can be concluded without an iota of doubt that the appellants had caused the injuries to the informant, which could have led to his death.

Having concluded as above, we now proceed to exam-ine the crucial issue as to whether the injuries in question were inflicted with the requisite intention or knowledge, and in such circumstances that, had death ensued, the act would amount to murder.

The words 'such intention' found in Section 307 IPC, refer to the intention referred to in Section 300 IPC. It means: (i) intention to cause death; (ii) intention to cause such bodily injury, which the offender knows is likely to cause death; (iii) intention to cause such bodily injury, which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

The essential ingredient of the offence of attempt to murder is the intention to cause death. Such intention ex¬ists prior to the actual attempt and must be established in-dependently of the act itself or the actus reus. Once the re-quisite intention to commit murder is proved, the eventual outcome of the attempt becomes irrelevant, unless the at-tempt culminates in death, in which case the offence would fall within Section 300 IPC. In the absence of proof of in-tention, a conviction under this provision cannot be sus-tained."

The complaint dated 21.02.2025, filed by Respondent No. 3, is at page no. 53 of the paper book. Mr. P. Rao, submits that the incident of 10.02.2026 arose out of tiffs and skirmishes between the two live-in partners. The nature of injury alone is not determinative of the applicability of Section 109 of BNS. What is relevant is the intention or knowledge with which the act was committed. The allegations in the complaint, prima facie, do not indicate the two essential elements i.e. the intention or knowledge to commit murder and the actual act of attempting to commit the murder. The necessary mens rea and actus reus for the offence under Section 109 of the BNS are prima facie, lacking from the allegations made by the Respondent No. 3. Further, there is no explanation for the delay in filing the complaint.

Mr. Parag Rao, learned Advocate appearing for the Applicant, during his arguments, by referring to page No. 134 of the paper book, submits that Respondent No. 3 was very unmannerly and rude while her statement under Section 183 of BNSS (Section 164 of Cr.P.C.) was being recorded on 02.03.2026, by the Magistrate. Mr. Parag Rao was at pains to point out a note of the Magistrate made in the statement dated 02.03.2026 recorded under Section 183 of BNSS, which, according to Mr. P. Rao, the Magistrate was compelled to make in view of the refusal of the Respondent No. 3 to sign the said statement recorded by the Magistrate. He further points out the Notice dated 06.03.2026 (at page no. 203 to 204), where the Chief Judicial Magistrate "A" Court, Merces, Goa had called upon Respondent No. 3 to clarify her stand as to why Respondent No. 3 did not sign the statement recorded by the Magistrate under Section 183 of BNSS. Mr. Parag Rao states that Respondent No.3 has, to date, not filed any reply to the said Notice dated 06.03.2026.

A perusal of the note(s) made by the Magistrate in the statement of Respondent No. 3, recorded under Section 183 of BNSS, gives the impression that Respondent No. 3 was harsh towards the Magistrate while her statement was being recorded, as rightly submitted by Mr. Parag Rao.

Be that as it may, the investigation in the present crime is complete and the chargesheet has been filed. As submitted by Mr. Nikhil Vaze, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, the Applicant has cooperated with the investigation. The prosecution has cited 14 witnesses in the said crime. In the facts of this case, custody of the Applicant pending trial is not warranted. The apprehensions expressed by Mr. Shalom Sardina can be allayed by imposing stringent bail conditions.

Mr. Parag Rao, learned Advocate for the Applicant submits that the Applicant shall not enter the jurisdiction of the Village Panchayat of Ribandar till the conclusion of the trial in Session Case No. 37/2026.

In view of the above, this is a fit case for enlarging the Applicant on bail, subject to the following conditions:

(a) The Applicant shall be released on bail in Crime No. 01/2026, registered by Respondent No. 2 under Sections 115, 351(3), 117(2) and 109 BNS, upon furnishing a personal bond of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) with one surety in the like amount, to the satisfaction of the Sessions Court.

(b) The Applicant shall not contact Respondent No.3 directly or indirectly nor issue any threats to Respondent No. 3.

(c) The Applicant shall not threaten or influence the witnesses, nor shall the Applicant directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person/s acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade that person/s from disclosing such facts to the Court. The Applicant shall not tamper with the evidence.

(d) The Applicant shall furnish his identity proof, address proof, email and phone number, including those of his sureties, to the Investigating Officer, who shall verify them within three days of his release and keep the Investigating Officer updated on the same.

(e) The Applicant shall surrender his Passport to the Investigating Officer, within three days of his release.

(g) The Applicant shall not leave the Country without the prior permission of the Sessions Court.

(h) The Applicant shall not enter the territorial jurisdiction of the Village Panchayat of Ribandar village till the conclusion of the trial.

(i) The Applicant shall regularly appear on the dates fixed in Session Case No. 37/2026, unless specifically exempted by the Sessions Court.

(j) Needless to say, the violation of any of the aforesaid conditions shall make the Applicant liable for cancellation of bail.

The observations made herein are prima facie and are limited and restricted to the consideration of the present bail Application.

The Application stands disposed of accordingly.

This order will be digitally signed by the Private Secretary/ Personal Assistant of this Court. All concerned will act on production by fax or email of a digitally signed copy of this order.