AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
V.M. Kanade, J.
Heard.
In the present case, operative part of the order was pronounced on 1st December, 2014. Rule was granted on 14th July, 2014 and it was served on the Respondents. Respondents were directed to file reply within four weeks. Reply accordingly has been filed on 21/09/2014.
Brief facts giving rise to the present Petition are as under:-
Petitioner is the wife of Respondent No. 1''s brother. There were certain disputes between the Petitioner and Respondent No. 1 in respect of residential flat occupied by the Petitioner. According to the Petitioner, she and her husband are residing in the said flat and Respondent No. 1 initially filed a Suit in this Court being Suit No. 1286 of 2010 which is now transferred to the Bombay City Civil Court being Short Cause Suit No. 3694 of 2013. Petitioner has also initiated criminal complaints against Respondent No. 1 and two others. Similarly, Respondent No. 1 and deleted Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 also have filed criminal complaints against the Petitioner herein. According to the Petitioner, Respondent No. 1 and deleted Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have committed various acts of contempt which are punishable under section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act.
It is the case of the Petitioner that Respondent Nos.1 ,2 and 3 have published various articles and have written letters making scandalous allegations against the learned Magistrate and even the Hon''ble Judges of this Court. Petitioner''s case is that this has been done intentionally with a view to intimidate the Presiding Officers of various Courts who were hearing the case of the said Respondents and the Petitioner.
Petitioner, therefore, made an application dated 4th December, 2013 alongwith copies of various complaints, letters and applications made by Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to the learned Advocate General of Maharashtra to seek leave to prosecute Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 under the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act. The learned Advocate General granted permission to prosecute Respondent No. 1 by exercising power vested in him under section 15(1)(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act. Petitioner has also annexed various letters written by Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 maligning not only the Judicial Officers of this Court and subordinate court but also every Advocate and every Counsel who appeared in the matter. By order dated 16/01/2014, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate has issued notices to Respondent No. 1 and his wife asking them to show cause why reference should not be made to the High Court for initiating contempt proceedings.
Mr. Murthy, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner has invited our attention to the permission granted by the learned Advocate General dated 06/1/2014. He has invited our attention to the various letters, communications made by Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 against the Metropolitan Magistrates, Officers of this Court, Advocates and Counsels appearing on behalf of the Petitioner. He has submitted that Respondent No. 1, therefore, has committed contempt of this Court. He has submitted that no apology has been given by Respondent No. 1 in the affidavit in reply.
Respondent No. 1 has appeared in person and he has neither tendered unconditional apology to this Court nor he has shown any remorse for writing scandalous letters and making allegations against the Magistrates as also the Counsels who were appearing on behalf of the Petitioner.
Petitioner had filed an application dated 4th December, 2013 seeking permission under section 15(1)(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act. The learned Advocate General came to the conclusion that so far as the alleged scandalous statements which were made on the social networking site (Face Book) in October, 2011 were concerned, they were barred by limitation. The learned Advocate General, however, came to the conclusion that the statements made in 2013 and the letter dated 22nd August, 2013 addressed to the various dignitaries as well as letter dated 5th April, 2013 scandalize and lower the authority of the Bombay High Court and cast unwarranted defamatory aspersions upon the character or ability of judges and the allegations of corruption amount to scandalizing the court. The learned Advocate General has made the following observations:-
"In a letter dated 22nd August 2013 addressed by the alleged contemnor (ii) and one Shri Sunil D. Hiranandani to the Hon''ble Prime Minister of India, the Hon''ble Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court, the Prothonotary and Senior Master of the Bombay High Court and the Principal Judge of the Bombay City Civil Court, it is stated as under:
"Re: Grievance, for my Bombay high court Order 1286/2010, to transfer to Bombay city civil court, due to value less then one crore, since 10 months. No justice have been granted only given dates, and loosing hopes on judiciary, due to there is no system, no law, who ever give bribe wins the case.
With reference to, we are completely unhappy, from the unjustice given by Bombay high court, we feel we have been cheated, we filed the case in 22nd April 2010, and after two and half years, it was most foolish decision to transfer all the cases below one crore."
In an application made to the Bombay City Civil Court on 22nd August 2013 by the alleged contemnor (ii) the first line of the "prayer" reads as follows:
"The Bombay High Court have (sic has) already delayed the case over period of two years......"
In a letter dated 5th April 2013 addressed by the alleged contemnors to the Hon''ble Prime Minister of India, the Hon''ble Chief Minister of Maharashtra, the Hon''ble Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court and the Director General of Police, Maharashtra, it has inter alia been stated as follows:
"With reference to the above, we have grievances; this case was not fairly judged by the Hon''ble Justice P.V. Hardas & Hon''ble Shri Justice A.R. Joshi and they have totally supported respondent no. 1 State of Maharashtra, despite knowing how corrupt Oshiwara Police station is. Justice K.R. Chaudhary has prolonged and stretched the case for two years, and passed this order, we cannot remove respondent no. 2 because there is only corruption.
The justice system of India has made our life very miserable and makes us totally sick to visit court over 100 times, and make us to sit with full tension for 4 to 5 hours, and no justice was granted and still the cases are running at Andheri court no. 65, the next date on board is 24th May 2013.
...we are only suffering, due to high corruption in your various courts, we are extremely unable to get any justice at all.
The judges are not fearful, even though they are wrong, there are no punishments, they know they are going to sit on the chair, which is pure money making machine for them. ""
Respondent No. 1, instead of showing any remorse in writing such scandalous letters or tendering his apology, has tried to justify his actions. Even in the affidavit in reply which is filed by Respondent No. 1, he has tried to justify his actions.
We are satisfied that Respondent No. 1 has committed contempt of this Court in respect of the letters written by him for which permission has been granted by the learned Advocate General to prosecute Respondent No. 1 under the Contempt of Courts Act. The Apex Court in Brahma Prakash Sharma and Others Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh, has observed in paras 8, 10, 11 and 12 as under:-
"(8) It admits of no dispute that the summary jurisdiction exercised by superior courts in punishing contempt of their authority exists for the purpose of preventing interference with the course of justice and for maintaining the authority of law as is administered in the courts. It would be only repeating what has been said so often by various Judges that the object of contempt proceedings is not to afford protection to Judges personally from imputations to which they may be exposed as individuals; it is intended to be a protection to the public whose interests would be very much affected if by the act or conduct of any party, the authority of the court is lowered and the sense of confidence which people have in the administration of justice by it is weakened."
(10) There are decisions of English Courts from early times where the courts assumed jurisdiction in taking committal proceedings against persons who were guilty of publishing any scandalous matter in respect of the court itself. In the year 1899, Lord Morris in delivering the judgment of the judicial Committee in -''McLeod v. St. Aubin'', (1899) AC 549 (C ) observed that
"Committals for contempt by scandalising the Court itself have become obsolete in this country. Courts are satisfied to leave to public opinion attacks or comments derogatory or scandalous to them."
His Lordship said further:
"The power summarily to commit for contempt is considered necessary for the proper administration of justice. It is not to be used for the vindication of a judge as a person. He must resort to action for libel or criminal information."
The observation of Lord Morris that contempt proceedings for scandalising the courts have become obsolete in England is not, strictly speaking, correct; for, in the very next year, such proceedings were taken in ''1900-2 QB 36 (A)''. In that case, there was a scandalous attack of a rather atrocious type on Darling J. who was sitting at that time in Birmingham Assizes and was trying a man named Wells who was indicted ''inter alia'' for selling and publishing obscene literature. The Judge, in the course of the trial, gave a warning to the newspaper press that in reporting the proceedings of the court, it was not proper for them to give publicity to indecent matters that were revealed during trial. Upon this, the defendant published an article in the Birmingham Daily Argus, under the heading "An advocate of Decency", where Darling J. was abused in scurrilous language. The case of Wells was then over but the Assizes were still sitting. There can be no doubt that the publication amounted to contempt of court and such attack was calculated to interfere directly with proper administration of justice. Lord Russell in the course of his judgment, however, took care to observe that the summary jurisdiction by way of contempt proceedings in such cases where the court itself was attacked has to be exercised with scrupulous care and only when the case is clear and beyond reasonable doubt. "Because", as his Lordship said, "if it is not a case beyond reasonable doubt, the court should and ought to leave the Attorney- General to proceed by criminal information". In 1943, Lord Atkin, while delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in - Brahma Prakash Sharma and Others Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh, observed that cases of contempt, which consist of scandalising the court itself, are fortunately rare and require to be treated with much discretion. Proceedings for this species of contempt should be used sparingly and always with reference to the administration of justice. "If a judge is defamed in such a way as not to affect the administration of justice, be has the ordinary remedies for defamation if he should feel impelled to use them."
(11) It seems, therefore, that there are two primary considerations which should weigh with the court when it is called upon to exercise the summary powers in cases of contempt committed by "scandalising" the court itself. In the first place, the reflection on the conduct or character of a judge in reference to the discharge of his judicial duties would not be contempt if such reflection is made in the exercise of the right of fair and reasonable criticism which every citizen possesses in respect of public acts done in the seat of justice. It is not by stifling criticism that confidence in courts can be created. "The path of criticism", said Lord Atkin -''Ambard v. Att.-Gen. for Trinidad and Tobago'', AIR 1936 PC 141 at pp. 145 and 146 (E)
"is a public way. The wrong-headed are permitted to err therein; provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part in the administration of justice and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism and not acting in malice, or attempting to impair the administration of justice, they are immune."
(12) In the second place, when attacks or comments are made on a judge or judges, disparaging in character and derogatory to their dignity, care should be taken to distinguish between what is a libel on the judge and what amounts really to contempt of court. The fact that a statement is defamatory so far as the judge is concerned does not necessarily make it a contempt. The distinction between a libel and a contempt was pointed out by a Committee of the Privy Council, to which a reference was made by the Secretary of State in 1892, -''In the matter of a Special Reference from the Bahama Islands'', 1893 AC 138 (F).
A man in the Bahama Islands, in a letter published in a colonial newspaper criticised the Chief Justice of the Colony in an extremely ill-chosen language which was sarcastic and pungent. There was a veiled insinuation that he was an incompetent judge and a shirker of work and the writer suggested in a way that it would be a providential thing if he were to die. A strong Board constituting of 11 members reported that the letter complained of, though it might have been made the subject of proceedings for libel, was not, in the circumstances, calculated to obstruct or interfere with the course of justice or the due administration of the law and therefore did not constitute a contempt of court.
The same principle was re-iterated by Lord Atkin in the case of Brahma Prakash Sharma and Others Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh, referred to above. It was followed and approved of by the High Court of Australia in ''King v. Nicholls'', 12 Com-w LR 280 (G), and has been accepted as sound by this Court in Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy Vs. The State of Madras, . The position therefore is that a defamatory attack on a judge may be a libel so far as the judge is concerned and it would be open to him to proceed against the libellor in a proper action if he so chooses. If, however, the publication of the disparaging statement is calculated to interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of law by such court, it can be punished summarily as contempt. One is a wrong done to the judge personally while the other is a wrong done to the public. It will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the court''s administration of justice, or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties. It is well established that it is not necessary to prove affirmatively that there has been an actual interference with the administration of justice by reason of such defamatory statement; it is enough if it is likely, or tends in any way, to interfere with the proper administration of law [Mr. Mookerjea J. -''In re Motilal Ghose'', AIR 1918 Cal 988 at p. 994 (I)."
The tendency of litigants, who appear in person, to scandalize the Court has increased. Respondent No. 1 is one such litigant who has resorted to scandalizing the court by making reckless allegations against the judges, lawyers and counsels. We are of the view, therefore, that Respondent No. 1 has committed contempt of this Court.
In the result, the following order is passed:-
ORDER
Contempt Petition is allowed. The Contemnor Respondent No. 1 Dwarka Revchand Hiranandani is convicted under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act and he has to undergo sentence of simple imprisonment for one month.
Needless to state that the Respondent No. 1 has a right to file an appeal in the Apex Court against this order and, therefore, this order will not be implemented till the appeal period is over. State, however, is directed to take Respondent No. 1 in custody forthwith after the reasoned order is made available to him and after the appeal period is over from the date when he received the reasoned order, unless the stay order is granted by the Apex Court.