Anjore Das @APPELLANT@Hash State of Chhattisgarh

The substantial question of law involved, formulated and to be answered in this plaintiff No.1's second appeal is as under: -

“Whether both the Courts below were justified in holding that the suit filed by the plaintiffs was not maintainable in view of the bar contained in

Section 257(y) of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code?â€​

(For sake of convenience, parties would be referred hereinafter as per their status shown in the trial Court.)

Plaintiff No.1 Anjore Das and two others filed a suit for declaration of their title and permanent injunction stating inter alia that the suit tank bearing

Khasra No.159, area 3.14 acres, and embankment of the suit tank bearing Khasra No.143, area 10.63 acres, was given to the plaintiffs in partition

prior to the Abolition of Proprietary Rights and as such, they are the owners and title holders of the suit land which has been vested with the State

Government under Section 251 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (for short, 'the Code') contrary to law and therefore title be declared in

their favour and injunction be granted. In the said suit, defendant No.1 and other defendants remained ex parte.

The trial Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence on record held that the suit tank with its embankment were vested with the State

Government by the order of the competent authority under Section 251 of the Code vide order dated 19-2-1964 (Ex.P-9) and by virtue of the

provisions contained in Section 257(y) of the Code, the jurisdiction of civil court is barred which has been upheld by the first appellate Court and in

second appeal, substantial question of law has been framed which has been set-out in the opening paragraph of this judgment.

Mr. Akash Pandey, learned counsel appearing for the appellant / plaintiff No.1, submits that the concurrent finding recorded by the two Courts

below are perverse and contrary to the record.

Mr. Arun Sao and Mr. Adhiraj Surana, learned State counsel, would support the impugned judgment & decree.

Undisputedly, the suit tank along with its embankment was vested with the State Government by the order of the competent authority in exercise of

power conferred under Section 251 of the Code by order dated 19-2-1964 (Ex.P-9). The instant suit for declaration of title and injunction was filed by

the plaintiffs in which simple declaration of title in their favour and injunction was sought. Order dated 19-2-1964 (Ex.P-9) has not been questioned by

the plaintiffs expressly though a ground has been taken and no relief of setting aside of the order dated 19-2-1964 has been sought for. It ought to

have been challenged expressly.

At this stage, it would be apt to notice clause (y) of Section 257 of the Code which reads as under: -

“257. Exclusive jurisdiction of revenue authorities .â€" Except as otherwise provided in this Code, or in any other enactment for the time being in

force, no Civil Court shall entertain any suit instituted or application made to obtain a decision or order on any matter which the State Government, the

Board, or any Revenue Officer is by this Code, empowered to determine decide or dispose of, and in particular and without prejudice to the generality

of this provision, no Civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction over any of the following matters:â€

(y) any decision regarding vesting of tanks in State Government under section 251 and any claim against the State Government arising thereunder;â€​

A focused perusal of clause (y) of Section 257 of the Code would show that any decision regarding vesting of tanks in State Government under

Section 251 of the Code and any claim against the State Government arising thereunder is expressly barred.

Reverting to the facts of the present case, in the civil suit, the decision of the competent authority dated 19-2-1964 (Ex.P-9) was sought to be

impliedly challenged though no express challenge was made and the claim was made to the suit tank which has already been vested with the State

Government vide Ex.P-9 as such, the suit was barred by the aforesaid provision. The trial Court as well as the first appellate Court rightly held the suit

to be barred by Section 257(y) of the Code.

There is yet one another reason for holding the suit to be barred, as the order of vesting dated 19-2-1964 was not expressly challenged by the

plaintiffs which could have been challenged by claiming further relief of setting aside of the said order by virtue of the proviso to Section 34 of the

Special Relief Act, 1963 and therefore the suit as framed and filed by the plaintiffs is also hit by proviso to Section 34 of the Special Relief Act, 1963.

The Supreme Court in the matter of Jugraj Singh and another v. Jaswant Singh and others1970(2) SCC 386 , dealing with similar situation, held as

under: -

“13. … It will be noticed that they neither asked for the cancellation of the order of the Collector nor for any injunction, two of the reliefs which

they were entitled to ask in the case in addition to the declaration. Such a suit would be hit by Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act and we would be

quite in a position to deny them the declaration without these specific reliefs. Indeed they had only to ask for setting aside of the order.â€​

In view of the aforesaid discussion, both the Courts below have rightly held the suit to be barred by Section 257(y) of the Code as well as the

proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. I do not find any merit in the second appeal. The substantial question of law is answered in

affirmative. The second appeal deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to cost(s).