Anju Mehta and Others vs State of Punjab and Others

Rajan Gupta, J.—The petitioners have sought a writ in the natureof certiorari for quashing order dated 24.10.2011 (AnnexureP-12) passed by respondent No.2 transferring them tovarious places in Tarn Taran and Kapurthala.

Learned counsel for the petitioners contends thatorder was passed in an arbitrary manner as personsappointed on contract basis are sought to be appointedagainst the posts which were occupied by petitioners.According to him, petitioners who are regular employees,were entitled to continue on the posts they were holding indistrict Amritsar in view of long service rendered by them.

I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners.

The argument raised is not convincing. A regularemployee is liable to be transferred in accordance withrules. This apart it appears that petitioners have beentransferred to places very near to their previous place ofposting vide order dated 24.10.2011. In all likelihood petitioners must have joined at their new place of posting.Transfer is not only an exigency but an incidence ofservice. In this regard, observations of this court in thejudgment reported as Jit Singh Mallah vs. Punjab State Electricity Board and Others The Punjab Law Reporter (2007-1) 579, are relevant which are reproduced below:-

We are unable to accept any of the submissionsmade by the learned counsel. Firstly, the petitionerbeing a Government servant has no inherent right tochoose the place of his posting. Secondly, theinstructions relied upon by the petitioner are mereguidelines. The said guidelines cannot be said to bemandatory and do not, therefore, create any legalright in favour of the petitioner. This question hasbeen specifically considered by the B. Varadha Rao Vs. State of Karnataka and Others, wherein it has been clearly held that theguidelines such as Annexure P-11 do not confer anylegal right on an employee. The transfer of anemployee is not only an incident of service but acondition of service as well. It is the prerogativeof the authorities concerned and this Court is not tonormally interfere except when it is shown to bevitiated by mala fides or is in violation of astatutory provision or has been passed by anincompetent authority. None of the said factors hasbeen shown or even pleaded in the present case. Weare also of the opinion that the order passed by therespondents is purely administrative in nature and,therefore, cannot be termed as either arbitrary orwhimsical.

In view of the facts and circumstances of the caseand the judgment in Jit Singh''s case (supra), I am of the considered view that no interference is called for in writjurisdiction of this court.

Dismissed.