High CourtsSingle Bench(2019) 08 RAJ CK 0125

Anjum Pervez vs Rajasthan Marudhara Gramin Bank R.m.g.b And Ors

Rajasthan High Court · Decided on 21 August 2019

HON’BLE JUDGES
P.K. Lohra, J
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Civil Writ Petition No. 7998 Of 2018

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Judgment

9 paragraphs · 645 words

Petitioner has preferred this writ petition to challenge order dated 09.06.2017 (Annex.13), passed by Disciplinary Authority of respondent-Bank, imposing penalty of reduction of basic pay by five stages lower to the original pay scale till retirement with cumulative effect and denial of stagnation increment due on 27.03.2018, as well as order dated 22.12.2017 (Annex.16), passed by Appellate Authority of the respondent-Bank.

The facts, in brief, are that while working on the post of Officer Scale-III, petitioner was subjected to disciplinary proceedings and upon conclusion of enquiry, considering his proven delinquency, he was conveyed aforesaid punishments. Being aggrieved by order of punishment, petitioner preferred appeal before Appellate Authority under Regulation 49 of the Rajasthan Marudhara Gramin Bank (Officer & Employees) Service Regulations, 2010 (for short, 'Regulations of 2010'). As per version of the petitioner, punishment order was conveyed to him on 22.07.2017, and thereupon, he preferred appeal within the period of limitation, i.e., on 03.08.2017. The Appellate Authority, while considering the appeal, noticed that the punishment order was conveyed to the petitioner on 14.06.2017 at his residence through registered A.D. Post, and therefore, the appeal is filed after expiry of 45 days. The Appellate Authority, therefore, non-suited the petitioner solely on the ground of delay, without entering into merits of the contentions raised in the memo of appeal.

On behalf of respondent-Bank reply to the writ petition is filed. In the reply, it is pleaded that the appeal was barred by limitation and there is no provision for condonation of delay under the Regulations of 2010, and therefore, so far as order Annex.16 is concerned, no interference is warranted.

During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner has confined his submissions only to the extent of assailing impugned order Annex.16. It is argued by learned counsel that in fact appeal was within time, and therefore, it ought not have been dismissed on the ground of delay. Alternatively, it is argued by Mr. Sharma that there was hardly 5 days' delay, and therefore, it was expected of the Appellate Authority to have examined the appeal on merits.

Per contra, Mr. Tiwari, learned counsel for the respondent, submits that as there is no provision for condonation of delay under Regulation 49 of the Regulations of 2010, no interference with the impugned order Annex.16 is warranted.

I have bestowed my considerations to the arguments advanced at Bar.

Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and taking into account nature of the punishments with which petitioner is visited by order Annex.13, in the considered opinion of this Court, it was expected of the Appellate Authority to have examined afflictions of the petitioner on merits. The remedy of appeal provided under the Regulations of 2010 though do not envisages condonation of delay but then such power can be exercised being plenary within the competence of the Appellate Authority for doing substantial justice in the matter. Any incumbent, who has been awarded punishment, as a consequence of disciplinary enquiry, cannot be denied right of appeal, which is provided under service rules or regulations on a jejune ground of delay that too of hardly 5 days. As observed supra, nature of the punishments is also per se too harsh, and therefore, it was very much desirable from Appellate Authority to have considered the appeal of petitioner on merits.

In view thereof, the writ petition is allowed in part and impugned order dated 22.12.2017 (Annex.16), passed by Appellate Authority of respondent-Bank is quashed and set aside and the matter is remanded back to Appellate Authority for deciding the appeal of petitioner afresh, strictly in accordance with law by passing a well reasoned and speaking order.

As the punishment order relates back to June, 2017, it is also expected of the Appellate Authority to decide the appeal as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of three months from today.