Ankush Gupta (Dr.) & Ors. vs State & Ors.

Mr. B.S. Walia, J.(Oral) - Vide this order, I intend to decide 561-A Cr. P.C. No. 644/2015 and 561-A Cr. P.C. No. 642/2015. Learned

counsel for the petitioners states that as per compromise, Annexure-D, dated 27.10.2015 between petitioner No. 1 and respondent No. 4,

petitioner No. 1 was to pay Rs. 15.00 lacs as lump-sum present and future maintenance to respondent No.4 and that as against the total sum of

Rs. 15 lacs, a sum of Rs. 7.5 lacs was paid to respondent No. 4 vide Cheque No. 069436, dated 27.10.2015 drawn by petitioner No. l’s

father on Jammu and Kashmir Bank, Link Road Branch, Jammu and that in terms of the compromise deed, respondent No.4 was to withdraw all

the cases filed by her in any Court/Police Station of the Country against the petitioners. Remaining amount of Rs. 7.5 Lacs was to be paid by

petitioner No. 1 at the time of passing decree of divorce by the Family Court Pune.

Learned counsel for the petitioners states that in view of receipt of payment of Rs. 7.5 lacs (vide Cheque No. 069436, dated 27.10.2015

drawn by petitioner No. l’s father on Jammu and Kashmir Bank, Link Road Branch, Jammu in favour of respondent No. 4), respondent No.

4 is required to withdraw all the cases filed by her in any Court/Police Station of the Country. He further contends that although the balance

amount of Rs. 7.5 lacs was to be paid by petitioner No. 1 to respondent No. 4 at the time of passing of decree of divorce by the Family Court

Pune, yet the said payment was being made to respondent No. 4 beforehand and further that petitioner No. 1 would take all steps to facilitate

passing of decree of divorce by the Family Court Pune, therefore, the prayer of the petitioners for quashing of the above mentioned FIR’s be

accepted.

Respondent No. 4 is present in court in person. She is identified by learned counsel for the petitioners to be Ms. Sanghita Dey, daughter of Shri

Jahar Dey and wife of Dr. Ankush Gupta, S/o Shri Dhani Ram. In the background as referred to above, learned counsel for the petitioners handed

over to respondent No. 4 in open Court, Cheque No. 000003, dated 11.01.2016 issued by petitioner No. 1 in favour of respondent No. 4 drawn

on HDFC Bank Pune, Maharashtra for the balance sum of Rs. 7.5 lacs towards full and final lump-sum payment of present and future

maintenance.

Respondent No. 4 has accepted the aforesaid cheque/payment and states that she does not want to file reply as she acknowledges

Compromise Deed Annexure D, dated 27.10.2015 as reflecting her true intention to settle the dispute amicably. She further states that in terms of

the compromise she does not want to pursue FIR No. 36/2015, dated 16.06.2015 registered u/ss 498-A, 109 RPC (against the petitioners of

561 -A, 644/2015) registered at Women Protection Cell, Gandhi Nagar, Jammu and FIR No. 220/2015, dated 13.07.2015 registered under

Sections 354, 109 RPC (against the petitioners of 561-A, 642/2015) at Police Station Domana, and all connected proceedings in respect thereto.

She further states that in view of her having received the full amount of Rs. 15.00 Lacs towards lump-sum present and future maintenance amount

in terms of Compromise Deed, Annexure D, dated 27.10.2015 and in anticipation of being granted divorce by the Family Court at Pune on expiry

of statutory period in view of stand on behalf of petitioner No. 1 that all steps would be taken by petitioner No. 1 to facilitate passing of decree of

divorce by the Family Court, Pune, she does not want to pursue the aforementioned FIRs and connected proceedings against the petitioners and

that in the circumstances she has no objection if the said FIR’s and connected proceedings if any are quashed by this Court in exercise of its

inherent powers as she would like to move on in life.

Learned counsel for the petitioners relies upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case titled Jitendra Raghuvanshi & Ors. v.

Babita Raghuvanshi & Anr. {Criminal Appeal No. 447 of 2013, (Arising out of S.L.P. (Cri.) No. 6462 of 2012)} and B.S. Joshi and

Others v. State of Haryana and Anr. reported as (2003) 4 SCC 675 in support of the plea that quashing of the FIR’s in such like cases

would be in the ends of Justice.

Relevant extract of the decision by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, (2003) 4 SCC 675, is as under:

The question that falls for determination in the instant case is about the ambit of the inherent powers of the High Courts under Section 482 of

the Code of Criminal Procedure (the Code) read with Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to quash criminal proceedings. The scope

and ambit of power under Section 482 has been examined by this Court in a catena of earlier decisions but in the present case that is required to

be considered in relation to matrimonial disputes. The matrimonial disputes of the kind in the present case have been on considerable increase in

recent times resulting in filing of complaints by the wife under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC not only against the husband but his other family

members also. When such matters are resolved either by the wife agreeing to rejoin the matrimonial home or mutual separation of husband and

wife and also mutual settlement of other pending disputes as a result whereof both sides approach the High Court and jointly pray for quashing of

the criminal proceedings or the first information report or complaint filed by the wife under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC, can the prayer be

declined on the ground that since the offences are non-compoundable under Section 320 of the Code, therefore, it is not permissible for the court

to quash the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint.

In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy considering the scope of inherent power of quashing under Section 482, this Court held that in the

exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash proceedings if it comes to the conclusion that the ends of justice so require.

It was observed that in a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the

prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice and that the ends of justice are higher

than the ends of mere law though justice had got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. This Court said that the compelling

necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the

inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of

that salient jurisdiction. On facts, it was also noticed that there was no reasonable likelihood of the accused being convicted of the offence. What

would happen to the trial of the case where the wife does not support the imputations made in the FIR of the type in question. As earlier noticed,

now she has filed an affidavit that the FIR was registered at her instance due to temperamental differences and implied imputations. There may be

many reasons for not supporting the imputations. It may be either for the reason that she has resolved disputes with her husband and his other

family members and as a result thereof she has again started living with her husband with whom she earlier had differences or she has willingly

parted company and is living happily on her own or has married someone else on the earlier marriage having been dissolved by divorce on consent

of parties or fails to support the prosecution on some other similar grounds. In such eventuality, there would almost be no chance of conviction.

Would it then be proper to decline' to exercise power of quashing on the ground that it would be permitting the parties to compound non-

compoundable offences? The answer clearly has to be in the ""negative"". It would, however, be a different matter if the High Court on facts declines

the prayer for quashing for any valid reasons including lack of bona fides.

In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre it was held that while exercising inherent power of quashing under

Section 482, it is for the High Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is

expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. Where, in the opinion of the court, chances of an ultimate conviction are

bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may, while taking into

consideration the special facts of a case, also quash the proceedings.

The special features in such matrimonial matters are evident. It becomes the duty of the court to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial

disputes.

The observations made by this Court, though in a slightly different context, in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad are very apt for determining the

approach required to be kept in view in a matrimonial dispute by the courts. It was said that there has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in

recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But

little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the

family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their

being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial

litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a

court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their ""young"" days in chasing their ""cases"" in different

courts.

There is no doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XX-A containing Section 498-A in the Indian Penal Code was to prevent torture to a

woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498-A was added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives who harass

or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy- unlawful demands of dowry. The hypertechnical view would be counterproductive and

would act against interests of women and against the object for which this provision was added. There is every likelihood that non-exercise of

inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter

XX-A of the Indian Penal Code.

In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or

complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code.

For the foregoing reasons, we set aside the impugned judgment and allow the appeal and quash the FIR above mentioned.

I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner, respondent No. 4 who is present in person as also learned counsel for the official respondents.

Learned counsel for the official respondents also stated that he too does not wish to file reply in view of the compromise between petitioner No. 1

and respondent No.4, statement of respondent No. 4 as well as law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as referred to above, and that in the

circumstances he was not opposing the prayer of the petitioners for quashing of FIR No. 36/2015, registered u/ss 498-A, 109 RPC against the

petitioners on 16.06.2015 at Women Protection Cell, Gandhi Nagar Jammu and FIR No. 220/2015, dated 13.07.2015 registered under Sections

354,109 RPC against the petitioners at Police Station Domana as also all connected proceedings in respect thereto.

In view of the position as noted above i.e. of petitioner No. 1 and respondent No. 4 having decided to part company amicably so as to move

on in life and not get bogged down in unending litigation so as to rob them of their youth as also of chances of ultimate conviction in the

aforementioned FIRs being bleak, no useful purpose would be served by allowing the criminal prosecution to continue. Rather non-exercise of

inherent power to quash the proceedings would prevent petitioner No. 1 and respondent No. 4 from settling down in life afresh earlier.

Accordingly, in view of Compromise Deed dated 27.10.2015 as well as statement of respondent No.4 of her having received the entire amount

agreed to be paid by petitioner No. 1 i.e. Rs. 15.00 lacs and in the circumstances not wanting to pursue FIR No. 36/2015 and FIR No.

220/2015, in order to have peace of mind and to settle down in life and in the circumstances, having no objection to both aforesaid FIRs and all

connected proceedings in respect thereto to be quashed, FIR No. 36/2015, dated 16.06.2015 u/ss 498-A, 109 RPC (registered against the

petitioners of 561-A in 644/2015) at Women Protection Cell, Gandhi Nagar, Jammu and FIR No. 220/2015 dated 13.07.2015, registered under

Sections 354, 109 RPC against the petitioners of 561-A in 642/2015) at Police Station Domana, and all connected proceedings in respect thereto

are liable to be quashed.

In the circumstances, while directing Petitioner No. 1 to abide by statement to take all steps to facilitate passing of decree of divorce by the

Family Court, Pune, 561-A Cr. P.C. No. 644/2015, and 561-A Cr P.C. No.642/2015, are allowed. Resultantly, FIR No. 36/2015, dated

16.06.2015 u/ss 498-A, 109 RPC (registered against the petitioners of 561-A in 644/2015) at Women Protection Cell, Gandhi Nagar, Jammu

and FIR No. 220/2015, dated 13.07.2015 registered under Sections 354, 109 RPC against the petitioners of 561-A in 642/2015) at Police

Station Domana, and all connected proceedings in respect thereto are quashed.