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Judgment
29 paragraphs · 628 wordsRamakrishnan, J.—The short question raised in this revision case is whether a certificate of the Deputy Commissioner of the Hindu Religious
Endowments Board, is required, when a trustee seeks for delivery of possession, u/s 101 of Madras Act No. XXII of 1959 in regard to the
records and accounts of a temple. That section says that a trustee or executive officer of a religious institution, etc., shall on application before a
Magistrate and on production of the order of appointment and where the application is for possession of property, of a certificate by the
Commissioner in the prescribed form setting forth that the property in question belongs to the religious institution, direct delivery, to the person
appointed, of the possession of such-religious institution, or the records, accounts and properties thereof, as the case may be.
The Magistrate, in this case, directed delivery of possession both of the institution as well as of the records and accounts. The Petitioner who is
an ex-trustee, contends that, the records and accounts are also properties of the temple, and that, therefore, without a certificate from the Deputy
Commissioner, delivery of possession of records and accounts cannot be ordered. The short question for consideration is whether, for the purpose
of Section 101, the word properties in regard to which production of a certificate by the Commissioner is enjoined, will include the records and
accounts. No doubt, on a broad view of the term, records and accounts are also property. But the section has used, the term, religious institution,
records, accounts and properties treating them as distinct units. Therefore, to find out whether records and accounts should be clubbed with
properties, for the purpose of the requirement of the certificate, we should look at the language of the section as a whole, to find out what the
Legislature meant by that term. The three provisos and especially the second and third provisos provide a clue as to what the word properties
should mean in the context. The second and third provisos read thus:
Provided further that for the purpose of proceedings under this Sub-section, the certificate aforesaid shall be conclusive evidence that the
properties to which it relates belong to the religious institution:
Provided also that nothing contained in this Sub-section shall bar the institution of a suit by any person aggrieved by an order under this Sub-
section for establishing his title to the said, property.
The certificate follows an enquiry and investigation enjoined by the section itself, to be conducted by the Deputy Commissioner, to find out
whether the properties in question belong to the religious institution. The third proviso goes further and gives a right to the person aggrieved by the
order of the Commissioner to resort to a Civil Suit, for establishing his title to the property. So far as accounts and records of a temple are
concerned, ordinarily, they will exhibit on their face that they appertain to the temple. There could be no question of any investigation, as to
whether they belong to the institution and there could be no need to file a suit for establishing the title of the institution to such records or accounts.
Viewed in the light of the above consideration, it appears to me that the three units, religious institution or the records, accounts and properties
should be taken disjunctively and the certificate prescribed in that section should be confined only to properties as such. But no certificate will be
required for delivery of possession of the religious institution as well as its records and accounts. Consequently, I find that the certificate prescribed
u/s 101 is not required, where delivery of records and accounts of the temple are sought.
In view of the above finding, the revision case is dismissed.
