AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Heard Mr. A. Mazumder, learned senior counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. B. Sarma, learned counsel for the respondent authorities. In all
the three writ petitions a common question of law is involved to be determined on the same set of facts, except that the demand notices under section
73 of the Finance Act of 1994 are in respect of different tea estates of the petitioner company and accordingly, the three writ petitions are taken up
for a final consideration, resulting in the common judgment and order.
The petitioners are engaged in the business of plantation, manufacture, sale and transportation of tea under the petitioner No.1 company, which has
various tea gardens in India. In course of their business, the petitioners engage various goods transport agencies for transportation of the tea from its
tea gardens in Assam to its ware houses. The question involved is as to whether the petitioners are liable to pay service tax under Chapter-V of the
Finance Act of 1994 for availing the service of transportation of the tea. To that effect, demand cum show-cause notices of different dates were
issued by the Assistant Commissioner of Excise Customs and Good & Services Tax, Guwahati to the different tea estates operated by the petitioner
No.1.
In respect of Budlapara tea estate, a demand cum show cause notice dated 07.09.2017 was issued for the period from April 2013 to March 2016 by
arriving at a conclusion that service tax including cess for an amount of Rs.3,52,556/- was evaded. Consequent thereto, the Budlapara tea estate was
called upon to show cause notice within thirty days as to why service tax including cess amounting to Rs.3,52,556/- should not be recovered under
Section 73(1) of the Finance Act of 1994 and further as to why appropriate interest should not be charged and recovered under Section 75 and further
as to why penalty should not be imposed under Section 78 of the said Act of 1994.
Similar demand cum show cause notices were also issued to the other tea estates of the petitioner No.1. In respect of Talup Tea Estate a demand
cum show cause notice dated 14.09.2017 was issued for an amount of Rs.4,50,005/- and in respect of Pengree Tea Estate it was issued for an amount
of Rs.1,42,796/-. The demand cum show cause notice in respect of Budlapara tea estate has been assailed in WP(C) No.7863/2017, in respect of
Taluk tea estate, it has been assailed in WP(C) No.7888/2017 and in respect of Pengree tea estate, it has been assailed in WP(C) No.7896/2017.
Mr. A. Mazumder, learned senior counsel for the petitioners assails the aforesaid three demand cum show cause notices by raising a contention
that under the relevant notifications in force, there is an exemption on the imposition of service tax including cess in respect of transportation of tea.
Hence according to Mr. A. Mazumder, learned senior, counsel all the three demand cum show cause notices are therefore, without any authority of
law and as such liable to be interfered.
In order to substantiate his contention, Mr. Mazumder, learned senior counsel refers to the Notification No.30/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012 of the
Govt. of India in the Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue. The said notification issued in exercise of the powers under Section 68(2) of the
Finance Act of 1994 notifies certain taxable services as stated therein and also the extent to which service tax is payble thereto by the persons liable
to pay service tax for the purpose. The taxable services referred in the notification of 20.06.2012 also included the services provided or agreed to be
provided by a goods transport agency in respect of transportation of goods by road, where the person who would be liable to pay the freight for such
transportation is, amongst others, a factory registered under Factories Act of 1948, a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, a
cooperative society established by or under any law, a dealer of excisable goods registered under the Central Excise Act of 1944, a corporate body
established by or under any law, or any partnership firm whether registered or not.
According to Mr. A. Mazumder, learned senior counsel, the activities carried out by the petitioners are included within the meaning of a person
liable to pay freight as provided in Sub-Clauses (a) to (f) of Entry I(A)(ii) of the notification of 20.06.2012. Accordingly, as per the notification of
20.06.2012, the petitioners would be liable to pay service tax including cess. But by another Notification No.25/2012-ST also dated 20.06.2012 of the
Govt. of India in the Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, certain services included in the Notification No.30/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012 were
exempted from the purview of levy of service tax including cess. In other words, although by the notification No.30/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012, service
tax had been imposed on certain category of services in general, the Notification No.25/12-ST dated 20.06.2012 exempts certain categories of service
from the purview of service tax. Subsequently, another Notification No.3/2013-ST dated 01.03.2013, an amendment was brought in to the Notification
No.25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012, by which some more specific services were also exempted from the purview of service tax by bringing in addition
to the list of services earlier exempted by the Notification No.25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012. By virtue of such amendment whereby, some further
specific services were also included within the purview of the notification No.25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012, the same also stood exempted from the
purview of imposition of levy of service tax.
In the Notification No.25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012, Entry-21 thereto is as follows:
(a) fruits, vegetables, eggs, milk, food grains or pulses in a goods carriage;
(b) goods where gross amount charged for the transportation of goods on a consignment transported in a single goods carriage does not exceed one
thousand five hundred rupees; or
(c) goods, where gross amount charged for transportation of all such goods for a single consignee in the goods carriage does not exceed rupees seven
hundred fifty;
By the later Notification No.3/2013-ST dated 01.03.2013 Entry 21 of the Notification No.25/12-ST dated20.06.2012 was substituted in the following
manner:-
“ 21. Services provided by a goods transport agency, by way of transport in a goods carriage of-
a) agricultural produce,
b) goods, where gross amount charged for the transportation of goods on a consignment transported in a single carriage does not exceed one thousand
five hundred rupees,
c) goods, where gross amount charged for transportation of all such goods for a single consignee does not exceed rupees seven hundred fifty,
d) foodstuff including flours, tea, coffee, jiggery, sugar, milk products, salt and edible oil, excluding alcoholic beverages,
e) chemical fertilizer and oilcakes,
f) newspaper or magazines registered with the Registrar of Newspapers,
g) relief materials meant for victims of natural or man-made disasters, calamities, accidents or mishap or
h) defence or military equipments.â€
As the notification No.25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012 provides for the specific services that are exempted from the purview of service tax including
cess, the substitution of Entry 21 thereto by the Notification No.3/2013-ST dated 01.03.2013 the specific services mentioned in the substituted Entry
21, would now stand exempted from the purview of service tax. Entry-21(a) as substituted by the Notification No.3/13-ST dated 01.03.2013 refers to
the services provided by a goods transport agency by way of transport in a goods carriage of agricultural produce, whereas, Entry-21(d) thereto
provides for the services provided by a goods transport agency by way of transport in a goods carriage of food staff including flours, tea, coffee,
jaggery, sugar, milk, salt, edible oil including alcoholic beverages. As per the substituted Entry-21(d), transportation of tea by way of goods carriage,
stood exempted from the purview of levy of service tax.
By a subsequent notification No.6/2015-ST dated 01.03.2015, a further amendment was brought in to Entry 21 of the Notification No.25/2012-ST
dated 20.06.2012 by which, the clause (d) stood substituted as follows:-
(d) ‘milk, salt and food grain including flours, pulses and rice.’
The effect of the substitution of Entry-21(d) would be that Clause-d of the Notification No.3/2013-ST dated 01.03.2013 stood removed and
substituted by the later Clause-d providing for milk, salt and food grain including flours, pulses and rice. What is noticeable is that the later substituted
Clause-d of Entry-21 excludes tea from being included for the purpose of exemption from the purview of service tax.
In other words, upon tea being excluded from the provision of Entry-21 Clause-d, the exemption granted for transportation of tea by a goods
transport agency in a goods carriage, now stands withdrawn.
In the aforesaid circumstance, it is the submission of Mr. A. Mazumder, learned senior counsel that in the common parlance meaning of the
expression agricultural produce and also as decided by the Supreme court in its pronouncement rendered in Commissioner of Sales Tax, Lucknow
â€"vs- M/s D.S. Bist and Sons, Nainital reported in (1979) 4 SCC 741 in paragraph-15, tea in its basic nature continues to be an agricultural produce.
According to Mr. A. Mazumder, learned senior counsel transportation of agricultural produce by a goods transport agency in a goods carriage having
been retained for exemption from the purview of service tax including cess as per Entry-21 (a) and tea also being an agricultural produce as held by
the Supreme Court, therefore, the petitioners continue to be entitled for an exemption from the purview of service tax including cess for transportation
of tea by a goods carriage agency in a goods carriage. Mr. A. Mazumder, learned senior counsel in order to substantiate his submission refers to the
provisions in paragraph 6, 7 and 15 of the decision rendered in DS Bist (supra) which is as follows:-
“6.The question for consideration is whether on the findings aforesaid it can be justifiably held in law that the leaves lost their character of being an
agricultural produce and became something different. It should be remembered that almost every kind of agricultural produce has to undergo some
kind of processing or treatment by the agriculturist himself in his farm or elsewhere in order to bring them to a condition of non-perishability and to
make them transportable and marketable. Some minimal process is necessary to be applied to many varieties of agricultural produce. As for example,
when wheat stalks are cut from the farm, threshing and winnowing have to be done. The product so obtained has to be dried for a few days. The husk
and dust have to be separated. Thereafter packing the wheat in bags or other containers it is taken to the markets for sale. One can never suggest
that such a wheat product becomes a commodity different from the one which was produced in the process of agriculture. To pursue that example
further, if the agriculturist who produces the wheat has a flour mill and crushes the wheat produced by him in that mill and then if the flour so
produced is sold by him one can never reasonably suggest that the flour sold by him is an agricultural produce, because in that event, the
manufacturing process goes beyond the limit of making the agricultural produce fit for marketing as such and turns it into a different commodity
altogether i.e. flour. But there may be some other kinds of agricultural produce which required some more processing to make it marketable. In the
case of such a commodity what one has to judge is to find out whether in relation to that agricultural produce the process applied was minimal or was
it so cumbersome and long drawn that either in common parlance, or in the market, or even otherwise, any body would not treat the produce as an
agricultural produce. The mere fact that in the case of a particular product the process is a bit longer or even a bit complicated will not rob the
produce of its character of being an agricultural produce.â€
Unlike many agricultural products tea-leaves are not marketable in the market fresh from the tea gardens. No body eats tea-leaves. It is meant to
be boiled for extracting juice out of it to make tea liquor. Tea-leaves are, therefore, only fit for marketing when by a minimal process they are made fit
for human consumption. Of course, the processing may stop at a particular point in order to produce inferior quality of tea and a bit more may be
necessary to be done in order to make it a bit superior. But that by itself will not substantially change the character of the tea-leaves, still they will be
known as tea-leaves and sold as such in the market. In my opinion all the six processes enumerated above from the primary findings of fact recorded
in the order of the Revising Authority were necessary for the purpose of saving the tea-leaves from perishing, making them fit for transporting and
marketing them. The process applied was minimal.
The question before us is whether after the tea leaf had been put through the process of withering, crushing, roasting and fermentation it continued
to be agricultural produce. If the Calcutta High Court can be said to have laid down that as a result of those processes the tea leaf ceased to be
agricultural produce, I am unable to agree with it. To my mind, the tea leaf remained what it always was. It was tea leaf when selected and plucked.
and it continued to be tea leaf when after the process of withering, crushing and roasting it was sold in the market. The process applied was intended
to bring out its potential qualities of flavour and colour. The potential inhered in the tea leaf from the outset when still a leaf on the tea bush. The
potential surfaced in the tea leaf when the mechanical processes of withering, crushing and roasting, fermenting by covering with wet sheets and
roasting again were applied. The tea leaf was made fit for human consumption by subjecting it to those processes. At no stage. did it change its
essential substance. It remained a tea leaf throughout. In its basic nature, it continued to be agricultural produce.â€
Mr. A. Mazumder, learned senior counsel by relying upon the proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in Collector of Central Excise, Patna
â€"vs- Usha Martin Industries reported in (1997) 7 SCC 47 in paragraph 19, 20 and 21 submits that the notifications and circulars issued by the
department have a binding effect and the authorities cannot take a view which would be contrary to the provision of such notifications. The learned
senior counsel also seeks to raise the contention that agricultural produce having been retained as an exempted service for the purpose of service tax
including cess and tea being held to be included as an agricultural produce, therefore, the authorities cannot take a stand which would be contrary to
the provision of the notifications inasmuch as, such provision of the notifications are binding on the department. Paragraph 19, 20 and 21 Usha Martin
Industries (supra) is as follows:-
“19. No doubt the court has to interpret statutory provisions and notifications thereunder as they are with emphasis to the intention of the
legislature. But when the Board made all others to understand a notification in a particular manner and when the latter have acted accordingly, is it
open to the Revenue to turn against such persons on a premise contrary to such instructions?
Section 37-B of the Act enjoins on the Board a duty to issue such instructions and directions to the excise officers as the Board considers
necessary or expedient for the purpose of uniformity in the classification of excisable goods or with respect to levy of duty excised on such goods."" It
is true that Section 37b was inserted in the Act only in December, 1985 but that fact cannot whittle down the binding effect of the circulars or
instructions issued by the Board earlier. Such instructions were not issued earlier for fancy or as rituals. Even the pre-amendment circulars were
issued for the same purpose of achieving uniformity in imposing excise duty on excisable goods. So the circular, whether issued before December
1985 or thereafter should have the same binding effect on the Department.
Through a catena of decisions this Court has pronounced that Revenue cannot be permitted to take a stand contrary to the instructions issued by
the Board. It is a different matter that an assessee can contest the validity or legality of a departmental instruction. But that right cannot be conceded
to the department, more so when others have acted according to such instructions.â€
Mr. A Mazumder, learned senior counsel also refers to the proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka and Others â€"vs-
Balaji Computers and others reported in (2007) 2 SCC 743 in paragraphs 35, 39 and 42 to substantiate his submission that in case of there-being any
doubt in the event where an exemption notification admits two views, which is not clear and unambiguous, the view which is beneficial to the assesee
will have to be taken and further the rule of construction by reference to contemporanea exposition is a well established rule for interpreting a statute
by reference to exposition it had received from the contemporary authority, though it must give way where the language of the staute is plain and
unambiguous and further that even if it is assumed that the provision of an exemption notification is not clear and explicit, it is proper and reasonable to
place the construction which is beneficial to the assessee by exempting the levy of a tax . Paragraphs 35, 39 and 42 of Balaji is as follows:-
In case there is any doubt that if the language employed in exemption Notification admits of two views and is not clear and ambiguous, the
Division Bench in the impugned judgment aptly observed, the view which is beneficial to the assessee, will have to be taken.
This Court in the case of K. P. Varghese v. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam reported in (1981) 4 SCC 173, while considering the binding nature
on the circulars issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes on the department, has also observed that the Rule of construction by reference to
contemporanea expositio is a well established rule for interpreting a statute by reference to exposition it has received from contemporary authorities,
though it must give way where a language of the statute is plain and unambiguous.
(5) It is well settled that even if it is assumed that the things are not made clear and explicit in the exemption notifications, it is proper and
reasonable to place the construction which is beneficial to the assessee by exempting levy of tax on parts of computer and computer peripherals;
The core contention of Mr. A. Mazumdar, learned senior counsel for the petitioners is that the Supreme Court in DS Bist (Supra) having decided
that the expression agricultural produce also includes the manufactured tea, therefore, the expression agricultural produce as appears in Entry-21(a) of
the Notification No.3/2013-ST dated 01.03.2013 also includes manufactured tea. According to Mr. A. Mazumdar, learned senior counsel, it is another
factor that Entry-21(d) of the said notification also provides for tea to be included under the category of food stuff. According to Mr. Mazumdar, tea
having been included under Entry-21(d) in the category of food stuff will not change the meaning given by the Supreme Court in DS Bist (Supra),
where tea is also included as an agricultural produce.
In the aforesaid circumstance, according to the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, the amendment effected by the subsequent notification
No.6/2015-ST dated 01.03.2015, by which the earlier Entry-21(d) had been withdrawn and substituted by a new Entry-21(d), which does not provide
for tea to be included as a food stuff, does not in any manner take away the inclusion of tea as an agricultural produce under Entry-21(a), which
remains as such even after the amendment incorporated by the notification of 01.03.2015.
To arrive at a conclusion as to whether the aforesaid contention of Mr. A. Mazumdar, learned senior counsel for the petitioners is to be accepted
in the manner it had been contended, it would be relevant to examine as to under what context the Supreme Court in DS Bist (Supra) had arrived at
the conclusion that tea is also included as an agricultural produce and as to whether the meaning to be attributed to the expression agricultural produce
appearing in the Notification No.3/2013-ST dated 01.03.2013 as well as in the Notification No.6/2015-ST dated 01.03.2015 would also have to be
given the same meaning or keeping in view the provisions of law under which the said two notifications were issued, the expression agricultural
produce would have to be given a different meaning.
In DS Bist (Supra), the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the expression agricultural produce appearing in the proviso to Section 2(i) of
the UP Sales Tax Act, 1948 includes tea or not for the purpose of it being exempted from the imposition and levy of sales tax. Section 2(i) of the UP
Sales Tax Act, 1948 defines turnover to mean the aggregate amount for which goods are supplied or distributed by way of sale or the aggregate
amount for which goods are bought, whichever is higher, with a proviso that the sale by a person of agricultural produce grown by himself or grown on
any land over which he has an interest, shall be excluded from his turnover. Accordingly if an item is included as an agricultural produce, then such
item is excluded from the definition of turnover resulting in the consequence that no sales tax is required to be paid for the purpose.
The Supreme Court in paragraph-6 of DS Bist (Supra) while analyzing as to whether tea has to be included as an agricultural produce, had dealt
into the aspect whether tea leaves had lost their character of being an agricultural produce and became something different after it was subjected to
the resultant process. In paragraph-7, a conclusion was arrived at that the tea leaves are not marketable in the market fresh from the tea gardens and
nobody eats tea leaves and therefore, the tea leaves become fit for market only when they are subjected to a minimal process for being made fit for
human consumption. It was concluded that such process by itself will not substantially change the character of the tea leaves and therefore the tea so
processed are also agricultural produce.
In Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 14th edition in Page-124, it has been provided as follows:-
“On the same principle when words acquire a technical meaning because of their consistent use by the Legislature in a particular sense or because
of their authoritative construction by superior courts, they are understood in that sense when used in a similar context in subsequent legislation.â€
In view of such proposition of law, the meaning given to the expression ‘agricultural produce’ by the Supreme Court in DS Bist (supra), by
which, tea is also included as agricultural produce, the same meaning would also have to be given to the expression agricultural produce appearing in
Entry-21(a) of the Notification No.3/2013-ST dated 01.03.2013 and 6/2015-ST dated 01.03.2015 and the submission of Mr. Mazumdar, learned senior
counsel for the petitioners would have to be accepted. Accordingly, the meaning given by the superior Court to the expression agricultural produce
would also have to be understood to have the same meaning when the said expression or ward is used in a subsequent legislation. But, it is also taken
note of that the aforesaid meaning to the expression agricultural produce was given while interpreting the proviso to Section 2(i) of the UP Sales Tax
Act, 1948, where no such definite meaning was sought to be given by the said Act to the expression agricultural produce.
In the instant case, it is taken note of that the expression agricultural produce appearing in entry 21(a) of the Notifications No. 3/2013-ST dated
01.03.2013 and 6/2015-ST dated 01.03.2015 are issued under the provisions of the Finance Act of 1994, where Section 65B(5) of the Finance Act of
1994 defines agricultural produce as such:-
“agricultural produce means any produce of agriculture on which either no furtherer processing is done or such processing is done as is usually
done by a cultivator or producer which does not alter its essential characteristics but makes it marketable for primary market.â€
As the expression agricultural produce has been defined in the Finance Act of 1994 and the concerned notifications, wherein the said expression
appears are also issued under the provisions of the said Act of 1994, it has to be understood that the expression agricultural produce used in the two
notifications are not used in a similar context as prevailed in the matter before the Supreme Court in DS Bist (Supra), wherein the said expression was
explained and a meaning given to it. From the said point of view, as the expression agricultural produce was used under two different contexts, the
meaning given to it in DS Bist (Supra) in its own context may not be applicable in the present case, where the expression is not only used in a different
context, but is also defined for the purpose.
To the above extent, reference is made to the provisions laid down by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Central Excise and Finance,
Mumbai â€"vs- Fiat India Private Limited and another, reported in (2012) 9 SCC 332, wherein in paragraph-39, it had been held as follows:-
“It is well settled that whenever the legislature uses certain terms or expressions of well-known legal significance or connotations, the courts must
interpret them as used or understood in the popular sense if they are not defined under the Act or the Rules framed thereunder.â€
In Fiat India Private Limited (Supra) it had been clearly provided that whenever the legislature uses certain terms or expression of well known
legal significance or connotation, the court must interpret them as used or understand in the popular sense and from the said point of view, the meaning
given to the expression agricultural produce in DS Bist (Supra) otherwise would have to be accepted in the manner it was provided. But the Supreme
Court in Fiat India Private Limited (supra) also provides that the meaning as understood in popular sense would be applicable only if such expressions
are not specifically defined under the Act or the Rules framed therein, under which the expression is used.
In other words, on a conjoint reading of the provisions in paragraph 124 of Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice GP Singh and the
provisions in paragraph-39 of Fiat India Private Limited (Supra), the technical or the popular sense meaning given by the superior Court in respect of a
given expression would prevail while interpreting the same expression appearing in a subsequent legislation, but if the subsequent legislation defines the
same expression and gives a meaning different to the technical or popular sense meaning, the expression as defined by the subsequent legislation
would have to be accepted and would prevail over the technical or popular sense meaning given by the superior Court earlier.
From the aforesaid aspect, it is to be taken note of that the agricultural produce has been defined for the purpose of the Finance Act of 1994 u/s
65B(5) of the Finance Act of 1994. Accordingly, whatever meaning transpires from the definition of the expression agricultural produce given u/s
65B(5) of the Finance Act of 1994 would prevail while interpreting the said expression as it appears under Entry-21(a) of the Notifications No.3/2013-
ST dated 01.03.2013 and No.6/2015-ST dated 01.03.2015, which are admittedly issued u/s 93 of the Finance Act of 1994.
When the definition of agricultural produce as it appears u/s 65B(5) of the Finance Act of 1994, is examined, it is discernible that agricultural
produce means any produce of agriculture on which either no further processing is done or such processing is done as is usually done by a cultivator
or producer, which does not alter its essential characteristic, but makes it marketable for primary market. The elements as appears in the definition of
agricultural produce u/s 65B(5) are that there must either be no further processing done on the produce of agriculture or the processing is done by a
cultivator or producer, which does not alter its essential characteristic, but makes it marketable for the primary market.
On a reading of the provisions of Section 65B(5) of the Finance Act of 1994, it is to be understood that the expression primary market mentioned
therein apparently refers to the market where the agricultural produce as such are being sold and the process that the cultivator or the producer may
undertake is to the extent to make it transportable and presentable in such a market. When the aforesaid situation is compared with that of the
manufactured and finished tea, which apparently is being transported by the petitioners, the Court cannot take a different view but to conclude that
such transported tea is not for the purpose of being marketed in a primary market where the agricultural produces are being marketed, but on the
other hand the transported tea is being marketed as a finished product in the consumer market for its consumption. In view of the above, as to
whether the expression agricultural produce appearing in Entry 21(a) of the Notifications No. 3/2013-ST dated 01.03.2013 and 6/2015-ST dated
01.03.2015 includes tea or not would have to be understood from the perspective of the definition of the expression agricultural produce as appearing
in Section 65B(5) of the Finance Act of 1994 and not from the perspective of the expression agricultural produce as defined and explained in D.S Bist
(Supra).
Further, it is also to be taken note of that in the Notification No.3/2013-ST dated 01.03.2013, tea had been included as a food stuff under Entry-
21(d), wherein Entry 21(a) pertains to agricultural produce. By including tea as a food stuff under Entry-21(d), it is to be understood that the intention
of the legislature was not to include tea within the meaning of the expression agricultural produce as appearing in Entry-21(a). The interpretation
sought to be given by Mr. Mazumder that tea was included both under Entry-21(a) and 21(d) would also not be acceptable inasmuch as, by including
the same item both under Entry 21(a) and 21(d), at least one such entry between the two entries would become surplus and redundant. The principle
of interpretation of statutes clearly provides that any interpretation which renders a provision to be irrelevant and redundant is to be avoided.
By following the such principles of interpretation, the contention sought to be raised by the petitioners that tea is included under Entry 21(a) as well
as under Entry 21(d) of the Notification No.3/2013-ST dated 01.03.2013 would be unacceptable inasmuch as, if the said contention is accepted either
Entry 21(a) providing for agricultural produce to be inclusive of tea or the Entry 21(d) also providing for tea as a food stuff, for the purpose of
exemption from the purview of service tax, would become irrelevant and redundant. In order to save the situation, the only possible interpretation that
can be given to Entry 21(a) and Entry 21(d) of the said notification of 01.03.2013 would be that Entry 21(a) providing for agricultural produce does not
include tea and the authorities by including tea under Entry-21(d) had deliberately left out tea from being included under Entry-21(a). Such an
interpretation would also be inconformity with the meaning of the expression agricultural produce as defined u/s 65B(5) of the Finance Act of 1994.
Under such circumstance, when the deletion of Entry-21(d) in the Notification No.3/2013-ST dated 01.03.2013 and the substitution thereof by the
later Entry-21(d) appearing in the Notification No.6/2015-ST dated 01.03.2015 is taken into consideration, the only conclusion that can be arrived is
that the exemption from service tax granted for transportation of tea stood withdrawn and it cannot be interpreted and accepted that upon deletion of
Entry 21-(D) as it appeared in Notification No.3/2013-ST dated 01.03.2013, tea now on its own stands included as an agricultural produce under
Entry-21(a) of the Notification No.6/2015-ST dated 01.03.2015. It is also taken note of that the provision of Entry-21(a) of the Notification No.3/2013-
ST dated 01.03.2013 had been retained in the same manner as it was provided even after the amendment that was brought by the Notification
No.6/2015-ST dated 01.03.2015.
In the circumstance, where a conclusion is already arrived that Entry-21(a) of the Notification No.3/2013-ST dated 0103.2013 did not include tea
and the said Entry-21(a) having been retained as it was even after the Notification No.6/2015-ST dated 01.03.2015 was issued, it cannot be stated that
tea now stands included within the meaning of the expression agricultural produce as appeared in Entry-21(a).
As a conclusion had already been arrived hat Entry-21(a) of the Notification No.3/2013-ST dated 01.03.2013 does not include tea even after the
amendment brought in by the Notification No.6/2015-ST dated 01.03.2015, the other contention of the petitioners that where two views are possible,
the view in favour of the assessee is to be accepted, is inapplicable in the present case.
In view of the aforesaid conclusion, the contention of the petitioner that tea was included within the meaning of the expression agricultural produce
as appearing under Entry-21(a) of the Notification No.3/2013-ST dated 01.03.2013, and it continues to remain included even after the amendment
incorporated by the Notification No.6/2015-ST dated 01.03.2015, the contention of the writ petitioners that they are entitled for an exemption from
service tax in respect of its transportation by a goods carriage agency in a goods carrier is found to be unacceptable.
Although the claim of the petitioners for interfering with the demand-cum-show cause notices had been refused, but it clarified that the
respondents, if desire may proceed ahead with the said demand-cum-show cause notices and the same be done strictly in accordance with law but
from the point of view that the demand-cum-show cause notices came into effect from the date of this judgment.
Accordingly, the writ petitions are found to be devoid of any merit and the same are dismissed. However, no order as to costs.