Tribunals and Commissions

A.P.J. SCHOOL vs SH.M.P.BHANOT

National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission · Decided on 15 September 1992 · Citation: 1992 3 CPJ 254 : 1993 0 CPC 54 : 1994 1 CLT 221

HON’BLE JUDGES
S.S.Sandhawalia , Basanti Devi , S.Kulwant Singh J.
RESULT
Appeals allowed
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Judgment

4 paragraphs · 743 words
1.

FIRST Appeal Nos. 230 to 232 of 1992 are directed against the same order of the District Forum Faridabad, dated the 6th of July, 1992 whereby in the operative part of the order provisional admission with effect from 13th of July, 1992 has been given to the students in the appellant A.P.J. School, as an interim relief.

2.

IT would be apt to read this order in continuation of our earlier one recorded on the 10th of July, 1992. Therein, it has been observed as follows : - "In the light of the above, prima-facie, we treat the present appeal as a revision under Section 17(1)(b). The order under challenge is consequently stayed ad-interim". The primal contention of Mr. S.C. Kapoor on behalf of the appellants/petitioners is that the matter is now concluded in their favour by the exhaustive order of this Commission in First Appeal No. 225 of 1992 A.P.J. School v. Dr. K.L. Galhotra Faridabad, II (1992) CPJ 807. Relying upon the categoric observations therein it was forcefully submitted that the orders under challenge are now obviously unsustainable.

There is patent merit in the aforesaid submission. In A.P.J. School v. Dr. K.L. Galhotra (supra) a virtually identical issue had been raised. On examining the matter in considerable depth we had allowed the appeal. Mr. Ashok Aggarwal on behalf of the respondents could point out no meaningful distinction herein. It is consequently unnecessary and would be wasteful to retread the beaten ground afresh. It suffices to recall the, relevant observation and findings in paragraphs 26, 30 and 31 of the said order : - "26. The aforesaid submission has to be viewed in the context of the admitted fact that the appellant school is a purely private organisation. It is being run by the Apeejay Education Society, New Jawahar Nagar, Mahavir Marg, Jalandhar, which is strictly governed by its memorandum of association and Rules & Regulations, which have been placed on the present record It was forcefully submitted on behalf of the appellant that the said society or the school does not receive an iota of financial State-aid and is funded entirely by private agencies. There is, thus, no statutory obligation upon it with regard to the fresh admission to the school in the 11th class, though inevitably the rule of merit has to be given pre-eminence. A modicum of discretion to the school and the society in this matter cannot be altogether denied. It has been plausibly contended before us that no student has a vested right of fresh admission to the 11th class nor is there a corresponding statutory obligation on the appellant''s with regard thereto. 30. Lastly the broad parameter within which the consumer jurisdiction operates in this field cannot be lost sight of. A deficiency in service to be justiciable has to be with regard to a standard either required to be maintained by or under any law or one in pursuance of a contract, therefor. Obviously in the present case, no prescribed legal sanction or standard for such deficiency could be pointed out. Equally no such obligation in pursuance of any such contract would apply herein. In declining admission to the student on the basis of his merit in the medical group, it could not even remotely be said that the respondents were guilty of any deficiency in the service of education, which they had undertaken to perform. It must, therefore, be held that on merits also no case for interference in the present jurisdiction has been made out. 31. For the foregoing reasons, the majority order granting relief in absolute terms cannot be sustained. We are constrained to set it aside. The appeal is hence, allowed, but we decline to burden the respondent consumer with any costs".

3.

IT would be somewhat manifest from the above that if in identical circumstances an order granting relief in absolute terms in a similar situation could not be sustained, it is more so with regard to the interim relief which if upheld would virtually allow the complaint. Recently, this Commission has taken the view in I (1992) CPJ 127, S.D.O.A.E.E. City Division Hisar v. Hotel Palki, Hissar that on issue, of law or closely analogous facts, the Commission would be bound by its own judgments. In view of the above, we are constrained to allow these appeals/revisions and the orders under challenge are hereby set aside. However, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. Appeals allowed.