A.P.S.R.T.C. vs Eswara Dass and others

This Judgment has been overruled by : A.P.S.R.T.C. and Another Vs. B.S. David Paul, AIR 2006 SC 961 : (2006) 108 FLR 1005 : (2006) 2 JT 149 : (2006) 1 LLJ 999 : (2006) 2 SCALE 110 : (2006) 2 SCC 282 : (2006) SCC(L&S) 287 : (2006) 1 SCR 1001 : (2006) 2 SLJ 379 : (2006) AIRSCW 661 : (2006) 1 Supreme 564

M.S. Liberhan, CJ.

It is a glaring case of an unfair labour practice by an expected to be an ideal employer representing the State i.e., an instrumentality of the State which is duty bound, under the Constitution of India, to provide social justice, fair and humane conditions for working and not to evolve technicalities to evade its duties towards the citizens, enjoined by the law and the Constitution.

The 1st respondents was employed as far back as on 1-11-1987 as a sweeper and washer man for the purpose of cleaning the buses. The appellants, for reasons best known to them, wanted to draw a curtain between the relationship of employer and employee by invoking and articulating the terminology of contract labour which is not applicable to the appellants and which is, rather we may hasten to add, is prohibited. The 1st respondent''s services were terminated orally on 16-8-1988 contrary to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The poor worker was forced to seek appropriate relief before the Labour Court by filing an industrial dispute. The worker, after fighting there mighty management for six years, secured the relief of reinstatement on 16-5-1994 through an award of the Labour Court. The management did not feel satisfied. The award was challenged which was rejected and finally the worker is reinstated on 6-11-1995. Still, the management was not satisfied and was not ready and willing to give the due of the worker.

It is not dispute at the Bar, on our repeated asking that the persons similarly employed are discharging the same functions with no distinction whatsoever either in the nature of work, hours of work, responsibilities of work and duties of work and no difference in work has been pointed out between the work carried out by the other cleaners and the 1st respondent in these appeals. The principle of equal pay for equal work has not only been totally lost sight of, if we may hasten to add, but also intentionally has not been taken care of by the authorities. In view of the checkered history to which the 1st respondent-worker was put, to litigate with a mighty industry of the State which has no love for the expenditure to be incurred on litigation, the 1st respondent-worker, inspite of continuous service of almost 12 years by now, is still fighting with the appellants to get his due. Inspite of the due having been granted by the Labour Court u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 still the appellants, for reasons best known to them, on one pretext or the other do not want to give him his due and preferred the writ petitions in this Court inter alia contending that Section 33-C(2) would not be attracted as the 1st respondent was casual labour and still continues to be a casual labour and is not entitled to the regular scale of pay and that question cannot be determined u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

In our considered view there is no gain saying that Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court, is meant for doing justice and substantial justice and not to do injustice or to determine the technicalities and legalities of the findings on the objections. Here nothing has been pointed out in what manner and v/hat prejudice the appellants have suffered by the determination by the Labour Court of the wages payable to the 1st respondent on the principle of equal pay for equal work which is not in dispute. The Labour Court was expected only to calculate the amount due. The principle is not in dispute. Duties are not in dispute. Functional parties are not in dispute. We fail to comprehend how the object of reducing the litigation and avoiding the technicalities by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is subserved if the appellants are permitted to raise such frivolous objections not sustainable in the eye of law and forcing the worker to litigate for every right of his in the Courts. It is a glaring case of an attempt to tire out a worker who is no match to the mighty management of the appellants. To be precise, the very grievance of the worker is the object for which Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is enacted. We are fully satisfied that the worker is entitle to the regular pay scale which his co-workers arc enjoing and, even otherwise, under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 a daily wage worker having worked for 240 days continuously without break shall be deemed to be a regular worker. Still, for the reasons best known to the appellants, they are refusing to treat him as a regular worker. Be that as it is, we are satisfied that it is not a fit case to invoke the writ jurisdiction to perpetuate injustice to the worker.

The learned single Judge has rightly declined to interfere in the writ petitions. The writ appeals are dismissed with cost. Costs of Rs.1,000/- each shall be deposited within 30 days from today to the credit of the Secretary, Andhra Pradesh State Legal Services Authority, Hyderabad. The costs shall be borne by the officer responsible for bringing about this rate of the worker.

The learned Counsel for the appellants at this stage contends that the 1st respondent was not regularised; consequently, direction for regularisation or to pay regular scale cannot be issued u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. We fail to comprehend the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants for the simple reason that it is not disputed at the Bar that the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation is an industry as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is not disputed at the Bar that the 1st respondent has completed 240 days of continuous service with the industry. We fail to comprehend what further directions are required for regularisation when the statue itself deems the 1st respondent to be a regular employee of the industry. The mode of payment of salary -as a piece-meal, monthly or weekly - is of no consequence to calculate the amount payable by the appellants. In our considered view it is a fit case to initiate suo motu contempt proceedings against the appellants as the law laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court for equal pay for equal work is not being followed by the appellants, with impunity. But the judicial restraint demands that notice be not issued at this stage for contempt proceedings for not complying with the law laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court.

It is brought to our notice by the learned Counsel for the 1st respondent that the amount awarded by the Labour Court as far back as in 1998 has not been paid till date. If it is so, it is a fit case to direct the authorities to pay the amount due to the 1st respondent under the award within one week from today with interest at 12%p.a. from the date due and report compliance to this Court.

In the result, the writ appeals are dismissed in the above terms.