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Judgment
Ramaprasada Rao, C.J.—The Life Insurance Corporation obtained a decree against the appellants and this resulted in a final decree in a
mortgage action. In the course of the processing of the final decree proceedings, Application No. 1501 of 1976 was filed by the appellants to stay
further proceedings on the ground that one of the judgment-debtors was an agriculturist and was entitled to the benefit of the Tamil Nadu Indebted
Agriculturists (Temporary Relief) Act, 1976 (Act No. 15 of 1976) (hereinafter referred to as "" the Act ""). Having regard to the provisions of the
Act then, this court stayed the further processing of the final decree. In the very Act "" Debt "" has been defined u/s 2(c), but a reservation was made
and became in-built therein wherein the Legislature itself could exempt certain debts in favour of certain institutions from the impact of the Act. At
the time when orders were passed in Application No. 1501 of 1976, there was no notification under which the LIC of India was expressly notified
as an exempted institution against whom the benefit or the relief provided to the debtors under the Act could be taken advantage of. After the final
orders were passed in Application No. 1501 of 1976, by a notification G.O.Ms. No. 761, Co-operation, dated 2nd November, 1976, the LIC of
India was expressly notified as an excepted financial institution and this was published in the Official Gazette on November 17, 1976. Pursuant to
the above notification, the LIC of India filed the present application, the order in which is appealed against in this appeal, seeking for the vacating
of the orders passed in Application No. 1501 of 1976 on the footing that the judgment-debtors cannot claim any benefit under the Act, having
regard to the notification as above classifying the LIC of India as an excepted financial institution. It is not in dispute before us that the LIC of India
has been so notified and as against any such notified institution the benefits conferred on a debtor under the Act cannot be claimed. But what was
urged before the learned judge and repeated before us is that at or about the time when the processing of the final decree was stayed in
Application No. 1501 of 1976 the LIC of India was not notified as an excepted financial institution and, therefore, the supervening notification
cannot have any impact on the rights already earned by the appellants and in this way, the application filed by the LIC of India to vacate the order
passed in Application No. 1501 of 1976 was misconceived. The second argument was that any such notification including the financial institution
as an excepted institution could only be operative in the future and cannot have a retrospective operation. Both the contentions were negatived by
the learned judge. As against this the present appeal has been filed.
It is not in dispute before us that the Legislature reserved to themselves the power to notify from time to time such, financial institutions against
whom the relief or the benefits conferred on debtors could not be claimed under Act 15 of 1976. It, therefore, follows that if, on a particular date,
any institution, such as the LIC of India, is so notified as an excepted financial institution, then, it should be deemed that such an exception should
have come into effect and become enforceable as such even from the date when the Act has come into force. The inclusion of a financial institution
as an excepted financial institution on a date later than the date when the Act came into force having regard to the reservation made by the
Legislature itself to make such notifications in the future, could only mean that it is declaratory of a particular state of affairs and not the
pronouncement or creation of a new state of affairs not contemplated under the Act. When, therefore, under G.O.Ms. No. 761 dated 2nd
November, 1976, the LIC of India was notified as an excepted financial institution, then, it means that the debtors cannot claim the relief or
benefits adumbrated in the Act as against such a notified institution, though such notification was posterior to the date of coming into force of the
Act. We have already referred to the fact that the Legislature reserved for itself the right to notify from time to time such of the financial institutions
against whom the relief provided for under the Act can be claimed by the debtor. The LIC is one such institution. Rightly, therefore, the learned
judge held that the appellants cannot claim the relief.
As regards the second contention that the notification can only be prospective in operation, we are afraid that it is a misconception to invoke the
principle of prospective operation as against retrospective operation. The inclusion of the LIC as an excepted financial institution, as we said, was
purely declaratory of the position which, was reserved by the Legislature even at the time when it passed the enactment, by including the LIC of
India in the notification as above. It means that as and from the date of the commencement of the Act, the LIC of India is entitled to assert its rights
and resist any attempt on the part of the debtor to claim relief under the Act in question. This was also considered by the learned judge and he was
right when he said that once it became an exempted institution, it is entitled to pursue its suit or other proceedings, in this, case the decree, against
the appellants even though they are agriculturists and the appellants, therefore, would not be entitled to the relief under the Act. The two questions
argued, therefore, fail and this appeal is dismissed.