High CourtsDivision Bench

Aravindakshan vs Raghavan

High Court Of Kerala · Decided on 16 December 1999 · Citation: (1999) 12 KL CK 0055

HON’BLE JUDGES
P.A. Mohammed, J · G. Sivarajan, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 — Section 11, 11(16), 11(4), 2(3), 20
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
C.R.P. No''s. 273, 302, 305, 343 of 1994 and 261 of 1995
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Judgment

21 paragraphs · 1,731 words

P.A. Mohammed, J.—These revision petitions have been filed against the common order of the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Thrissur in R.C.A. Nos. 321/90, 322/90, 323/90, 2/91 and 5/91 dated 26th August, 1993. In C.R.P. Nos. 273/94, 302/94, 305/94 and 343/94 the landlord of the buildings sought to be evicted is the common revision Petitioner. C.R.P. No. 261/95 has been filed by the tenant against the order in R.C.A. No. 322/90.

2.

The landlord filed the applications for eviction of buildings involved in these cases u/s 11(4)(iv) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short ''the Act''). All the eviction petitions were filed through a power-of-attorney holder. The Rent Control Court ordered eviction on the ground of reconstruction u/s 11(4)(iv). The objection raised by the tenants that the power-of-attorney holder was not authorised to file the petitions was rejected by the Rent Control Court. The appeals were filed by the tenants before the Rent Control Appellate Authority. The Rent Control Appellate Authority confirmed the orders of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court u/s 11(4)(iv) of the Act, but the applications were dismissed on the ground that the power-of-attorney holder was not authorised to file the applications for eviction. It is against the said common appellate order the present revision petitions have been filed by the landlord.

3.

Heard learned Counsel for the revision Petitioner and also the Respondents.

4.

When these revision petitions came up for hearing today, learned Counsel for the revision Petitioner in C.R.P. No. 261/95 arising from R.C.A. No. 322/90 submitted before this Court that the revision Petitioner-tenant had surrendered the key of the building to the landlord. Therefore the counsel submits that he is not pressing the said revision petition. This Submission is recorded. Accordingly the revision petition, C.R.P. No. 261/95 is dismissed.

5.

The landlord has filed C.R.P. No. 343/94 against the order in R.C.A. No. 322/90 arising from R.C.P. No. 9/89. Since the building has been surrendered to the landlord on accepting his contentions by the tenant we do not propose to examine those contentions. There is no dispute on this point between the parties. Hence the revision petition, C.R.P. No. 343/94, is allowed.

6.

C.R.P. Nos. 273, 302 and 305/94 can be dealt with together inasmuch as the question involved in these cases is identical. The question that requires to be determined is whether the power-of-attorney holder appointed as per Ext. A-2 has the power or authority to file applications for eviction of the tenants as has been done in these cases. The definition of the word ''landlord'' contained in Section 2(3) of the Act is as follows:

''landlord'' includes the person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building, whether on his own account or on behalf of another or on behalf of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant.

From the above definition of the word ''landlord'' it is axiomatic that the person who is entitled to receive the rent of a building on account of another is also a ''landlord'' coming within the purview of the Act. This would necessarily imply that a person who is authorised to receive the rent on behalf of the landlord can also file an application u/s 11 for eviction of the tenant. The landlord may sometimes authorise his agent orally to receive rent from his tenants on his behalf. That will not ipso facto authorise him to file application for eviction. Therefore a condition is prescribed in Sub-section (16) of Section 11 of the Act. The said provision makes it mandatory for the agents of the landlord to obtain the previous written consent of the landlord to apply for eviction of the tenants u/s 11 of the Act. Section 11(16) of the Act is as follows:

(16) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, no person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building merely as an agent of the landlord shall, except with the previous written consent of the landlord be entitled to apply for the eviction of the tenant.

In view of the above provision, the person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of the building can also file an application for eviction only with the previous written consent of the landlord.

7.

The question posed before us is whether Ext. A-2 power-of-attorney contains the ''written consent'' to the power-of-attorney holder to file application for eviction on behalf of the landlord. As pointed out earlier, in this case the landlord has filed the applications for eviction through his power-of-attorney holder. Ext. A-2 is a general power-of-attorney executed by the landlord in favour of one K.P. Janardhanan Nair who signed the applications for eviction on behalf of the landlord. Clause 5 of Ext. A-2 is as follows:

To make allowance to and arrangement with all or any of the tenants or occupiers for the time being of any such houses, lands, tenements and hereditaments, farms, fields, etc. determine tenancies and give notices to quit and to enter under the powers reserved in any leases and to accept surrenders of leases and tenancies and to take and use all lawful proceedings and means for evicting and ejecting defaulting tenants and occupiers from all or any of the said premises determining the tenancies or occupations thereof and for obtaining receiving and retaining possession of all or any of the premises held or occupied by such defaulters.

(Emphasis supplied)

On a close reading of the above clause we have absolutely no doubt in our mind that the said provision authorises Sri K.P. Janardhanan Nair to take all lawful proceedings and means for evicting the tenants and occupiers from the building or premises belonging to the landlord. In view of this clear provision, the Rent Control Appellate Authority ought to have held that the applications for eviction filed by the revision Petitioners are competent. We cannot agree with the reasonings and conclusion arrived at by the Appellate Authority in this regard. The finding of the Appellate Authority on point No. 1 is therefore unsustainable. It is accordingly set aside.

8.

The last point to be discussed is whether the finding of the Rent Control Appellate Authority approving the order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court u/s 11(4)(iv) is liable to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of power conferred u/s 20 of the Act. Section 11(4)(iv) authorises the eviction if the building is in such a condition as it needs to be reconstructed and if the landlord requires bona fide to reconstruct the same. The tenants sought to be evicted in these appeals have not challenged the above finding of the Rent Control Appellate Authority by filing separate revision petitions u/s 20 of the Act or by urging before us at the time of hearing of these cases. Whatever that be, let us examine the material facts required for the aforesaid uniform finding by the authorities below. The respective rooms occupied by the several tenants form part of a single building. The said building was constructed more than about 50 years back. It is totally damaged having cracks here and there on the walls and now it stands beyond repair. It is likely to collapse in view of the existing damaged condition. The building is situated in a commercially developed area where modern buildings sprang up. Hence the building requires reconstruction. The oral evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 as also the documentery evidence of C-1 and C-2 support the above factual findings. This would sufficiently establish that the requirement pleaded by the landlord is bona fide. Once the bona fide is established the landlord in this case has to comply with two requirements namely he has the required plan and licence and the ability to rebuild. Ext. A-14 is the plan and Ext. A-15 is the certificates issued by the Pazhayannur Panchayat certifying that no sanction is required for reconstruction. Ext. A-16 and A-17 would show that the landlord had two Bank deposits of Rs. 46,400 and Rs. 3,600. It has come out in evidence that the landlord had been working abroad and he and his family were financially sound.

9.

In view of what is said above, the finding of the Rent control Appellate Authority allowing eviction u/s 11(4)(iv) does not call for any interference by this Court. The power of this Court u/s 20 of the Act is neither unlimited nor unqualified. It is specified within certain parametres. The Supreme Court while examining the scope of the power under the very same provision observed in Rukmini Amma Saradamma Vs. Kallyani Sulochana and others, to the following effect:

A revisional court u/s 20 of the Act cannot act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. Even the word ''propriety'' in Section 20 does not indicate that there could be a re-appreciation of evidence. The revisional court can come to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it.

This view is reiterated by the Supreme Court in a recent decision reported in Ubaiba Vs. Damodaran, . In this context it is apt to mention that we have analysed the ambit and scope of the power conferred on this Court u/s 20 of the Act in Raghavan v. Raju 1998 (2) KLT 394 where we have taken a similar view.

10.

Accordingly we restore the finding of the Rent Control Court ordering eviction of the buildings involved in these cases on the ground of reconstruction u/s 11(4)(iv) of the Act.

11.

The Rent Control Court gave a direction to the landlord to complete the reconstruction of the building in question within six months of surrender as required under the first proviso to Section 11(4). Considering all the aspects of the case, we therefore direct the landlord to complete the reconstruction of the buildings involved in these cases within a period of six months from the date of delivery of possession of those buildings to the landlord.

In the result, C.R.P. Nos. 273/94, 302/94 and 305/94 are allowed.