Arjun Basavanni Kambar vs The Management of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation

Anand Byrareddy, J.—Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for respondent.

The petitioner was an erstwhile employee of the respondent, namely, North West Karnataka Road Transport Corporation. The petitioner was said to be working as a Conductor. It transpires that the bus on which he was on duty was intercepted by a Checking Squad and on certain irregularities having been noticed, he was placed under suspension and Articles of charge were issued dated 05.10.1981. In that, on 04.09.1981 when he was on duty, the bus having been checked the petitioner had recorded in the way bill that he had issued 20 tickets of Rs. 1/- denomination and four tickets of Rs. 1.50 ps. denomination and two tickets of Rs. 2/- denomination and four tickets of Rs. 2.50ps. denomination and three tickets of Rs. 3/- denomination, and hence, an office memo was served alleging that the petitioner had collected Rs. 0.50 ps. more from each of the 10 passengers. There were said to be 24 passengers in the bus, out of whom the petitioner had failed to issue tickets to 10 passengers, despite having collected Rs. 0.50 ps. each from the said passengers. The petitioner having replied to the charge memo, the respondent was not satisfied with the same and an enquiry was conducted. An Enquiry report was submitted, on the basis of which the Disciplinary Authority had dismissed him from service by an order dated 15.03.1982.

The petitioner claims that he had sought the assistance of his Trade Union, insofar as the dismissal was concerned. The matter was ultimately referred by the State Government to the Additional Labour Court in the year 1997 and the respondent had entered appearance in the Labour Court in the year 1998. The domestic enquiry was held in favour of the workman and an award was passed directing the reinstatement of the petitioner without back wages. The respondent had preferred a writ petition before this Court in W.P. No. 39798/2002. The writ petition having been heard on merits, the matter was remanded to the Labour Court since the Labour Court had not addressed the issue as regard the delay in instituting the proceedings.

It transpires that, on such remand, the Labour Court had rejected the application on the ground of delay and laches and had also expressed an opinion as regards the charge against the petitioner having been proved, though the earlier view was to the contrary and such a change in opinion was not possible when the Labour Court was addressing the very same facts, that were urged before it in the earlier occasion.

In this regard, the learned counsel would place reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Biecco Lawrie Limited and Another versus State of West Bengal, 2009 AIR SCW 5779, wherein the Supreme Court has expressed that a Single Judge of the High Court having remanded the matter to the Industrial Tribunal for reconsideration, when the charges were found to be proved, was a misuse of power vested in the Court and the Tribunal on such remand having reversed its own decision on the same evidence, the Apex Court had expressed that it was inexplicable that the same Forum could appreciate the same evidence differently and in that regard the learned counsel for the petitioner, in the case on hand, would submit that the earlier remand was not warranted and on such remand the Tribunal having taken a different view is again illegal, as held by the Supreme Court, and would, therefore, claim that he was entitled to backwages, now that he has attained the age of superannuation.

As the proceedings are vitiated and as regards the question of delay and laches, the learned counsel would point out that the law as it stood at the relevant point of time upto the year 1988 required that a workman, such as the petitioner, would seek any such remedy in an industrial dispute only through the respective Trade Union and the petitioner had taken all steps to pursue the matter through the Trade Union and the unfortunate circumstance that no expeditious steps were taken cannot be placed at the door of the petitioner. It is only in view of the change in law, where an individual workman could exercise the option to seek remedies that after 1988 he had immediately taken steps to challenge the order of his termination by filing an appeal and that has been categorically pleaded in the proceedings before this Court in the first instance and it is only on a reference by the State Government, which has taken its own time to make a reference, that the matter has ultimately reached the Labour Court. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner was responsible for causing the delay and even insofar as the question of delay is concerned, the law laid down by the Supreme Court is to the effect that Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, cannot be made applicable to a proceeding before the Labour Court and he would place reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Raghubir Singh versus General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar, 2014 AIR SCW 5515, wherein, on a review of the case law, the Supreme Court has opined that delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to the adjudication being lost and rendered not available, but delay if it is not culpable, would not disentitle the appellant workman to relief. Similarly the plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where delay is shown to be existing, the Tribunal, Labour Court or Board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant backwages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment, termination or dismissal.

The learned counsel, therefore, placing reliance on the above said dictum of the Supreme Court would contend that there is no injustice caused to the respondent if the appellant is granted back wages atleast from the year 1997 when there has been a reference made to the Labour Court though he was dismissed from service in the year 1982.

The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, would vehemently oppose the petition and would point out that the matter had been remanded to the Labour Court not on the findings of fact as to the misconduct on the part of the petitioner, but as regards the primary issue as to whether the delay in the proceedings was fatal to the claim of the petitioner. The same having been held in the affirmative by the Labour Court cannot be characterised as being illegal.

Admittedly, the petitioner was dismissed from service in the year 1982 and even assuming that till 1988 the petitioner was helpless in pursuing the matter otherwise than through his Trade Union from the year 1988 upto the date of reference by the State Government to the Labour Court has not been explained by the petitioner by reference to any material evidence. The mere statement that when reference is sought through the State Government generally it takes two to three years, does not again explain the entire period of delay between 1988 and 1997. The Supreme Court has also not stated that delay cannot be fatal to the proceedings before the Labour Court. It has merely opined that any reasonable delay would not fetter the remedy of workmen, before the Labour Court and that cannot be the sole ground on which a proceeding could be rejected.

Therefore, the learned counsel would point out that in the present case on hand the delay is unreasonable and having regard to the conduct of the petitioner, whereby it was found as a fact that he was guilty of similar misconducts in 11 earlier instances, it is that circumstance, which warranted the extreme punishment of dismissal. And the question of placing a premium, on such conduct of the petitioner, by granting him backwages cannot be countenanced, especially when there is a finding of fact in that regard and further that even if the Labour Court was not justified in reversing its own findings of fact in variance with the findings earlier on the very same evidence and even if that is eschewed, the petitioner is hard put to explain the inordinate delay in bringing the proceedings and it certainly causes prejudice to the respondent Corporation, which has to deal with the thousands of its employees and the long period of delay would certainly place the respondent at a disadvantage in supporting its case with the relevant record. For the records of the respondent are not perpetually maintained. Therefore, it is a clear case where the delay causes prejudice to the respondent, and hence, the finding of the Labour Court as to the delay and laches being fatal to the case of the prosecution, would have to be upheld.

Given the above facts and circumstances, though the Supreme Court has laid down in Biecco Lawrie Limited''s case, that a Tribunal could not reverse its own findings on the same evidence before it on a remand and also having held in Raghubir Singh''s case, that delay cannot be the sole ground on which the workman''s claim could be rejected, the fact remains that the proceedings had been remanded by this Court not necessarily on the facts of the case, but on the circumstance as to whether the same was vitiated on account of delay and laches and it is that which was crucial to the petitioner''s case, which has been answered in the affirmative by the Labour Court. Consequently even though delay alone cannot be a ground on which the claim of a workman can be turned down by the Labour Court, it ought not be culpable delay, as held by the Supreme Court in earlier decisions, which are referred to and relied upon in Raghubir Singh''s case. Consequently, there is no merit in this writ petition and accordingly the same is dismissed.