Arjun Dev and Others vs The State of Haryana and Others

V.K. Bali, J.—The challenge herein is to the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner Annexure P-6, dated 11.12.1992 vide which, exercising suo motu powers under provisions contained in Haryana Municipal Act, 1973, resolution passed by Municipal Committee, Kaithal, sanctioning construction plan of the petitioner was suspended.

Brief facts of the case on which the relief asked for is sought to rest, reveal that the petitioners purchased land measuring 1 kanal 7 marlas from Dharam Pal vide registered sale deed dated 10.12.1990. They applied to the Committee for sanctioning of the building plan which was rejected by resolution passed by the Committee on 17.9.1991. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner filed statutory appeal which came up before the Deputy Commissioner, Kaithal and the same was allowed vide order dated 29.1.1992, Annexure P-3. The matter was remitted to the Municipal Committee to redecide the matter. At this stage, when the matter came up before the Municipal Committee, building plan of the petitioners was sanctioned by the resolution passed on behalf of Deputy Commissioner, on 5.12.1992. However, Deputy Commissioner exercising suo-motu powers u/s 246 of the Haryana Municipal Committee suspended the resolution passed aforesaid. The impugned order passed by the Deputy Commissioner reads as follows :-

"I, Maha Singh, IAS Commissioner, Kaithal exercising the powers given u/s 246 of the Haryana Municipal Committee Act 1973 suspends Resolution No. 9 Supplementary Item passed by the Municipal Committee Kaithal in its meeting on 5.12.1992 being against rules."

It may be clarified that even though the word Deputy Commissioner has been mentioned, the learned counsel states that the word ''Deputy'' has been written in hand and therefore, order was passed by the Commissioner.

It is argued that the resolution of the Municipal Committee can be suspended only in the events mentioned under the aforesaid Section i.e. Section 246. The Deputy Commissioner has not mentioned any of the grounds that gives him the power to suspend the resolution.

Mr. Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner states that the orders, Annexure P-6 could not be passed unless reasons of passing such an order were detailed in the order itself.

With a view to appreciate the contention of the learned counsel, it is necessary to see the provisions contained in Section 246 of the Haryana Municipal Act. The Section reads as under :-

"The Deputy Commissioner, may by order in writing suspend the execution of any resolution or order of a committee, or joint committee or prohibit the doing of any act which is about to be done, or is being done in pursuance of or under cover of this Act, or in pursuance of any sanction or permission granted by the committee in the exercise of its powers under this Act, if, in his opinion the resolution, order or act is in excess of powers conferred by law or contrary to the interests of the public or likely to cause waste or damage of municipal funds or property, or the execution of the resolution or order, or the doing of the act, is likely to lead to a breach of the peace, to encourage lawlessness, or it causes injury or annoyance to the public or to any class or body of person."

From the bare reading of Section 246, it is amply clear that the power can be exercised if in the opinion of Deputy Commissioner, resolution is in excess of the powers conferred by law or contrary to the interest of the public or likely to cause waste or damage of municipal funds or property etc.

In considered view of this Court, before passing the order u/s 246, the Deputy Commissioner ought to have mentioned as to which particular clause or clauses were applicable in the instant case. The order as reproduced above is totally bereft of reasons, non-speaking, cryptic and even otherwise lacks the very essentials of a quasi-judicial order.

In view of what has been stated above, this petition is allowed, Order Annexure P-6, passed by the Deputy Commissioner dated 11.12.1992 is set aside. The matter is remitted to the Deputy Commissioner to pass a fresh order in accordance with law. Parties through their counsel are directed to appear before the Deputy Commissioner on 20.6.1996.

Before I part with the judgment, I might mention that a number of other points have been taken in the writ petition on which no decision has been rendered. If, therefore, the Deputy Commissioner still passes the order against the petitioners, they shall be at liberty to file a fresh petition even by taking the grounds which are not pressed at this stage.