Arjun Lal vs Hiralal and Others

Wanchoo, C.J.—This is an application by Arjun Lal under Article 133(b) of the Constitution of India for a certificate under causes (a) and (b) of that Article. Learned counsel urges that the amount or value of the subject-matter of the dispute in the Court of first instance and still in dispute on appeal was and is not less than Rs. 20,000/-, or that, in any cast the judgment, decree or final order involves directly or indirectly some claim or question respecting property of the like amount or value.

The suit, in this case, was filed by the petitioner for partition of his one-third share in a certain house in the Civil Court at Udaipur. This suit was dismissed by the trial Court. There was an appeal, which was also dismissed, and then there was a second appeal to the Mahadraj Sabha, which was equivalent to a High Court in the former State of Mewar, which was also dismissed. There after, on account of some peculiar circumstances, wnich were prevalent in the State of Mewar in those days, the case came up again for hearing be-fore the High Court of Udaipur which was established on the 1st October, 1940. When the United State of Rajasthan was formed in 1949, and this Court was created, the appeal, which was pending in the High Court of Udaipur, was transferred to this Court. It was heard by a Division Bunch, and was dismissed, thus confirming the decision of the three Courts beiow.

It is stated that when the suit was filed in the trial Court it was not necessary to value the suit. So the exact valuation of the suit is not known. In the present application the applicant says that the house in dispute is worth over a lakh of rupees, and that his share is worth over Rs. 20,000/-. Besides this bare statement of the applicant, which is also not supported so far by any affidavit, there is nothing on the record to show that the applicant''s share was valued at over Rs. 20,000/-at the time the suit was filed. It has been stated that the defendant in his written statement claimed that he had upent about Rs. 30,000/- over the constructions, and that therefore, the entire house was certainty worth more than Rs. 20,000/-. Learned counsel then relies on Article 133(1)(b), and says that as this is a suit for partition, and the entire house on the defendant''s own showing was worth more than Rs. 20,000/-, he is entitled to a certificate. He relies on two cases, viz., ''Bhugwat Sahay v. Pashupati Nath'' 10 Cal W N 564: and ''Muhammad Asghar v. Abida Begum'' 54 All 858 These two casos, however, were considered by their Lordships of the Privy Council in AIR 1944 65 (Privy Council) and were impliediy overruled by the following observations, which occur at page 66:

"It is enough for the purposes of the present case to say that their Lordships feel no doubt that, a question as to the title of the plaintiff to the share which he claims in the joint property does not become a question respecting the who e of the joint familyy estate merely because if his title is established it will result in the joint family estate being partitioned."

Even, therefore, if the house was valued at about Rs. 30,000/-, the share of the applicant would only be Rs. 10,000/-, and the applicant is not entitled to a certificate either under Clause (a) or Clause (b) of Article 133 (1). We may mention that he is not claiming a certificate under Clause (c) of that Article.

Further, even if it were to be conceded, for the sake of argument, that the value of the applicant''s share in the house was and is not less than Rs. 20,000/-, the applicant would not be entitled to a certificate, unless he can further show that the appeal involves some substantial question of law, as this Court has confirmed the decree of the Court immediately below it. Learned counsel urges that the substantial question of law involved in this case is that this Court has gone wrong in appraising the evidence, which was produced, and coming to certain conclusions of facts on that evidence. We are of opinion that this is no substantial question of law at all, and the applicant is, therefore, not entitled to any certificate under Article 133(1) of the Constitution.

The application is hereby rejected.