Arjun Singh and Others vs Land Acquisition Collector and Others

D. Raju, C.J.—The above revision has been filed against the order passed by the Land Acquisition Collector, Beas Dam Project, Talwara exercising the powers u/s 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the ''Act'') dated 18.11.1995, whereunder the application made by the Petitioner came to be rejected on the ground that it has been made after 91 days and thereby it suffered a delay of one day since the application u/s 28A of the Act was not filed within ninety days as stipulated in the said provision of the Act. In the light of the submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing on either side, I have tried to calculate the limitation and at one stage, I was of the view, with reference to the dates given by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner to be taken into account for computing the period of three months in terms of provision of Section 10A that it comes to only ninety days and, therefore, it may be within the permitted period of 90 days. But Mr. Chauhan, learned Deputy Advocate General brought to my notice that the copy of the Award filed before the Collector claiming benefit u/s 28A of the Act and endorsements made by the Court thereon may be perused and if properly construed and the endorsements and entries made therein are to be taken into account, the exclusion of the period from 13.12.1990, when the copy was attested to 16.9.1991 when the delivery of the copy was taken was not permissible in law and that it would show that the application was barred by limitation. Argued the learned Counsel for the State further, contending that if the applicant sought for a copy of the award and was indifferent in taking delivery even after it was made ready for such a long time, the benefit of such period when he was at lapse cannot be given to his credit, for being excluded from computation. In the light of the above, I had to necessarily took into the very certified copy filed by the Petitioner before the Collector as the basis for claiming benefits u/s 28A. For the purpose of reference and completeness of record, the endorsements as found given on the said certified copy is set out as follows:

The number of application in register C.D. 2 : 1952

The date of presentation of the application for copy : 3.10.1990.

The name of copyist : Sd/-

The date on which the copy completed: 13.12.1990.

The date on which the copy examined and attested : 13.12.1990.

The cause of delivery if the copy has been completed after the third day from the date of application:

The number of words and pages: 5.

The cost of the copy as prescribed under the rules: 7.50

Urgent fees:....

Search fee:....

Registration and postal charges:

V.P.P. charges:

Total recovery : 7.50

Date of delivery: 16.9.1991.

From the said endorsements which, in my view, admits of no controversy on facts, the learned Counsel for the State, in my view, is right in his objection that the period beyond 14.12.1990 till date of delivery or thereafter cannot be excluded in computing the period of three months stipulated in the provision to Section 28A of the Act. If that be the position, as it ought to be, the application by the Petitioner would be hopelessly barred and it could not be claimed to have been filed within the time stipulated.

The learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted further that if that be so, the proceedings may be remitted to the Collector to enable the Petitioner to present an application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking for condonation of delay, if any, explaining sufficient reasons for such delay. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner placed reliance upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in 1996(1) SimLC 191 Santokh Singh and Anr. v. State of H.P. and Anr.. That was a case wherein a Division Bench of this Court dealt with an appeal u/s 54 and the validity of an order rejecting a reference made by the District Judge on the ground that it was barred by limitation prescribed in Section 18 of the Act. It was observed relying upon Section 18(3) as also the object underlying Section 28A of the Act and Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply. Though that was not a case arising directly u/s 28A, the intention of the Legislature in introducing Section 28A was relied upon to construe Section 18 and nature of time-limit stipulated in Section 18 and the character of the Forum or authority, viz., the Collector who has to exercise powers u/s 18 of the Act. This decision is not an authority for the manner in which Section 28A and the period stipulated therein and the applicability or otherwise of Section 5 of the Limitation Act has to be construed or decided. Further Section 18(3) introduced in the Act by a local Amendment inserted by the H.P. State Legislature, treating the Collector as if he were a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115 and make his order u/s 18 of the Act revisable, convert the Collector exercising jurisdiction u/s 18, a Court for all purposes beyond even the purpose for which the deeming clause has been enacted and make Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, applicable. Finally, it is not that every statutory provision which stipulates a time-limit can be construed to mean a period of limitation or the authority envisaged to exercise powers a Court and a period of time stipulated, in a given case, would be and may have to be treated as a condition precedent and so construed there is no scope for applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act, to get over the period of time within which alone the power envisaged has to be exercised. Though normally I would have referred this matter to a larger Bench for consideration of the issue, the said course had been rendered unnecessary by a subsequent decision of the Apex Court, directly on point.

Further, though in para 13 of the judgment in Santokh Singh''s case (supra), it was observed that the Supreme Court is yet to decide the question of applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to proceedings u/s 18 of the Act in the context of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, by now there is an authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court in the decision reported in Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) and Another Vs. Shah Manilal Chandulal and Others, directly on issue after taking into account all the relevant provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, viz., Section 3(c)(d), Section 18(3) and Section 5 and Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. It was held by their Lordships of the Apex Court that the Land Acquisition Act maintained specifically distinction between the Collector and the Court and the Collector/Land Acquisition Officer was held to discharge only statutory duties as a consequence of which it would be difficult to construe him to be Court for purposes of Limitation Act and more particularly Section 5 of the said Act. It was also observed therein that though hard it may be, the Collector/Land Acquisition Officer is not a Court when he acts as a statutory authority u/s 18 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied for extension of the period prescribed under the provision to Section 18(2) by making Section 5 of the Limitation Act, applicable. In view of this the decision of this Court in 1996(1) Sim.L.C. 191, can no longer be said to be good law or a binding precedent and I am bound to follow and apply the decision of the Apex Court in preference to the decision reported in 1996(1) Sim.L.C. 191 . The decision of the Apex Court and the ratio laid down in Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) and Another Vs. Shah Manilal Chandulal and Others, would apply on all fours in construing the proviso to Section 28A of the Act. In my view, apart from the fact that the Collector exercising powers u/s 28A of the Act is not ''Court'' and is merely a statutory Authority exercising quasi-judicial powers within the four corners of the limitations imposed and restrictions engrafted in the very provision conferring such powers, the period of time stipulated in the provision to Section 28A(1) is more a condition or limitation imposed by law subject to which the very power conferred has to be exercised and not to be viewed as a period of limitation, even to extend or apply the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, even de hors the question as to whether the Collector is ''Court'' or merely a statutory functionary or Authority exercising limited jurisdiction.

For all the reasons stated above, there are no merits in this revision petition. The revision fails and shall stand dismissed.