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Judgment
G. Rajasuria
Animadverting upon the judgement and decree passed by the Subordinate Judge, Gobichettipalayam, dated 16.7.2007 in LAOP No. 1 of
2001, the land owner/land loser has filed this appeal.
Heard both the learned counsel appearing for the parties.
A recounting and r''esume of facts absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this appeal would run thus: The Government vide
Notification dated 09.11.1995 made u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, intended to acquire the land measuring an extent of 2.43.0 acre in
Survey No. 59/1 in Pariyur Vellalapalayam, for the purpose of setting up an additional work-shop for the Tamil Nadu Transport Corporation.
After complying with the procedures, the Land Acquisition Officer acquired the land and passed an award assessing the compensation in a sum of
Rs. 80,000/- per acre, based on Ex. P3-the sale deed dated 6.4.1994, which emerged anterior to the Section 4(1) Notification of the Land
Acquisition Act.
Being aggrieved by such award, the land owner got the matter referred to the Sub Court u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.
During enquiry, before the trial Court one Thiruvenkadam3 the executive officer of the appellant temple was examined as P.W. 1 and Exs. P1
and Ex. P7 were marked. On the side of the respondents, the land Acquisition Officer one C. Periavadi-the retired District Revenue Officer was
examined as RW1 and one Ponnusamy was examined as R.W. On behalf of Tamil Nadu Transport Corporation and Exs. R1 to R7 were marked
and on the respondents side. Ultimately the Sub Court confirmed the award passed by the land acquisition officer.
Being dissatisfied with such awarding of compensation, the Land owner/land loser has preferred this appeal on various grounds, inter alia to the
effect that the land acquisition officer simply ignored a very important document, namely, Ex. P4-the sale deed dated 16.9.1994, which emerged
anterior to Section 4(1) of the Notification of the Land Acquisition Act. Even during trial, the land acquisition officer simply pleaded ignorance
about the existence of Ex. P4.
According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the assessment made by the lower Court was niggard and bereft of illegality, warranting
interference in this appeal. Accordingly, the learned counsel prayed for enhancing the compensation.
The point for consideration is as to whether the Sub Court was justified in simply confirming the assessment made by the land acquisition officer
in a sum of Rs. 80,000/- per acre, ignoring Ex. P4-the sale deed dated 16.9.1994?
A poring over and perusal of the records would display and demonstrate that the land acquisition officer, from the data lands, selected Ex. P3-
the sale deed dated 6.4.1994, which is referring to an agricultural land and as per that, per acre was valued in a sum of Rs. 80,000/-. The location
of the said property is somewhat nearer to the land acquired by the Government, so to say, Ex. P3 refers to S. No. 29/74 and accordingly
assessed the valuation. However, the learned counsel for the appellant would correctly and appositely point out that there is one other document,
viz., Ex. P4-the sale deed dated 16.9.1994 and it is situated not far off from the data land, as contained in Ex. P3. As such, the land acquisition
officer was not justified in ignoring Ex. P4, in which, one acre of land was assessed in a sum of Rs. 1,25,000/-. In fact, Ex. P4 is not a cooked up
document, as it emerged more than a year anterior to the Section 4(1) Notification of the Land Acquisition Act.
The claim of the land losers should be viewed sympathetically, as they are the persons, who are affected by the land acquisition, but the lower
Court failed to take note of the same. No plausible reason was given for rejecting Ex. P4.
The learned for the appellant, in all fairness, would submit that the other documents relied on by the appellant, namely, Exs. P5, P6 and P7 are
not very much relevant for the assessment, as they emerged subsequent to Ex. P4.
In fact, Ex. P5-the sale deed dated 5.4.1995 is relating to a piece of land measuring 55 cents, emerged only five months anterior to the land
acquisition proceedings and obviously and axiomatically that point fails to create confidence in the mind of the Court, because anticipating
publication of Sec. 4(1) Notification, such a document might have been brought about.
Exs. P6 is relating to a house site and that too, emerged in the same year of Section 4(1) Notification, so to say, three months prior to such
Notification. As such, the reasons assigned for not placing reliance on Ex. P5 is also mutatis mutandis applicable to Ex. P6 also.
So far as Ex. P7-the sale deed dated 22.8.1995 is concerned, it emerged two months prior to the Section 4(1) Notification and it is quite
obvious that such a document cannot be relied upon for the reasons already adhered to supra.
Considering the pro et contra, Ex. P4-the sale deed dated 16.9.1994 in my considered opinion is a document which ought not have been
excluded by the land acquisition officer as well as by the Court below. There is no reason much less plausible reason for not taking it as a exemplar
document for assessing the compensation.
A mere perusal of the map concerned would show that the existence of the land, as contemplated in Ex. P3 and the land contemplated in Ex.
P4 are almost in equal distance from the land acquired.
The core question arises as to why then such difference occurred between the two sale deeds, namely, Ex. P3 and P4.
Depending upon local conditions and the necessity of the purchaser, there might have emerged such difference. At this distant point of time,
while this Court taking up Ex. P4 as an exemplar document, certain deductions should be made for the purpose of off setting the price and to
achieve parity. Accordingly, if viewed a viamedia has to be stuck.
This court is fully aware of the dicta as found exemplified in the precedents of the Hon''ble Apex Court against averaging the prices taking into
account two or more sale deeds when the lands contemplated in those sale deeds are not similar.
Here, there is nothing to indicate that the lands contemplated in Exs. P3 and P4 are different in any aspect. However, as observed supra,
owing to the requirement of the subsequent purchaser, he might have paid slightly higher amount than the amount contemplated in Ex. P3 sale deed
dated 06.04.1994 almost five months anterior to the emergence of Ex. P4 sale deed dated 16.09.1994. As such, I am of the considered view that
by way of off-setting the price contemplated in Ex. P4, half of the difference in prices existing between the two sale deeds can be taken for
deduction from the sale price contemplated in ExP4. Hence, I am of the considered view that per acre, the compensation could be awarded in a
sum of Rs. 1,02,500/-.
The following precedent of the Hon''ble Apex Court reported in Chandrashekar (D) by L.Rs. and Others Vs. Land Acquisition Officer and
Another, could fruitfully be cited in this regard. An excerpt from it would run thus:
Having given our thoughtful consideration to the analysis of the legal position referred to in the foregoing two paragraphs, we are of the view
that there is no discrepancy on the issue, in the recent judgments of this Court. In our view, for the ""first component"" under the head of
development"", deduction of 33-1/3 percent can be made. Likewise, for the ""second component"" under the head of ""development"" a further
deduction of 33-1/3 percent can additionally be made. The facts and circumstances of each case would determine the actual component of
deduction, for each of the two components. Yet under the head of ""development"", the applied deduction should not exceed 67 per cent. That
should be treated as the upper benchmark. This would mean, that even if deduction under one or the other of the two components under the head
of ""development"" put together, should not exceed the upper benchmark.
In Lal Chand''s case (supra) and in Andhra Pradesh Housing Board''s case (supra), this court expressed the upper limit of permissible
deductions as 75 per cent. Deductions upto 67 percent can be made under the head of ""development"". Under what head then, would the
remaining component of deductions fall? Further deductions would obviously pertain to considerations other than the head of ""development"".
Illustratively a deduction could be made keeping in mind the waiting period required to raise infrastructure, as also, the waiting period for sale of
developed plots and or built-up areas. This nature of deduction may be placed under the head ""waiting period"". Illustratively again, deductions
could also be made in cases where the exemplar sale transaction, is of a date subsequent to the publication of the preliminary notification. This
nature of deduction may be placed under the head ""de-escalation"". Likewise, deductions may be made for a variety of other causes which may
arise in different cases. It is however necessary for us to conclude, in the backdrop of the precedents on the issue, that all deductions should not
cumulatively exceed the upper benchmark of 75 percent. A deduction beyond 75 per cent would give the impression of being lopsides, or
contextually unreal, since the land loser would seemingly get paid for only 25 per cent of his land. This impression is unjustified, because deductions
are made out of the market value of developed land. Whereas the acquired land is undeveloped (or not fully developed). Differences between the
nature of the exemplar land and the acquired land, it should be remembered, is the reason/cause for applying deductions"". Another aspect of this
matter must also be kept in mind. Market value based on exemplar sale, from which a deduction in excess of 75 per cent has to be made, would
not be a relevant sale transaction to be taken into consideration, for determining the compensation of the acquired land. In such a situation the
exemplar land and the acquired land would be uncomparable, and therefore, there would be no question of applying the market value of one
(exemplar sale) to determine the compensation payable for the other (acquired land). It however needs to be clarified, that even though on account
of developmental activities (under the head ""development""), we have specified the upper benchmark of 67 per cent, it would seem, that for the
remaining deduction(s), the permissible range would be upto 8 percent. That however is not the correct position. The range of deductions, other
than under the head ""development"", would depend on the facts and circumstances, may even exceed 8 per cent, but that would be so only, where
deductions for developmental activities (under the head ""development"") is less than 67 per cent, i.e., as long as the cumulative deductions do not
cross the upper benchmark of 75 per cent. We therefore hold, that the range for deductions, for issues other than development costs, would
depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, they may be 8 percent, or even the double thereof, or even further more, as long as,
cumulatively all deductions put together do not exceed the upper benchmark of 75 percent.
Before applying deductions for ascertaining the market value of the undeveloped acquired land, it would be necessary to classify the nature of
the exemplar land, as also, the acquired land. This would constitute the second step in the process of determination of the correct quantum of
deductions. The lands under reference may be totally undeveloped, partially developed, substantially developed or fully developed. In arriving at an
appropriate classification of the nature of the lands which are to be compared, reference may be made to the developmental activities referred to
by us in connection with the ""first component"", as also, the ""second component"" (in paragraph 17 above). The presence (or absence) of one or
more of the components of development, would lead to an appropriate classification of the exemplar land, and the acquired land. Comparison of
the classifications thus arrived, would depict the difference in terms of development, between the exemplar land and the acquired land. This
exercise would lead to the final step. In the final step, the absence and presence of developmental components, based on such comparison, would
constitute the basis for arriving at an appropriate percentage of deduction, necessary to balance the differential factors between the exemplar land
and the acquired land.
(emphasis supplied)
Regarding deductions towards development charges are concerned, no deduction is required for the simple reason that here the exemplar
document and the land acquired both are agricultural lands and in such a case as per the decision of the Honourable Apex Court and also this
Court, no deduction is required.
Accordingly, the appeal is allowed to the extent that per acre should be assessed in a sum of Rs. 1,02,500/-(rupees one lakh two thousand
five hundred) and mutatis mutandis all other legal entitlements also should be calculated. However, there is no order as to costs.