Arun Prasad vs State Of Jharkhand And Ors

Heard learned counsel for the appellant, the State and the Private respondent.

The appeal arises out of the impugned judgment dated 14.09.2010 rendered in W.P.(C). No. 532 of 2009 whereby challenge to the orders dated

21.10.2008 passed in S.A.R. Revision No.114 of 2008 confirming the order dated 29.12.2006 passed in S.A.R. Appeal No.75(R) 15/2005-06 inter alia

confirming the order dated 12.05.1997 passed in S.A.R. No.176 of 1995 directing the writ petitioner to restore the land in question in favour of the

respondent No.5 Birsa Uraon (applicant in S.A.R. Case No.176 of 1995) was rejected.

We have considered the submission of learned counsel for the parties in detail and also perused the lower court records summoned during the

proceedings and on having done so, we are satisfied that the case needs to be remanded to the S.A.R. court for the reasons recorded hereinafter:

Private respondent Birsa Uraon initiated S.A.R. proceedings bearing no.176 of 1995-96 under section 71-A of the Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act before

the court of Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation (S.A.R.), Ranchi. As per the averments made in his application, the land in question bearing

khata no.97, plot no.148, area 1.93 decimals and khata no.98, plot no.149, area 2.5 acres stood recorded in Revisional Survey record of rights in the

name of Bandhu Oraon, Charan Uraon and Bhokhre Oraon, all sons of Kandu Oraon. It is pertinent to mention here that the aforesaid facts stand

corroborated by the learned counsel for the State from the survey records produced by the Revenue Officials during proceedings of this appeal.

The applicant further stated that one of the recorded tenant Bhokhre Oraon died leaving behind his son Etwa Oraon who died leaving behind the

applicant Birsa Uraon i.e. the private respondent herein. He belongs to the scheduled tribe community. Applicant pleaded that the land was

transferred fraudulently about ten years ago without any valid document in contravention of section 46 of the C.N.T. Act and opposite Parties had

forcibly captured the land. At present the land is vacant.

Be it noted here that this application did not mention about the other two recorded raiyats namely Bandhu Oraon and Charan Oraon or their legal

heirs/successors in interest. Applicant did not also say that he is the sole legal heir of the three recorded raiyats named above entitled to restoration of

the entire piece of land under both the khatas 97 and 98 in question. S.A.R. proceedings were conducted ex-parte since none of the Opposite Parties

namely Ramesh Prasad, Birendra Prasad and Asan Prasad, impleaded as all sons of Nageshwar Prasad or Opposite Party No. 4, Secretary,

Neelanchal Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti Limited, Ranchi appeared despite notice. The sole writ petitioner laid a challenge to the order of S.A.R. court

dated 12.05.1997 in S.A.R. Appeal No.75(R) 15/2005-06 after eight years while the other two sons of Nageshwar Prasad did not choose to prefer

any appeal.

According to the appellant/writ petitioner, the S.A.R. case was filed against dead persons and O.P. No.3 was wrongly named as Asan Prasad

whereas the third son of Nageshwar Prasad was the appellant Arun Prasad. Appellant pleaded that land is chhaparbandi declared in the year, 1948. It

was purchased by appellant, Birendra Prasad and Ahilya Devi on 03.12.1955 and it was in their possession. They were living at Patna. The land was

converted into chhaparbandi and transferred in the name of several purchasers and ultimately purchased by the appellant. Appellant was not made a

party and the case was filed against the other two opposite parties who were dead. Appellant had all valid documents and transactions were legal.

Respondent was a stranger unrelated with the recorded tenant. He urged that the order had been procured from the S.A.R. court by suppressing

material facts. Delay was explained on the ground that the order was not supplied to the appellant for long and only after the respondent had obtained

writ of delivery of possession, the appellant filed the memo of appeal without certified copy. Appeal was rejected by order dated 29.12.2006 holding

that appellant/writ petitioner failed to produce any document of conversion of land into chhaparbandi by way of lease as claimed during his oral

submissions. Appellant were in illegal possession over the land in question and therefore no interference was required in the order of the S.A.R. court.

It is pertinent to take note of at this stage that appellant/writ petitioner also failed to make categorical mention that he was the sole heir of the

transferee of the entire piece of land under both khata nos.97 and 98 or that his other brothers namely Ramesh Prasad and Birendra Prasad, sons of

Nageshwar Prasad died issueless leaving behind no legal heirs. In S.A.R. Revision No.114 of 2008 preferred by Arun Prasad, the same stand was

taken. He also asserted in his revision application that the order of S.A.R. court was ex parte against Ramesh Prasad, his full blood brother. At Para-8

of his revision application Arun Prasad also stated that he along with his brother Birendra Prasad and Ramesh Prasad had purchased the land by

virtue of registered deed of sale dated 04.04.1951 and the nature of land is chhaparbandi. He also asserted that he had raised structure over the

portion of the land on which the caretaker was residing. The land was chhaparbandi and proceedings under section 71-A of the C.N.T. Act was not

maintainable. He pleaded that case for restoration of land has been filed after 45 years of its transfer and therefore barred by limitation. The

Revisional Court rejected his application holding in a short order that both the transactions i.e. registered deed dated 02.04.1951 of settlement of the

land as chhaparbandi and registered sale deed dated 04.04.1951 by the raiyats Bandhu Oraon, Sukra Oraon, s/o late Kanhu Uraon and Jalsa Uraon,

s/o Parna Oraon were illegal transactions of tribal lands. The order of the inferior courts were correct and there was no ground to allow the Revision

petition.

The learned Writ Court refused to entertain the challenge to the orders of the S.A.R. Authorities after taking note of the pleadings of the writ

petitioner holding as under:

“3. It appears from the aforesaid order dated 12.5.1997 that the said proceeding for restoration of land under Section 71 A of the

Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act, was initiated by respondent no.5, against Ramesh Prasad, Birendra Prasad and Arun Prasad (petitioner) all

sons of late Nageshwar Prasad, resident of Dak Bunglow Road, Patna, Secretary, Neelanchal Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti, Ranchi. Inspite

of publication of notice in newspaper, no body appeared on behalf of the said opposite parties in the said proceeding. After considering the

documents produced by respondent no.5- Birsa Oraon, the S.A.R. Officer allowed the petition and directed restoration of land in favour of

respondent no.5.

An appeal was filed by the petitioner after about 8 years. No other party filed appeal. According to the petitioner, when he came to know

about the said order, he filed the said appeal. It was submitted on behalf of the petitioner before the appellate authority that in the said case

wrong persons were added as parties; and that the land in question was declared 'homestead' (cchaparbandi) in the year 1948 and on

03.12.1995 it was purchased by the predecessor in inerest of the petitioner who were living at Patna.

The Appeal was dismissed on the ground that the petitioner did not produce any document in support of his case, as to how the 'Adiwasi'

land was transferred and was declared 'homestead'. Only photo copies of some rent receipts were produced.

Petitioner preferred the said revision before the revisional authority. It appears from the revisional order that no documents were produced

by the petitioner, except that, in paragraph 6 and 7 of the revision petition, it was said by the petitioner that, the land belonging to the

'Adiwasi' Khata was settled on 02.04.1951 by registered document as 'homestead' land in favour of respondent no.5 and others, who were

the Khatiyani Raiyats and that on 04.04.1951 by registered document they sold it to petitioner and his relatives. The revisional authority

dismissed the revision holding that even as per the said statements made in the revision petition, both the transfers i.e., alleged settlement in

favour of respondent no.5 and others and the alleged sale by them to the petitioner and others, are actually one transaction, which clearly

establishes illegal transfer of 'Adiwasi' land.

This proceeding was initiated by respondent no.5 in the year 1995 i.e., about 15 years ago. The original order was passed after

publication of notice in the newspaper. Then, the petitioner filed an appeal after about 8 years, and then the revision, where he had full

opportunity, but he did not produce the documents in support of his case. The stand of the petitioner has been contradictory also. The

impugned orders have been passed after hearing the parties, and considering the documents produced by them and taking into

consideration relevant aspects of the matter. This appears to be a case of grabbing the land of poor 'Adiwasi'. It is also not understood as to

how a huge land of 4.08 Acres can be claimed by the petitioner as 'Homestead' (Chhaparbandi).

In the facts and circumstances noticed above, no grounds are made out for interfering with the impugned orders.

Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed with a cost of Rs.10,000/- (Rs. Ten thousand only) to be paid to respondent no.5 within four

weeks.â€​

Before us in appeal, learned counsel for the appellant, the State and the Private respondent/ applicant in S.A.R. proceedings have made the following

submissions:

Learned counsel for the appellant submits that application for restoration of land made after 45 years in the year, 1995 is not maintainable. It is an

abuse of the process of law and in teeth of the ratio rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Situ Sahu & Ors. vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors.;

(2004) 8 SCC 340. In that case the expression “at any time†in section 71-A was examined and it was held that lapse of 40 years was certainly

not a reasonable time for exercise of power, even if it is not hedged by a period of limitation. It is further submitted that section 71-A was introduced

by an amendment (Bihar Schedule Areas Regulation, 1969). Any transfer made in the year, 1951 could not be annulled by resort to the power under

section 71-A of the C.N.T. Act, that too at the instance of the applicant who is not the sole legal heir of the recorded raiyats who had transferred the

land through a registered sale deed of 04.04.1951. It is further argued that though writ petitioner had pleaded before the revisional court that

substantial structures were built upon the land in question but the S.A.R. authorities failed to undertake any inquiry as contemplated under section 71-

A of the C.N.T. Act. They failed to comply with the prescription of law contained in the second proviso to section 71-A. It would not only be illegal

but inequitable to evict a person occupying a piece of land since 1951, with structures built thereupon in order to favor an applicant who is not the sole

and only heir of the recorded raiyats. It would lead to unjust results. The learned inferior S.A.R. courts and the learned Writ Court have failed to

appreciate the legal and factual grounds which affect the subject matter of challenge and render the orders of S.A.R. authorities untenable on law or

on facts. He has pleaded that the whole S.A.R. proceedings be held as barred by limitation. In the alternative, he has submitted that the matter

deserves remand on all these issues.

On behalf of the State, learned Senior Standing Counsel Mr. Banerjee has adverted to the factual position borne out from the revenue records

produced during the proceedings of the case. According to him they show that the land was recorded in the name of Bandhu Oraon, Bhokhre Oraon

and Charan Oraon in the Revisional Survey Record of Rights. The record of rights have not been altered thereafter. It is further submitted that

appellant failed to produce any chit of document before the appellate and revisional authorities or even in the writ proceedings to support their claims

of transfer through registered sale deed and the lease deed of settlement of the land as chapparbandi of the year, 1951. Learned counsel for the State,

however does not dispute the contention of the appellant that rent receipts were issued in the name of the appellant till 1984-85 in respect of the land

in question though the rent receipts do not reflect the details of the land. He further submits that after the applicant succeeded before the S.A.R.

Court and the writ petition was dismissed, the rent receipts have been issued in favour of the applicant/private respondent in the year, 2015 in respect

of the land in question. Learned counsel for the State, however on perusal of the lower court records is not in a position to dispute that inquiry

contemplated in terms of section 71-A were not carried out by the S.A.R. Authorities. It therefore follows that prescriptions in law contained in the

proviso to section 71-A of the Act were also not adhered to by the S.A.R. authorities in the light of the assertion of the writ petitioner in his Revision

application that structures were built upon the land in question. He has also not been able to dispute that the S.A.R. proceedings were initiated in 1995

after 45 years of the alleged transfer since the revisional authorities have also taken note of the registered deed of lease dated 02.04.1951 allegedly

changing the nature of land into chhaparbandi and registered deed of sale dated 04.04.1951 conveying the land by the recorded raiyats in favor of the

appellant and two other sons of Nageshwar Prasad. Learned counsel for the State is also not able to countenance that applicant has not stated that he

is the sole heir of the recorded raiyats or that the rest two recorded raiyats namely Charan Oraon and Bandhu Oraon died issueless leaving no legal

heirs or successors in interest. As such, any restoration of land in favour of the applicant would possibly hurt the interest of heirs of the other recorded

tenant or their heirs, if any, may not have any objection at this length of time to the alleged transfer in the year, 1951 by their forefathers. It is

however, argued that the law does not permit change of nature of land to chhaparbandi. Moreover the writ petitioner has claimed that the entire piece

of land comprising 4.08 acres under both khata Nos.97 and 98, plot nos. 148 and 149 were allegedly converted as chhaparbandi which cannot be

correct. It is also pointed out from the Register-II that the relevant plots in khata nos.97 and 98 contained the names of the recorded raiyats. He,

however points out that the appellant has also failed to categorically assert that his two brothers namely Birendra Prasad and Ramesh Prasad died

issueless leaving behind no legal heirs. Appellant has also not asserted whether there has been a partition amongst the three brothers and whether

applicant claims to pursue his right as respects 1/3rd of the piece of land which at best he could claim.

The applicant/private respondent did not appear during the writ proceedings but has contested the appeal before us. Learned counsel represented

him has inter-alia made the following submissions:

It is submitted that appellant has only at the stage of this Letters Patent Appeal brought on record the registered deed of lease of 1951 executed by

the erstwhile landlord settling the land in question for 99 years as chhaparbandi and the registered deed of sale of the year, 1951 allegedly conveying

the land in question by the recorded raiyats in favour of the appellant and his two brothers. However, undisputedly these documents were not brought

on record even till the writ proceedings. It is further submitted that the transfer of tribal land being contrary to the provisions of the section 46 of the

C.N.T. Act which was brought in the statute book in the year, 1948 itself, were liable to be restored on any such application made by the recorded

raiyat or his legal heir. The applicant is the legal heir and grandson of the original recorded raiyat Bhokre Oraon. It is submitted that the expression

“at any time†used in section 71-A of the C.N.T. Act is of sufficient amplitude and flexibility. Any application for restoration by an aggrieved

scheduled tribe raiyat should not be defeated on such technical grounds when the proceedings before the S.A.R. court remained uncontested and even

at the appellate and the revisional stage, the writ petitioner failed to produce any document in his support. Learned counsel for the Private respondent

however is not in a position to categorically assert that he is the sole legal heir of the other two recorded raiyats namely Bandhu Oraon and Charan

Oraon, who are also said to have executed the registered sale deed in favour of the appellant and his two brothers on 04.04.1951 mentioned in the

revisional order and also taken note of in the impugned judgment of the learned Writ Court. He also does not dispute that rent receipts were issued in

the name of the appellant till 1984-85 and that no inquiry as contemplated under section 71-A has been undertaken during the S.A.R. proceedings to

ascertain whether the transferee was in occupation of the land in question for over a period of 30 years or had built a structure thereupon as

contemplated under the proviso to section 71-A of the Act. However, it is submitted that the proceedings for restoration having protracted for 24

years, this Court should refrain from remanding the matter for fresh determination when the case of the appellant is neither tenable on facts or in law

and were unsupported by documentary evidence before the S.A.R. courts.

We have taken note of the submissions of parties on the issue at hand. We deem it apposite to reproduce Section 71-A of the C.N.T. Act, 1908

hereunder as the issue involved herein are determinable on the scope and power of the Deputy Commissioner to restore possession of unlawfully

transferred land to a schedule Tribe member.

“[71-A. Power to restore possession to member of the Schedule Tribes over land unlawfully transferred.-- If at any time, it comes to the

notice of the Deputy Commissioner that transfer of land belonging to a raiyat [or a Mundari Khunt-Kattidar or a Bhuinhar] who is a

member of the Scheduled Tribes has taken place in contravention of Section 46 [or Section 48 or Section 240] or any other provisions of

this Act or by any fraudulent method, [including decrees obtained in suit by fraud and collusion] he may, after giving reasonable

opportunity to the transfer, who is proposed to be evicted, to show cause and after making necessary inquiry in the matter, evict the

transferee from such land without payment of compensation and restore it to the transferor or his heir, or, in case the transferor or his heir

is not available or is not willing to agree to such restoration, re-settle it with another Raiyat belonging to the Scheduled Tribes according to

the village custom for the disposal of an abandoned holding:

Provided that if the transferee has, within 30 years from the date of transfer, constructed any building or structure on such holding or

portion thereof, the Deputy Commissioner shall, if the transferor is not willing to pay the value of the same, order the transferee to remove

the same within a period of six months from the date of the order, or within such extended time not exceeding two years from the date of the

order as the Deputy Commissioner may allow, failing which the Deputy Commissioner may get such building or structure removed:

Provided further that where the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that the transferee has constructed a substantial structure or building on

such holding or potion thereof before coming into force of Bihar scheduled Areas Regulation, 1969, he may, notwithstanding any other

provisions of the Act, validate such transfer where the transferee either makes available to the transferor an alternative holding or portion

thereof or as the case may be, of the equivalent value of the vicinity or pays adequate compensation to be determined by the Commissioner

for rehabilitation of the transferor.

Provided also that if after an inquiry the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that the transferee has acquired a title by adverse possession and

that the transferred land should be restored or re-settled, he shall require the transferor or his heir or another raiyat, as the case may be, to

deposit with the Deputy Commissioner such sum of money as may be determined by the Deputy Commissioner having regard to the amount

for which the land was transferred or the market value of the land, as the case may be and the amount of any compensation for

improvements effected to the land which the Deputy Commissioner may deem fair and equitable.]

[Explanation 1].- In this Section “substantial structure or building†means structure or building the value of each on the day of

initiation of inquiry, was determined by the Deputy Commissioner to exceed Rs.10,000 but does not include structure or building of any

value, the material of each can be removed without substantially impairing the value of].

[Explanation II.- A Bhuinhar or Mundari Khunt-Kattidar, who is deemed to be a settled Raiyat under the provisions of Section 18 of this Act

shall also be deemed to be a Raiyat for the purpose of this Section.]

A bare perusal of section 71-A of the C.N.T. Act would show that the power is exerciseable suo moto. However it can also be expressed at the

instance of an aggrieved recorded raiyat belonging to schedule tribe whose land has been transferred in contravention of section 46 or any other

provisions of this Act or by any fraudulent method. Such power has to be exercised by the Deputy Commissioner after making necessary inquiry in

the matter and after giving a show cause to the transferee. It also contemplates that in case the transferor or his heir is not available or is not willing to

agree to such restoration, the Deputy Commissioner can resettle it with another raiyat belonging to scheduled tribe according to the village custom for

the disposal of an abandoned holding. The first Proviso to section 71-A contemplates that in case the transferee has, within 30 years from the date of

transfer, constructed any building or structure on such holding or portion thereof, the Deputy Commissioner shall, if the transferor is not willing to pay

the value of the same, order the transferee to remove the same within a period of six months from the date of the order or within such extended time

not exceeding two years from the date of the order as the Deputy Commissioner may allow, failing which the Deputy Commissioner may get such

building or structure removed. From a reading of the aforesaid proviso it follows that while taking such a decision suo motu or on application of an

aggrieved S.T. raiyat, the Deputy Commissioner is required to make an inquiry and if the transferee has within 30 years from the date of transfer

constructed any building or structure on such holding or portion thereof, order the transferee to remove the same within an extended period upto two

years if the tansferor is not willing to pay the value of the building or structure constructed by the transferee. As per the second proviso, if the Deputy

Commissioner is satisfied after proper inquiry and giving reasonable opportunity to the transferee that the transferee has constructed a substantial

structure or building on such holding or portion thereof before coming into force of Bihar Schedule Area Regulation, 1969, he may notwithstanding any

other provisions of the Act, validate such transfer where the transferee either makes available to the transferor an alternative holding or portion

thereof, as the case may be, of the equivalent value of the vicinity or pays adequate compensation to be determined by the Commissioner for

rehabilitation of the transferor.

The third proviso to section 71-A contemplates a situation where the Deputy Commissioner, if satisfied that the transferee has acquired a title by

adverse possession, is still of the opinion that the transferred land should be restored or resettled; then he shall require the transferor or his heir or

another raiyat, as the case may be to deposit with the Deputy Commissioner such sum of money as may be determined by the Deputy Commissioner

having regard to the amount for which the land was transferred or the market value of the land, as the case may be and the amount of any

compensation for improvements effected to the land which the Deputy Commissioner may deem fair and equitable.

Explanation-1 thereof explains the meaning of the expression “substantial structure or ‘buildingâ€​.

In the present case it appears that no such inquiry has been made. The appellant/one of the transferee has on the other hand asserted that he had

raised structure on the piece of land as averred in his application for condonation of delay filed alongwith the Revision application. The requirement of

law and the procedure prescribed as per section 71-A (introduced by an amendment of 1969) for restoration of possession to members of scheduled

tribe over the unlawfully transferred land, do not appear to have been followed.

On the part of the appellant it has been argued that the application of restoration is time barred. In this regard reliance has been placed on a decision

of Situ Sahu & Ors. (supra). In Situ Sahu & Ors. (supra) in a case arising out of section 71-A and 46 of the C.N.T. Act, 1908. The Apex Court in the

said case has explained the meaning of the expression “if at any timeâ€. Para-11 and 14 of the report is quoted hereunder as it has expatiated the

legal position as regards the time limits within which such a power under section 71-A can be exercised:

 “11. We are, therefore, of the view that the use of the words ""at any time"" in section 71A is evidence of the legislative intent to give

sufficient flexibility to the Deputy Commissioner to implement the socio- economic policy of the Act viz. to prevent inroads upon the rights of

the ignorant, illiterate and backward citizens. Thus, where the Deputy Commissioner chooses to exercise his power under section 71A it

would be futile to contend that the period of limitation under Limitation Act has expired. The period of limitation under the Limitation Act is

intended to bar suits brought in civil courts where the party himself chooses to exercise his right of seeking restoration of immovable

property. But, where, for socio-economic reasons, the party may not even be aware of his own rights, the legislature has stepped in by

making an officer of the State responsible for doing social justice by clothing him with sufficient power. However, even such power cannot

be exercised after an unreasonably long time during which third party interests might have come into effect. Thus, the test is not whether the

period of limitation prescribed in the Act of 1963 had expired, but whether the power under Section 71A was sought to be exercised after

unreasonable delay.

We shall now examine the last argument of Shri Narasimha that the transfer was fraudulent. Even on this, we are afraid that the

appellants are entitled to succeed. We need not go into the details of the transaction for we may even assume that the transfer was

fraudulent. Even then, as held in Ibrahimpatnam, the power under Section 71A could have been exercised only within a reasonable time.

Looking to the facts and circumstances of the present appeal, we are not satisfied that the Special officer exercised his powers under

Section 71A within a reasonable period of time. The lapse of 40 years is certainly not a reasonable time for exercise of power, even if it is

not hedged in by a period of limitation. We derive support to our view from the observations made by this Court in Jai Mangal Oraon case

which was also a case which arose under the very same provision of law. There this Court took the view that Section 46(4)(a), which

envisaged a prior sanction of the Deputy Commissioner before effecting the transfer in any of the modes stated therein, was introduced only

in the year 1947 (with effect from 5.1.1948) and no such provision existed during the relevant point of time when the surrender was made in

that case (15.1.1942). Obviously, therefore, no such provision existed in 1938, and the same reasoning applies.â€​

The Apex Court in the case of Fulchand Munda vs. State of Bihar & Ors.; (2008) 14 SCC 77,4 also dealt with the scope of powers under section 71-

A and 46 of the C.N.T. Act, 1908, para-15 thereof is quoted hereunder:

“15. The predecessors of the respondents could not be treated to be in possession in contravention of Section 46 as possession of land

by them has been upheld by the High Court in its decision. The decision of the High Court cannot be reopened by taking advantage of

amendment in Section 46 which came into force with effect from 5-1-1948. Section 71-A of the CNT Act would be attracted only in case the

Deputy Commissioner finds that the impugned transfer was made in contravention of Section 46 or any other provision of the CNT Act. The

decision of the High Court comes in the way of the Deputy Commissioner in arriving at any such findings. The possession having been

denied to the appellant's predecessors holding that there was no contravention of Section 46 as it stood in 1922, the appellant cannot be

permitted to take advantage under Section 46 on same having been amended by an Act of 1947. That apart, although there is no period of

limitation prescribed for exercising the power under Section 71-A by the Deputy Commissioner, the party affected is called upon to

approach the appropriate authority or the power has to be exercised by the Deputy Commissioner within a reasonable period of time. The

gap of more than 50 years for challenging the transaction of 1922 cannot be said to be a reasonable time for exercising the power even if it

is not hedged in by a period of limitationâ€​.

Apart from the aforesaid legal position, the facts of the instant case noted above conspicuously point out that the applicant/private respondent

alone sought restoration of the land without specifically making an assertion that the two other recorded raiyats i.e., brothers of his grandfather died

issueless leaving behind no legal heirs and he was the sole claimant. Apart from that, there are other noticeable relevant facts revealed from the

record i.e. the rent receipts were issued in favour of the appellant till the year, 1984-85 while rent receipts were issued in favour of the

applicant/private respondent in the year, 2015 by the Revenue Authorities. Apparently, as pointed by the learned counsel for the State, the rent

receipts did not reveal the plot numbers or the mutation case number. These are issues which leave the entire adjudication process inconclusive and

inchoate both on questions of fact and the consequences that follow in law on the claim of restoration of the land in question. The Deputy

Commissioner would be required to undertake an inquiry to ascertain questions of facts such as, as to who else are the legal heirs of the recorded

raiyats apart from the applicant/private respondent?; existence of structure/substantial structure and its age as claimed by the appellant on the land in

question, whether on whole or portion of such holding; status of the other two transferees or their legal heirs as regards the transferred land vis-a-vis

the claim of the appellant. Besides that, the validity of the transaction and the time limit within which such application for restoration can be made, as

per the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Situ Sahu & Ors. (supra), as regards the meaning of the expression “at any time†used in

section 71-A of the Act, have to be also adjudicated upon after proper inquiry and reasonable opportunity to the parties. However, since these issues

need to be adjudicated after due inquiry by the Deputy Commissioner/S.A.R. Authority, we consciously refrain from expressing our opinion on any of

these issues of fact or the consequences in law that may follow upon such determination.

Having said so, we are however satisfied that the case in hand is fit for reconsideration to the court of S.A.R. Officer. The impugned judgment

and the orders of the S.A.R. Officer, the Appellate Authority and the Revisional court are set aside. The S.A.R. Officer is required to determine all

the relevant issues of fact and law after due opportunity to the parties and after due inquiry as contemplated under section 71-A of the Act, however,

within a definite time frame so that the entire issue can be set at rest. We once again make it abundantly clear that none of the observations made

hereinabove should be construed as an opinion in favour of either of the parties on the merits of this case. The discussion and observations made

hereinabove are only with the purpose to come to a considered finding whether the decision of the S.A.R. authorities are strictly as per the provisions

of section 71-A of the CNT Act and the procedure prescribed thereunder. The SAR authorities shall be free to decide the case on its own merits

without being influenced by any of the observation made hereinabove.

Parties are directed to appear before the Special Officer, S.A.R., Ranchi on 15.01.2020. Let the entire lower court records be sent down to the

concerned court forthwith. The appeal is allowed in the manner and to the extent indicated hereinabove. The Revenue Records in the custody of the

Revenue Officials are to be retained by them.