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Judgment
Ramachandra Iyer, J.—This appeal which is filed by the decree-holder (4th defendant) raises a question of limitation, namely whether E. P.
No. 291 of 1956 in O. S. No. 121 of 1926 is barred by the provisions of S. 48 C. P. C. The suit was one for accounts on the basis of a dissolved
partnership. The decree in the suit was passed on 20th February 1928 under which the 2nd defendant along with two others were directed to pay
a large sum of money to the 4th defendant. By a subsequent agreement between the parties which was duly recorded in Court the liability of the
defendants was split up. Under the terms of the compromise, the 2nd defendant was to give security for the decree against him and also pay a sum
of Rs. 2000 per year, the balance of the decree amount to be paid on 13th April 1943 on which date the decree-holder would attain the age of
majority. For the due performance of the decree (under the terms of the compromise) the 2nd defendant was to give security of certain
immoveable properties. This be did. Both the compromise as well as the security bond were duly registered. The execution petition out of which
this appeal arises was filed on 5th April 1956, more than 12 years from the date when the money under the decree became payable. The appellant
claimed that he was entitled to exclude the period from 5th December 1953 to 27th February 1955 by virtue of S. 5 of the Madras Indebted
Agriculturists (Temporary Relief) Act, V of 1954 (to be referred to also as the Act) as the judgment debtor was an agriculturist entitled to the
benefit of the moratorium declared by that Act and by the Ordinance V of 1953, which preceded it. Before the lower Court it was urged on behalf
of the appellant that the debtor owned certain agricultural lands in the village of Kothamangalam and Nappalkudi in the Ramnad Dt., within the
State of Madras. The lower Court found and that finding has not been challenged before us that the judgment debtor did not own any agricultural
lands in this State. But the appellant now relies on the circumstance of the judgment debtor owning agricultural lands in Pegu (which fact is not
denied) and contends that possession of those lands on the material dates would entitle the debtor to the protection afforded by Act V of 1954
and the Ordinance preceding it and that the decree-holder being thereby prevented from filing the execution petition during the time when they
were in force that is for a period of one year and 26 days, be would be entitled to the exclusion of that period in the computation of limitation. The
appellant does not claim any benefit of the four mouths period given under Act 1 of 1955 as it has been found that the judgment debtor was not an
agriculturist within the meaning of that enactment.
The only question to be decided in this case is whether a person who owns agricultural lands not within the State of Madras but outside it would
be entitled to claim the benefit of the Ordinance V of 1953 and the Madras Act V of 1954. If the answer to that question is in the affirmative the
decree-holder would be entitled to exclude the period during which the Ordinance and the Act were in force by virtue of S. 5 of Act V of 1954. It
will be sufficient to consider the provisions of the Act as the provisions of the preceding Ordinance are almost identical with it. The Act purports to
provide for a temporary relief to indebted agriculturists. The preamble to it refers to the draught in the preceding years which led to greater
indebtedness of the agriculturists and of the coming in of adequate rains during the year enabling the agriculturists to devote their energies to
cultivate with assiduity and the necessity for relieving them from the pressure of creditors, for a short time in order that the maximum possible
advantage might result to the State in the matter of food production. The preamble would appear to show that the object of the legislation was to
benefit agriculturists possessing lands in this State as the failure of monsoon and the increasing the food production referred to could relate to this
State.
Section 3 of the Act provides that no suit for recovery of debt or application for execution of the decree against an agriculturist could be
instituted for a period of one year from the commencement of the Act. A similar provision was contained in the Ordinance which was in force from
5th December, 1953 till the commencement of the Act. The term "" agriculturist "" is defined under S. 2 (a) of the Act thus :
''Agriculturist'' means a person who owns an interest in land, and who, by reason of such interest is in possession of such land or is in receipt of the
rents or profits thereof and shall include a lessee the rest of the section is omitted as unnecessary.
Neither the terms of S. 3 nor the definition of the term "" agriculturist "" impose any express qualification on the person claiming the benefit of the
Act, that he should own agricultural lands in the State of Madras. It is argued for the appellant that whatever might have been the reason which
influenced the legislature to enact the legislation the operative part of the Statute is clear and unambiguous and that read in the light of the definition
would show that the benefit of the moratorium should be given to all persons who own agricultural lands whether it be within the State or outside it.
It was further argued that the words in the enacting part of the Statute should be held to have been designedly used so as to comprehend a
larger category of persons, as the legislature whenever it wanted to restrict to agriculturists within the State of Madras, had used specific words to
that effect Reference was made in this connection to the Madras Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, Act IV of 1938, which defined the term of
''agriculturist'' as a person owning or possessing agricultural lands within the State of Madras, to the Madras Agriculturists income tax Act and the
Wealth Tax Act etc.
One of the well settled and cardinal rules of construction of a Statute is that its provisions should be considered in such a way as to accord with
the intention of the Legislature that enacted it. How is that intention to be ascertained? One rule is that if the enacting part is clear, prima facie, that
should be taken as declaring the intention of the Legislature and that no other aid should be resorted for the purpose of ascertaining it. But where it
is not so clear resort may be had to other matters for arriving at the true construction. The question whether a Statute applied to a particular
subject matter or only to a limited part of it cannot strictly or always be called one of construction of the Statute. A Statute may expressly provide
in regard to its scope and applicability. But sometimes it may not be possible to ascertain the scope of the enactment by a mere reference to its
provisions.
The question then arises whether in regard to those cases resort can be had to other matters for the construction of the Statute. It is contended
on behalf of the appellant that where there is no ambiguity in the enacting part of the Statute, it is not the duty of the Court to restrict the scope of
the Act by trying to understand the words used in it in any limited sense. We do not consider that this is the correct way of approaching the
question. Thomson v. Advocate General 1845-12 Ch. and F. 1, a question arose whether the words of a Statute which levied an estate duty on
every legacy even by a person by his will, would apply to the case of a legacy under a Will executed by a person who was domiciled and died
abroad. Answering the question in the negative, Tindal C,J. observed.
The very general words of the Statutes must of necessity receive some limitation of their application for they cannot in reason extend to every
person everywhere whether subjects of their kingdom or foreigners or at the time of their death domiciled within the realm or abroad.
In Freffreys v. Boosey 1854-4 H.L.C. 815, the English Copyright Act, 1710, which give protection to an author by giving him the exclusive
right of printing for 14 years was held to apply only to British authors though there was no such ""qualification in the enacting part of the Statute. It is
therefore clear that a Court would be competent to ascertain what the meaning of the general words employed in the Statute is, in the context of
the enactment and with due regard to the subject matter dealt with by the Statute. In Maxwell''s Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edn., it is stated at
p. 19 as follows:
The literal construction then, has, in general but prima facie preference. To arrive at the real meaning it is always necessary to get an exact
conception of the aim, scope and object of the whole Act; to consider according to Lord Coke : (1) What was the law before the Act was
passed; (2) What was the mischief or defect for which the law had not provided; (3) What remedy Parliament has appointed; and (4) reason of the
remedy.
Act V of 1954 is not the first of these statutes which aimed at giving relief to agriculturists debtors. In 1938 the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act
was enacted providing for the scaling down of debts due by agriculturists. The operation of the Act was restricted to agriculturists who owned
lands in the Province of Madras. No doubt that was achieved as a result of the definition containing a qualification that the agriculturists own or
possess lands in the province. We shall presently consider whether the absence of any such qualification would at all make a difference. It is
sufficient for the present purpose to state that historically speaking the State Legislature gave relief to agriculturists debtors only in cases where they
owned or possessed lands within the State of Madras.
It is necessary next to consider the mischief which the present enactment sought to remedy. The Agriculturists Relief Act IV of 1938, did not
prevent creditors from suing on their debts. Having regard to the unprecedented draught conditions in the State which had the effect of increasing
the indebtedness of the agriculturists, temporary relief was deemed necessary to enable them to devote their energies exclusively to agricultural
operations; and it was also found necessary that a more comprehensive legislation should be enacted to enable them to liquidate the accumulated
liability. The first part of the object was achieved by Ordinance V of 1953 and Act V of 1954 which granted a moratorium to the debtors for a
short time. The second part was achieved by Act I of 1955 which followed the Act V of 1954 providing for payment of debts incurred by
agriculturists in annual instalments. It is therefore, clear, that the Act was intended to meet a situation peculiar to the agriculturists in the Madras
State. In our opinion, there is an indication in the provisions of the Act itself to show that a wider operation was not intended. A moratorium of the
kind granted by the Act might be misused by unscrupulous debtors. For example a debtor while taking advantage of the moratorium might put all
his properties outside the reach of creditors by effecting alienations etc. S. 6 provides for raising a statutory presumption that wherever a debtor
entitled to the benefits of Ss. 3 and 4 of the Act transfers immoveable property, such transfer shall be presumed to have been made with intent to
defeat and delay the creditors. The property referred to in S. 6 can only relate to these situate within the State as the State Legislature cannot
legislate in regard to immoveable property outside it. This section which provides against alienations by debtors during the time when they are
having the benefit of the Act or Ordinance cannot therefore apply to persons holding property outside the State. It is reasonable to assume that the
Legislature would not have intended to give the benefit of the Act to persons owning lands or other properties outside the State, as it will be
possible for them with impunity to defeat the claims of creditors. It follows that the benefit given by the Act should also be confined to those
persons to whom the sanction provided by S. 6 would apply. A person having no property in the State cannot therefore come within the ambit of
Ss. 3 and 4 of the Act.
Mr. Natesan, learned Counsel for the appellant, contended that there being no qualification in the definition of the term ""agriculturist"" in the Act,
it would not be competent for this Court to restrict its meaning. It may be accepted as a general rule that words occurring in an Act should be
interpreted in terms of the definition contained therein. At the same time if the scope of the enactment itself is limited the terms of definition cannot
enlarge it. The definition like any other words in the statute has to be read in the context, having regard to the scheme of the Act and the intention
of the Legislature. That all statutory definitions should be read in the light of the context is clear from the section containing the definition itself which
states that the definition given by the Act would apply only ""if the context does not otherwise require."" Therefore if the scope of the enactment and
the context in which the defined term is used provide only for limited operation, i.e., to the agriculturists within the State, the term itself can have
only that limited meaning. The preamble to that Act clearly shows that the intention of the Legislature is to limit the operation of it to agriculturists
owning lands in the State. The question then arises whether the preamble can be looked into for the purpose of ascertaining the scope of the Act.
In Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni and Others Vs. The State of Madras and Others, the Supreme Court observed that:
The preamble of a statute was a key to the understanding of it and that it might legitimately be consulted to solve any ambiguity or to fix the
meaning of the words which might have more than one or to keep the effect of the statute within its scope (italics supplied), whenever the enacting
part is in any of these respects open to doubt.
In Kannammal v. Kanakasabai Mudaliar 61 M.L.J. 535 Curgenven, J. observed :
It is, I think, indisputable that before restricting the scope of an Act by the terms of its preamble, the Court must be satisfied that there was an
intention on the part of the legislature that its scope should be so restated and, in fact, that the legislature would have agreed, had the point been so
put, that the passage relied upon in the preamble should form part of the text of the Act. It is not open to the Court to speculate regarding the
intentions of the legislature or to frame its decision in conformity with what it would itself have done had it been legislating. Now in the present
instance, if the preamble had declared it necessary to protect a certain clearly defined class of tenants, it might be reasonable to hold that, although
the text is silent, there was an intention so to restrict it; though even then the meaning of the Act would not be so clear as if the restriction had
appeared in the body of it.
In our opinion, it can be said in the instant case that the preamble has defined a class of agriculturists, (that is, those in the Madras State) who are
entitled to the benefits given under the Act. Perhaps if the attention of the legislature had been directed to it, they would have incorporated the
substance of the term of the preamble in the definition of the term "" agriculturist "" itself as they did in the case of Act IV of 1938.
Reliance was placed by learned Counsel for the appellant on the decision in H. R. H. Prince Augustus v. A.G. (1955) 3 AER 647 for the
proposition that the effect of the clear enacting words of a statute could not be restricted by the preamble which gave only a doubtful indication of
the intention of the Parliament. We do not find in that decision any rule that a preamble cannot be looked into for ascertaining the scope of the
Statute. Sir Raymond Evershed M. R. decided the case on the assumption that the words in a Statute prima facie of general import can be cut
down so as to make the effect of the Act to correspond with its purpose by reference to other relevant Statutes or other admissible matters of
context or by reference to its preamble. Romer, L. J. observed that while the function of the Court was to ascertain the intention of the Parliament
from the language used to express it, due regard must be had to alt relevant circumstances, which existed at the time the Act was passed. The
learned Lord Justice was not prepared to lay down as a rigid rule that a preamble could not be looked into where the enacting part would go
beyond the purpose of the Statute (see page 662).
In Popatlal Shah v. State of Madras (1953) 1 M.L.J. 739=66 L. W. 573, the Supreme Court had to conder the meaning of the term "" sale "" in
the Madras General Sales-Tax Act, 1939, which according to the definition covered every transfer of property in goods not necessarily made
within the State of Madras. Mukerjee, J. observed at page 742 :
It is a settled rule of construction that to ascertain the legislative intent all the constituent parts of a Statute are to be taken together and each word,
phrase or sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpose and object of the Act itself. The title of the Madras Sales-Tax Act
describes it to be an Act the object of which is to provide for the levy of a general tax on the sale of goods in the Province of Madras and the very
same words are repeated in the preamble which follows. The title and preamble, whatever their value might be as aids to the construction of a
Statute, undoubtedly, throw light on the intent and design of the Legislature and indicate the scope and purpose of the legislation itself. The title and
preamble of the Madras Sales-Tax Act clearly shew that its object is to impose taxes on sales that takes place within the Province though these
words do not necessarily mean that the property in the goods sold must pass within the Province.
The learned Judge went on to observe that in defining the word "" sale
the Legislature had in mind a sale in the Province of Madras and as these words occur in the title and preamble to the Act it was not deemed
necessary to repeat them in the definition or the charging Section.
There is nothing in the enacting part of Act V of 1954 to indicate to which class of agriculturists the Act were to apply. It will therefore be
permissible to refer to the preamble to ascertain the scope of the Statute. As we have stated already the preamble indicates that the moratorium
was intended only to apply to agriculturists owning lands within the State. The operation of the Statute, in our opinion, should he restricted
accordingly.
It was next contended that for the application of S. 5, it would be sufficient if the creditor in good faith thought that the debtor was an
agriculturist and it was further not necessary that the latter should actually be one. The learned Counsel argued that the appellant was acting in good
faith because (1) he believed that the debtor owned lands at Kothamangalam and Neppalpatti. (2) He equally bona fide believed that having lands
in Pegu would entitle the debtor to take advantage of the moratoriums. The question whether the appellant was bona fide of opinion that the
respondent was an agriculturist is a question of fact depending on the evidence. That plea in regard to that question was not taken in the lower
Court. The case of the appellant was that the debtor did own agricultural lands and not that he thought he owned them. It is unnecessary to
consider whether a mere mistake of law as to the applicability of the Act in the absence of evidence as to taking advice from competent persons
could be said to be a mistake made in good faith. We are of opinion that this belated plea should not be allowed to be raised in the circumstances
of the present case. It follows that the appellant cannot claim the benefit of S. 5 of Act V of 1954 and exclude the time during which that Act and
the Ordinance preceding it were in force in the computation of the period of limitation for the purpose of S. 48, C.P.C. We, therefore, agree with
the learned Subordinate Judge that the execution application is barred by the provisions of S. 48, C.P.C. and dismiss this appeal. There will be no
order as to costs.