Arunachalathammal and Others vs Sudalaimuthu Pillai and Others

Kailasam, J.—This petition is filed on behalf of Defendants 1 to 3 in Original Suit No. 132 of 1967 against the order of the Subordinate

Judge of Tirunelveli, holding that the Plaintiffs should pay the Court-fee for cancellation of a settlement deed, dated 17th July 1947 executed by the

first Plaintiff and the first Defendant on the value of the document, namely Rs. 3,500.

The Plaintiffs filed the suit praying for various reliefs, but we are concerned only with the prayer for cancellation of the document, dated 17th

July 1047, settlement deed executed by the first Plaintiff and the first Defendant in favour of the second Defendant. It was contended before the

lower Court by the Defendants that the Court-fee was payable u/s 40 of the Madras Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act (Act XIV of 1955), and

that the value of the subject-matter of the suit should be deemed to be the value of the property, that is the market value. This contention was not

accepted and the Court held that the value of the subject-matter of the suit should be deemed to be the amount for which the document was

executed and, therefore, directed that Court-fee should be paid on the value of the document, namely Rs. 3,500.

Section 40(1) of the Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act runs thus:

In a suit for cancellations of a decree for money or other property having a money value, or other document which purports or operates to create,

declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest in money, movable or immovable property, fee shall

computed on the value of the subject-matter of the suit, and such value shall be deemed to be--

If the whole decree or other document is sought to be cancelled, the amount or value or the property for which the decree was passed or other

document was executed.

If a part of the decree or other document is sought be cancelled, such part of the amount or value of the property.

It will be seen that the section provides for suits (i) relating to cancellation of decree for money, (ii) cancellation of a decree for other property

having a money value, and (iii) cancellation of other document which purports or operators to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish rights in

movable or immovable property. The sub-section provides that fee shall be computed on the value of the subject-matter of the suit. Then it

proceeds to state how such value should be calculated. It provides that if the whole decree is sought to be cancelled, the amount or value of the

property for which the decree was passed should be taken into account. In the case of other document which purports or operators to create,

declare, assign, limit or extinguish rights in movable or immovable property, the value shall be deemed to be the value of the property. It is not clear

as to whether the words the amount or value of the property for which the decree was passed are applicable to the cancellation of a document

which creates or declares rights in movable or immovable property. In the case of suits for cancellation of other documents, apart from suits for

cancellation of a decree for money or other property, the above clause would be certainly applicable. This would mean that in the case of suits for

cancellation of other documents, the value of the subject-matter of the suit shall be deemed to be the amount for which the document was

executed. It was submitted on behalf of the Defendants that even in the case of a suit for cancellation of other documents, the value shall be

deemed to be the value of the property. But this contention would ignore the effect of the words value of the property for which the decree was

passed. Even conceding that the value of the property should betaken into account in suits for cancellation of other documents, there are two

modes provided for to compute the value of the subject-matter of the suit, (i) the value of the property and (ii) the amount for which, the document

was executed.

Mr. Venugopalachari, learned Counsel for the Petitioners submitted that this view is opposed to the one taken in the decision in Kutumba Sastri

v. Sundaramma ILR [1939] Mad. 764 (F.B.) where the Full-Bench held that in a suit for cancellation of a. deed of conveyance the valuation must

be the valuation based on the market value of the property at the date of the plaint. The Full-Bench was considering the question as to the Court-

fee payable in a suit for cancellation of a deed of conveyance and for possession of the property covered the deed. The Court held that the Plaintiff

should value his relief in accordance with the provisions of Section 7(4-A), and not according to Section 7(v) of the old Court Fees Act, 1870.

After referring to the difference of opinion between the various decisions, the Full-Bench preferred the view taken in Balireddi v. Abdul Satar

(1935) I.L.R Mad. 240 followed in Venkatakrishniah v. Sheik Ali Sahib (1938) 48 L.W. 277. Section 7(4-A) of the old Act is slightly differently

worded and it runs as follows:

In a suit for cancellation of a decree for money or other property having a money value, or other document securing money or other property

having such value, according to the value of the subject-matter of the suit, and such value shall be deemed to be--

If the whole decree or other document is sought to be cancelled, the amount or the value of the property for which the decree, was passed or the

other document executed:

If a part of the decree or other document is sought to be cancelled, such part of the amount or value of the property.

It will be seen that the above section relates to s suit for cancellation of a decree for money or other property having a money value, or other

document securing money or other property having such value. There was some doubt whether the third part of the section relating to other

document securing money would include sales. In Balireddi v. Abdul Satar I.L.R(1935)Mad. 240 Venkatastjbba Rao J. referring to his earlier

decision in Doraiswami Reddiar and Others Vs. Thangavelu Mudaliar and Others, held that sale would not come within the meaning of the section.

Whether this sub-section includes sale deeds or not need not detain us, as Section 40(1) of Madras Act XIV of 1956 is differently worded and

there can be no doubt that it brings within its purview sales deeds as it relates to

Other document which purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right in movable or immovable property.

Section 7(iv-A) of the old Act states that the value shall be deemed to be

If the whole decree or other document is sought to be cancelled, the amount or the value of the property for which the decree was passed or the

other document executed.

The same words are used in Section 40(1) of the new Act. In construing this sub-clause in Section 7(iv-A) of the old Act, the Full-Bench pointed

out in the decision cited above that the suit within the meaning of the above section should be valued according to the value of the property and that

the value of the property, unless there is an indication to the contrary, must mean its market value. It may be noted that the Court was considering

the value of the property and does not appear to have taken note of the words the other document executed.

As already pointed out Section 7(iv-A) of the old Act as well as Section 40(1) of the present Act deal with suits for cancellation of a decree for

money, a cancellation of a decree for other property having a money value and suit for cancellation of other document. In the case of other

documents, the clause the amount or the value of the property for which the decree was passed cannot be held to be applicable and the only

clause that can be properly applied is only the value for which the document was executed. In the third category in Section 40(1), to the words

other document, the words which purports or operates to create, declare, assign limit or extinguish rights in movable or immovable property are

included. Obviously in suits for cancellation of other documents referred to in Section 40(1) of the new Act the valuation should be the value of the

other document executed. In Balireddi v. Abdul Satar I.L.R (1935) Mad. 240 the Court refers to the section which says that the value of the

subject-matter shall be deemed to be the amount for which the document is executed. But it confines its application only to a mortgage instrument.

In dealing with sale deeds the Court confined its discussion to the actual value of the property and held that it referred only to the market value.

This decision also does not refer to the valuation of the document on the basis of the amount for which the document is executed.

On a consideration of the section and the decisions cited before me, I am of the view that the Court-fee payable for cancellation of a document

u/s 40(1) of Act XIV of 1955 should be computed on the value of the document for which the document was executed. In this view, the decision

of the Court below is correct. This civil revision petition is dismissed with costs.