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Judgment
44 paragraphs · 1,085 wordsKing, J.—The subject matter of this petition is a promissory note executed by the first defendant in a suit in the Court of the District Munsif
of Tindivanam numbered as O.S. 193 of 1936. The plaintiffs are the nephews of one Shanmugha Goundan in whose favour the promissory note
had been assigned. Shanmugha Goundan is now dead and the plaintiffs have filed this suit as members of the joint family to which Shanmugha
Goundan had belonged and who therefore continue to own the joint family property. The suit was decreed by the learned District Munsif in
somewhat unusual circumstances. It was originally filed as a small cause suit in Tindivanam, its valuation being below Rs. 300 and the Judge who
was then in charge of the Court having extended small cause powers. This Judge was succeeded by another Judge who was not so empowered
and so the suit was transferred to the Original Side. A third District Munsif then presided over the Court and he was empowered to try all suits up
to the valuation of Rs. 300 as small cause suits. This third District Munsif has clubbed together three suits and disposed of them in a single
judgment. The third of these suits is the one which was numbered as O. Section 193 of 1936. The first defendant in O. Section 193 of 1986 after
the decree had been given against him, appealed to the learned District Judge of South Arcot. The learned Judge set aside the decree on the
ground that the plaintiffs were not entitled to sue as they had not obtained a succession certificate. This is now a revision petition by the plaintiffs
against the decree of the learned District Judge dismissing their suit.
The first point taken in revision is that the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. It is contended that when a suit is
tiled as a small cause suit and is disposed of by a Judge who possessed the necessary powers to try it as a small cause suit, it must be deemed to
have been disposed of as a small cause suit and therefore there can be no right of appeal. It is contended further that this legal principle must be
applied even though the suit be numbered as an original suit. In support of this contention I have been referred to a decision of Stone, J., reported
in Ramaswami Muthirian and Another Vs. The Firm of Ki Karu, Rama Ki and Others, . The facts there are almost precisely similar to those in the
present case and with respect I do not see any reason why I should not follow the reasoning of the learned Judge.
By the respondent (first defendant) I have been referred to two rulings of this Court, one of Patanjali Sastri, J., in Kamalathammal Vs. Harihara
Aiyar, , and the other in P.P.V.P.L. Chockalingam Chettiar (deaceased) and Another Vs. K.P.S.A.R. Palaniappa Chettiar, . Both of these cases
dealt with facts which can be easily distinguished. They are cases of suits which began their existence as small cause suits in the Court of a
Subordinate Judge and were subsequently transferred for trial to a District Munsif. It was held in both of them that the District Munsif was not
debarred from trying the suits from the mere fact that they had first been instituted as small cause suits in the Court of a Subordinate Judge. It is of
course impossible for any Court to have held in the case of suits valued at more than Rs. 300 that when a District Munsif did in fact come to try
them, he must be deemed to have tried them as small cause suits. These rulings therefore afford no assistance to the learned advocate for the
respondent in attempting to challenge the authority of Ramaswami Muthirian and Another Vs. The Firm of Ki Karu, Rama Ki and Others, . The
argument for the petitioners must be accepted that the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
The only question that remains is whether in these circumstances I should interfere u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such interference is
of course permitted, and in my opinion should be practised unless there are clear indications that the learned District Judge is obviously right and
the learned District Munsif obviously wrong upon other points in the case. I have not gone fully into the question whether the plaintiffs had the right
to sue in this matter. It seems to me however, prima facie that if they are entitled to act for the members of the family, no succession certificate
would be necessary for them. See the decision of Beasley, J., in Arunachalam Chetty v. Jagannatha Pillai (1926) 24 L.W. 659. I do not propose
now to consider the objections sought to be raised on behalf of the respondent that it was in reality the other members of the joint family who had
the right to sue, and not the plaintiffs. The situation is simply this : on the finding of fact the respondent owes money upon this promissory note to
the joint family. A decree has been passed against him by the District Munsif at the instance of the plaintiffs on the clear understanding that the
property in the decree belongs to the joint family. The first defendant therefore suffers no prejudice from being compelled to discharge his
obligations under this decree. There can be no question of any other plaintiffs suing him for this debt on the allegation that the present plaintiffs have
wrongly appropriated it to themselves. There therefore remains no obstacle to my taking action u/s 115 of the CPC and this being a clear case in
which the learned District Judge has acted without jurisdiction I set aside his decree and restore the decree of the learned District Munsif.
During the pendency of the appeal the first defendant filed an application claiming relief under Act IV of 1938. This application was of course
not dealt with by the learned District Judge because he had dismissed the plaintiffs'' suit and its consideration therefore became unnecessary. The
first defendant has now repeated his application claiming relief under the Act in this Court; and my decision confirming the decree of the learned
District Munsif will be subject to the disposal of that application which is herewith sent for disposal to the learned District
The respondent must pay the costs throughout of the petitioners.
