Arunpal Singh vs Rajan Taneja And Others

Alka Sarin, J

The present revision petition has been filed by the tenant-petitioner challenging the order dated 14.09.2018 passed by the Appellate Authority whereby

the Appellate Authority has remanded the case to the Rent Controller to decide the rent application afresh.

The limited ground of challenge in the present revision petition is to the remand order passed by the Appellate Authority, Tarn Taran, dated

14.09.2018. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of his arguments, has relied upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of

Raghu Nath Jalota vs. Romesh Duggal and anr., 1979(2) R.C.R. (Rent) 50,1 to contend that as per the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent

Restriction Act, 1949, (hereinafter to be referred to as “the Actâ€) especially in view of Section 15(3) thereof, the Appellate Authority has the

power to re- decide the issue either by himself or through the Rent Controller. The Appellate Authority, as such, does not have the power to remand

the case. The said question, as referred to above, came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Raghu Nath Jalota

(supra) wherein it was held as under:-

“15. Having cleared the ground with regard to the language of the Act and on principle, one must now inevitably advert to precedent. There

appears to be a long and unbroken line of authority for the view enunciated above. Indeed, learned counsel for the respondent was forced to concede

that apart from veiled rumblings of doubt, there was no judgement holding directly and squarely in favour of the respondent that Section 15(3)

conferred any express or implied power of remand on the Appellate Authority for altogether a fresh decision. More than two decades ago, the matter

fell directly for decision by Grover, J. in Moti Ram v. Ram Sahai. Civil Revn. No. 641 of 1957, decided on April 29, 1958 (Punj), under the provisions

of Section 16(3) of the Patiala and East Punjab States Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2006 Bk. which is in pari materia with the provisions

under consideration, wherein it was observed as follows:â€

“It would be useful to refer to the provisions of Sub-Section (4) of Section 16 as well. According to that provision the decision of the Appellate

Authority and subject only to such decision, an order of the Controller shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law.

It is submitted that the Appellate Authority could make such enquiry as it thought fit itself or it could ask the Controller to make that enquiry but the

appeal had to be disposed of by the Appellate Authority itself and since the decision of the Appellate Authority is to be final, it can have reference

only to such decision as the Appellate Authority makes on the merits and it can have no reference to such an order of remand as has been made in

the present case. It is quite clear that the statute makes no provision for an order of remand for retrial or fresh decision and the obvious intention of

the legislature seems to, be that the Appellate Authority should itself laid down by the Division passed by the Appellate CR-7235-2018 - 3 - decide the

points, and if for the purpose of doing so, it becomes necessary to make some further enquiry that can be done by the Appellate Authority itself or

through the Controller. It has been contended on behalf of the respondent that there is an inherent power in an Appellate Authority to remand a case

for retrial and fresh decision. Such an inherent power exists in the Courts under the Code of Civil Procedure as there can be a remand under inherent

powers apart from the provisions of O. 41 R. 23 of the CPC. In the first place there is no provision analogous to Section 151 of the CPC in the Rent

Ordinance. Secondly, the language of Sub-Section (3) read with Sub-Section (4) of Section 16 makes it fairly clear that the Appellate Authority has to

decide the dispute between the parties itself and there does not seem to be any warrant for reading into these provisions a general power of

remand.â€​

…… ….. ….. …… …… …… ……

To conclude therefore the history of the legislation, its object and purpose, the specific language of Section 15(3) of the Act and both principal and

precedent, attend to render an answer in the negative to the question formulated at the outset. It is, therefore, held that there is no jurisdiction in the

Appellate Authority to remand the whole case to the Controller for entirely a fresh decision and the view in Moti Ram v. Ram Sahai, Civil Revn. No.

641 of 1957 decided on April 29, 1958 and Krishan Lal Seth v. Shrimati Pritam Kumari, (1961) 63 Pun LR 865, is reaffirmed.â€​

Keeping in view the law Bench of this Court, the order Authority has to be considered.

In order to appreciate the controversy on hand, it is necessary to examine the brief factual matrix of the cas e. The landlord-respondent No.1 filed an

application under section 13 of the Act wherein it was averred that the grandfather of the tenant-petitioner took the shop in dispute on rent from the

previous owner. The grandfather of the tenant-petitioner having expired, the tenant-petitioner (Arunpal Singh) was in possession of the shop in dispute.

It was also averred that the said shop had been inherited by Shri Kapil Lal Taneja, father of landlord-respondent No.1, by way of a Will executed by

his father and subsequently in an oral family settlement the shop in dispute eventually fell to the share of the landlord-respondent No.1. The ejectment

application was filed on the ground of arrears of rent, the shop was in a dilapidated condition and not fit for human habitation as also that the shop was

required for the personal use and occupation of the landlord-respondent No.1.

On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed: -

“1) Whether the applicant is entitled to the eviction of the respondent from the demised shop? OPA

2) Whether the applicant is the owner/landlord of the demised shop? OPA

Whether the petition of the applicant is not maintainable? OPR

4) Whether the applicant has no locus standi to file the present petition? OPR

5) Whether the applicant has no cause of action to file the present petition? OPR

6) Whether the applicant has concealed the material facts from the Court? OPR

7) Relief.â€​

On issue No.2 as to whether the respondent No.1 herein was the owner/landlord of the demised premises, the Rent Controller returned a finding that

the respondent No.1 herein had failed to prove his ownership over the demised property and, therefore, decided the issue in favour of the tenant-

petitioner herein. In view of his finding on issue No.2, the ejectment application filed by the landlord-respondent No.1 herein was dismissed vide order

dated 20.01.2015. The landlord-respondent No.1 challenged the said order before the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority reversed the

finding of the Rent Controller on issue No.2 and while setting aside the order of the Rent Controller remanded the matter back to be decided afresh in

view of the observations made in the order. Aggrieved by the same, the tenant-petitioner has approached this Court by way of the present revision

petition.

I have heard the learned counsel for the parties.

In view of the settled law, I am of the considered opinion that the Appellate Authority was in error in remanding the matter back, inasmuch as, it has

clearly been laid down in the case of Raghu Nath Jalota (supra) that an Appellate Authority does not have the power to remand the matter back. The

Appellate Authority should itself decide the points, and if for the purpose of doing so, it becomes necessary to make further enquiry that can be done

by the Appellate Authority itself or through the Rent Controller.

In view of the above, the order dated 14.09.2018 passed by the Appellate Authority is set aside. It shall be open to the Appellate Authority, if it deems

necessary, to make a further enquiry. It may do so itself or through the Rent Controller.

Consequently, the parties shall appear before the District Judge, Tarn Taran, on 30.03.2020 for appropriate entrustment.

With the above observations, the present revision petition stands disposed of.