Arvind Kumar Yadav and others vs State of U.P.and others

K.L. Sharma, J.—Both the writ petitions relate to the ad hoe employees of the establishment of District Judge. Unnao and raise common questions of law and facts. Hence these writ petitions have been heard together and disposed of by a common judgment.

In Writ Petition No. 6219, the petitioners No. 1, 2 and 3 were appointed by order dated 31189 of the District Judge, Unnao vide Annexures 1 to 4 of the writ petition on ad hoc basis as Copying Clerk and they joined their service on 1st February, 1989, and the petitioners No. 4 and 5 were appointed by order dated 1st March, 1990 of the District Judge, Unnao on ad hoc basis as Copying Clerk vide Annexures 5 and 6 and they joined on 2nd March, 1990. All these petitioners have been continuing on ad hoc appointment and they have not appeared at the regular recruitment examination held on 2761993. They claimed that they are entitled to be considered for regularisation in accordance with the U.P. Regularisation of Ad hoc Appointments (on posts outside the purview of the Public Service Commission) Rules, 1979, hereinafter referred to as the Rules as amended on 7th August, 1989 and Circular letter of the High Court dated 24th December, 1992, hereinafter referred to as the Circular, but the District Judge, Unnao had not considered the case of the petitioners and has proceeded to hold the competitive examination for regular recruitment and threatened the petitioners that their services would come to an end on 31st August, 1993

In Writ Petition No. 6220 (SS) of 1993, all the four petitioners were appointed by order dated 19th March, 1991 of the District Judge, Unnao on ad hoc basis as Copyist initially for a period of six months, but they have been continuing on ad hoc appointment extended subsequently on different dates vide Annexures 1 and 2 to the writ petition. These petitioners claimed that they have completed more than two years of service continuously and are awaiting their regularisation under the Rules and the Circular, but the District Judge, Unnao has held a competitive examination for regular recruitment on 27693 and has refused to consider the petitioners for their regularisation, limiting their appointment to 3181993.

In both these writ petitions, the common grounds are that the cut of date of appointment on or before October 1, 1986 is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution as being arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory, and the petitioners are entitled to be considered for regularisation on completion of three years of continuous service on the post occupied by them and direct recruitment through competitive examination to fill these posts is unlawful. By a supplementary affidavit of the petitioner Arvind Kumar Yadav filed in W. P. No. 6219, (S/S) of 1993, an additional ground has also been taken that S/Sri Sunil Kumar Saxena, Munna Kumar Singh, Mahesh Chandra Nigam and Rajendra Prasad Yadav who were juniors to the petitioners, have been retained in service for indefinite period though they were also appointed like the petitioners on ad hoc basis and have not appeared in the competitive examination for regular recruitment The petitioners in both the writ petitions have, therefore, sought the issuance of the writ of certiorari for quashing cut of dates introduced in the rules and for the issue of a mandamus commanding the opposite parties to regularise the services of the petitioners on their respective posts and not to hold the competitive examination for regular recruitment until and unless the petitioners are considered for regularisation in accordance with the rules.

In both the writ petitions, a counter affidavit of Sri Karuna Shanker, Senior Administrative Officer in the Office of the District Judge, Unnao has been filed. It has been stated that the petitioners having not been appointed on or before the cut of date, i.e., 1st October, 1986, are not legally entitled to be considered for their regularisation. It has been further stated that the petitioners have not appeared in the competitive examination held by the District Judge, Unnao in accordance with the Circular, though some of the petitioners had submitted their applications for the competitive examination. It has been also stated that the competitive examination has been held for filling up 24 posts, and at present there are 15 persons working on ad hoc basis including the petitioners. It has also been asserted that the cut of date introduced in the rules is neither arbitrary, nor discriminatory or violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is also stated that the petitioners had ample opportunity to appear in the competitive examination for regular selection, but they have wilfully refused to avail of the said opportunity and as such they are not entitled to the consideration for the regularisation. The result of the examination held by the District Judge was stayed by interim stay order of this Court passed on 2081993.

I have heard the learned Counsel Sri P. K. Srivastava for the petitioners at length and also Mr. V.P. Srivastava, learned Standing Counsel for the opposite parties and perused the record.

The most important ground of attack taken in these two petitions relates to the validily of the cut of date, i.e., 1st October, 1986 introduced in the Rule 10 which reads as follows :

"10. Extension of the rulesThe provisions of these rules shall apply mutatis mutandis also to any person directly appointed on ad hoc basis on or before 1st October 1986 and continuing in service as such, on the date of commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Regularisation of ad hoc appointments (on posts outside the purview of the Public Service Commission) (Second Amendment) Rules 1989."

These Rules have been framed by the Governor of U.P. in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, and these Rules are applicable to all the Government servants appointed on ad hoc basis on the posts which fall outside the purview of the recruitment through U.P. Public Service Commission. The employees working in the courts subordinate to the High Court in the State of U.P. are admittedly government servants and their conditions of service are determined by the Governor of the state under Article 309 of the Constitution, in the absence of legislation by the State Legislature. However, by virtue of Article 235 of the Constitution, the High Court has got the power of control over District Courts and Courts subordinate thereto. The position of officers and servants of the High Court is different under Article 229 of the Constitution which has vested the power in the Chief Justice of the High Court not only for appointment but also for making rules, determining the conditions of service subject to limited approval of the Governor of the State relating to salaries, allowances, leave or pension only. The High Court has been issuing the Circular letters and general orders which are also made applicable to the staff of the courts subordinate to the High Court, and District Judges have been following the Circulars and general orders of the High Court regarding the implementation of the rules and government orders. For the relevant purpose, the High Court issued a Circular on 24th December, 1992 to all the District Judges regarding regularisation of ad hoc employees and called for submission of list of such ad hoc employees vide Annexure8 to the writ petition. It would be beneficial for understanding to reproduce this Circular as follows :

"From : Sri Bhanwar Singh, H. J. S., Registrar, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.

To : All the District Judges, Subordinate to the Hon''ble High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.

C. L. No. 70/Admn (D) Dated, Allahabad, December 24, 1992.

Subject : Regarding regularisation of ad hoc employees of submission of list of/such adhoc employees appointed under Rule 259 G. R. (Civil).

Sir,

I am directed to say that the court has been pleased to pass the following orders on the above subject :

That appointments on the adhoc class III employees of the subordinate courts, who are entitled to the benefit of the U.P. Regularisation of adhoc appointment (on posts outside the purview of the public service commission) Rules 1979, as amended up to date (or as applicable on date), be regularised.

That adhoc class III employees of the subordinate courts who are not entitled to the benefit of the U.P. Regularisation of Adhoc appointment (on posts outside the purview of the Public Service Commission) Rules 1979, but have been appointed prior to 21st May, 1992 be allowed to continue subject to their appearing at and passing the competitive test held for selection of Class III employees of the subordinate courts.

That adhoc class III employees, if any, appointed after the issuance of the Chief Justice in this regard, be ceased and explanation of the appointing authority for making such appointments be also furnished to this Court.

That you are also hereby requested to prepare a list of ad hoc appointments made under rule 269 G. R. (Civil) and submit the same to the Court immediately.

The aforesaid directions may kindly be complied with forthwith.

Yours faithfully,

Sd/ Bhanwar Singh

Registrar"

The District Judge, Unnao has consequently taken necessary steps for consideration of the regularisation of only those ad hoc employees who were appointed on or before 1st October, 1986, the cut of date mentioned in Rule 10 of the Rules and further proceeded to hold the competitive examination for regular recruitment in accordane with the rules of recruitment applicable to the posts in the subordinate courts. However, the petitioners claimed regularisation of their ad hoc appointment irrespective of cut of date mentioned in Rule 10 and refused to appear in the competitive examination and rather resisted the holding of the competitive examination through interin stay order of this Court.

Admittedly on the averments made in the two writ petitions, none of the petitioners was appointed on or before 1st October, 1986, the cut of date mentioned in Rule 10, which conferred a right for consideration of ad hoc appointee for regularization.

The learned Counsel for the petitioners made a strenuous and forceful effort in his statement that the cut of date 1st October, 1986 mentioned in the Rules is arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory having no nexus to the object to be achieved by the Rules, and, therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. In support of his submission, he has cited various decisions of the Hon''ble Supreme Court of India and of this Court which 1 consider necessary to mention in the following paragraphs.

The first important and leading case is of D. S. Nakara and others v. Union of India (1983 Labour and Industrial Cases (Supreme Court) Page 1). This case related to the grant of pensionery benefits by the Central Government to the government servants who were in service on March 31. 1979 and retired from service on or after that date. By this government order the government servants who had retired prior to March 31, 1979, were deprived of the liberlised pensionery benefits. Therefore, the grievance of pensioners who retired earlier, was submitted before the Hon''ble Supreme Court by a cooperative society consisting of public spirited citizens seeking to spouse the cause of retirees. The Hon''ble Supreme Court declared the law as follows :

"The fundamental principle is that Art. 14 forbids class legislation but permits reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation which classification must satisfy the twin tests of classification being founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those that are left out of the group and that differentia must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The doctrine of classification was evolved to sustain a legislation or State action designed to help weaker sections of the society in need of succour. Legislative and executive action may accordingly be sustained if it satisfies the twin tests of reasonable classification and the rational principle correlated to the object sought to be achieved. The State, therefore, would have to affirmatively satisfy the Court that the twin tests have been satisfied. It can only be satisfied if the State establishes not only the rational principle on Which classification is founded but correlate it to the objects sought to be achieved. Where all relevant considerations are the same, persons holding identical posts may not be treated differently in the matter of their pay merely because they belong to different departments. If that cannot be done when they are in service, can that be done during their retirement ? Expanding this principle, it can confidently be said that if pensioners form a class, their computation cannot be by different formula affording unequal treatment solely on the ground that some retired earlier and some retired later."

In the case of Jai Kishan & others v. U.P Cooperative Bank Ltd. and others (1989) 2 U.P. Local Bodies & Educational Cases 144), a Division Bench of this Court at Lucknow also had an occasion to consider the constitutionality of the cut of date 1st may, 1983 mentioned in Regulation 4 of U.P. Regularisation of Ad hoc appointments (on posts within the purview of U.P. Cooperative Institutional Service Board) Regulations, 1985. This Court considered the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of D. S. Nakara (supra) and followed the principle of law declared by the Hon''ble Supreme Court. In order to pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilled. The classification, must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those that are left out the group and that the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Statute in question. Applying these conditions, this Bench found that nothing has been shown on behalf of the State to establish the rational principle and the object which was sought to be achieved by classifying the ad hoc appointees by fixing a particular date, namely, 1st May, 1983 and making the benefit of the regularisation rules available to those who are appointed prior to 1st May, 1983 and not extending the benefit to the employees appointed thereafter. Therefore, this Bench held that fixation of date in regulation 4(1) of Regulations 1985 is arbitrary and discriminatory, and that part of the regulation is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This Court further held that those petitioners who are appointed at least on or before the date of the notification of the regulations of 1985, i.e. July 30, 1985, are also entitled for consideration for regularisation according to regulations of 1985 before these posts are regularly filled.

The case of Jacob M. Puthuparambil v. Kerala Water Authority (1991) 1 SCC 28) related to the regularisation of employees recruited in erstwhile Public Health Engineering Department continuing even after transfer of their services to Kerala Water and Waste Water Authority constituted under Section 3(1) of Ordinance 14 of 1984, later replaced by Act No. 14 of 1986. A question also arose in this case about the regularisation of the employees appointed between August 4, 1986 and July 30, 1988 respectively. The cut of date mentioned in the rule was found inconsistent with the spirit and philosophy of the Constitution. It was held that employees who are serving on the establishment for long spells and held the requisite qualifications for the job, should be regularised under the rules. It was also held that the regularisation rules made by the Government for government servants but adopted by authority by a resolution for application to the employees of the authority were only administrative rules and did not have statutory force as the approval of the Governor had not been obtained by the authority as required by Section 65 of Act No. 14 of 1986.

In the case of Km. Kusum Rawat v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another (1993 LABIC 45), this Court considered the validity of the cut of date used in Section 31C introduced in U.P. Higher Education Service Commission Act by U.P. Ordinance No. 43 of 1991 issued by the Governor on 221191 in a petition. Section 31C introduced by the Ordinance No. 43 of 1991 provided that any teacher who was appointed on ad hoc basis after 811984 but not later than 30691 on a post referred to therein and possessing the necessary qualification may be given a substantive appointment if found suitable for regular appointment by the selection committee referred to in clause (2). The petitioner was appointed as Lecturer in Zoology in H. N. B. Garhwal University, Garhwal on ad hoc basis for a period of six months after the cut of date June 30, 1991. After following the law declared by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of D. S. Nakara (supra), the cut of date was ignored and the interim stay order was issued directing the respondents to continue the petitioner in service, pay her salary and consider provisionally for regularisation by the selection committee constituted under Section 31C (2) of the impugned Ordinance.

In the case of Shanker Charan Tripathi and another v. Public Service Commission, U.P. Allahabad and another (1992) 1 UPLBEC 709), this Court considered the cut of date mentioned in the advertisement issued by the Public Service Commission for relaxation of age in the case of ExServicemen for appearing at the competitive examination. It was found that no explanation for fixing the cut of date was given by the Commission. It was held that the fixing of the cut of date had no nexus with the object sought to be achieved and the Commission had created unreasonable and arbitrary classification amongst the ExServicemen who are going to be released within six months from the last date of receipt of the application and those who are going to be released after six months.

In the case of B.P. Misra v. The Union of India through the General Manager, Northern Railway, New Delhi and others (1971 LAB IC 290), this Court considered the validity of the cut of date 141938 mentioned in subrule (2) of Rule 2046 of Railway Establishment Code, Volume II which prescribed age of superannuation on the basis of the classification of government servants in 2 categories appointed on or before 3131938 and those appointed on or after 141938. No rational basis was found by this Court regarding the adoption of the cut of date to prescribe different age of retirement. Therefore, the cut of date used in the rule was held to be invalid.

In the case of Retired Employees of NonGovernment College Association, Nagpur and others v. State of Maharashtra and others (1987 LAB IC 1183), a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court at Nagpur considered the validity of the cut of date 1101982 mentioned by the Government of Maharashtra in the Government Resolution dated 2171983 for the purpose of grant of retiral benefits under the scheme prepared by the Government for its retiring servants. No rational explanation could be offered by the Government and it was found that the date 1101982 was chosen because an assurance was given by the then Minister for Education on the floor of the House on that date. The Court held that there was no nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Pensioncumgratuity scheme for fixing the cut of date as 11082.

After a careful consideration of all these cases cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, I come to the conclusion that it is now well settled law declared by the Hon''ble Supreme Court as well as by this Court and other High Courts that the cut of date for making classification amongst persons or things cannot be arbitrarily and unreasonably chosen as to render the classification discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, and the two conditions must be satisfied for upholding the classification, firstly that the classification is founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those that are left out of the group and secondly that the differentia must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the Statute or the executive action.

In the instant case, the classification is, of course, founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes ad hoc appointees of three years'' continuous service from those adhoc appointees who have not completed three years of continuous service, but the cut of date for such classification does not appear to have any rational nexus to the object to be achieved by the rule. On behalf of the opposite party particularly the State Government, no counter affidavit has been filed despite ample opportunity to explain the reasons as to why this cut of date had been chosen and mentioned in Rule 10. However, a counter affidavit has been filed by the District Judge, Unnao, the opposite party No. 3, and it has been stated in general terms that the cut of date is not arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory and is also not violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Obviously, the District Judge could not have given any explanation or material to justify the choice of the cut of date 1101986 because he is not the maker of the rule. It is the State, opposite party No. 1 which was concerned and responsible for supplying the adequate explanation and material to justify the cut of date objected to. Unfortunately, no such explanation and material has been placed before the Court for examining whether there is rational nexus between the cut of date and the object to be achieved by the rule. However, it appears that the principles of law laid down do not protect this cut of date which appears to be arbitrary and unreasonable.

This Rule 10 in fact mentions two conditions for conferring the right of consideration for regularisation on the ad hoc appointees. The first condition is that the appointment on ad hoc basis must have been directly made on or before 1st October, 1986. The second condition is that the appointment on ad hoc basis must be continuing on the date of the commencement of these rules. Admittedly, these have been notified on 781989, on which date they came into force. These two different dates leave a gap of about three years. It is obvious that during this long gap the appointing authorities have been making appointment directly and such appointees have been serving the State in good faith without knowing the policy or the decision of the Government about the regularisation of the services of ad hoc appointees appointed on or before 1st October, 1986. There cannot be any presumption that these ad hoc employees were informed of the decision of the Government either through public advertisement or through the appointment orders issued by the appointing authorities. It is true, as pointed out by the learned Standing Counsel for the State, that the Government had prohibited ad hoc appointments and almost every year Government Orders banning ad hoc appointments were issued to the appointing authorities and other Heads of Offices. Though these Government Orders have not been brought on record by the learned Standing Counsel, it can be believed what he has stated, but the issuance of Government Orders prohibiting ad hoc appointments cannot affect the fate of the ad hoc appointees appointed by the appointing authorities in public interest to discharge public duties on the basis of the appointment orders received by them. If anything illegal has been committed, it has been committed by the appointing authorities and the State Government can take disciplinary action only against those appointing authorities, but cannot on any reason deprive the ad hoc appointees of the benefits which may accrue to them in the course of time on performance of duties with sincerity and good faith in the hope that on completion of three years'' service they would be also considered for regularisation in substantive vacancies. It is true, as contended by the learned Standing Counsel for the opposite parties, that nothing prevented these ad hoc employees from appearing in the competitive examination for regular recruitment or in the selections for substantive appointments. The learned Standing Counsel also stated that even these petitioners had ample opportunity to appear at the competitive examination, but they have deliberately avoided to appear threat. The Government is also obliged to ensure that the equal opportunities for employment are provided to all citizens for recruitment in public services by proper selections made in accordance with the rules. The ad hoc appointments are not made in accordance with the service rules and they are the Track door entries which militate against the constitutional right of other candidates equally qualified and waiting for opportunity. The learned Standing Counsel appears to be right in his contention. The Court has not to consider only the interest of the ad hoc appointees, but it has to consider also that all persons equally qualified and eligible for a particular post are given equal opportunities through proper selections in accordance with the rules. However, the Court has to enforce the rules made by the Government or the Legislature. Since the rules have already been made by the Governor under Article 309 of the Constitution of India for consideration of the ad hoc appointees for regularisation of their service in the substantive vacancies, the Court has to examine the rights conferred on the ad hoc appointees and enforce application thereof.

In the instant case, it is found that the cut of date mentioned for appointment made on or before 1st October, 1986 is arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable and hit by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The date of the commencement of Rule 10, i. e., 7th August, 1989 is the date on which the rights accrued to the ad hoc appointees who are working on the date of the commencement of the rule. Consequently, those ad hoc appointees appointed prior to the date of the commencement of the rule become eligible for consideration of regularisation of their services in accordance with the manner prescribed by rules. Unless and until these employees are considered for regularisation in accordance with the rules, they cannot be thrown out of employment. It is true that only those ad hoc employees who are adjudged to be suitable on the basis of their record of service by the selection committee duly constituted under the rules, can be retuned and regularised in service, but those ad hoc employees who are not considered suitable by the selection committee, cannot be retained in service and can be discharged on this ground that on consideration of their case for regularisation they were not found suitable on the basis of their record of service by the selection committee for regularisation. In my view, it is only the date of the commencement of rule 10 which has got rational nexus to the object to be achieved by the Government for making the Rule consonant with its policy of banning adhocism in appointment of Government Servants and also consistently with the spirit and philosophy of the Constitution, but it is again doubtful that the Government policies are enforced It is also a fact that the appointing authorities are ignoring the Government Orders and no action is being taken against them. It also appears doubtful whether the appointing authorities have been making these irregular appointments in contravention of prohibitory orders of Government only against the posts duly sanctioned by the Government, or in excess of the sanctioned strength of the posts. If the appointments are being irregularly made in excess of the sanctioned strength of post, then it is irresistible conclusion that the public money in the public exchequer is being squandered away without any accountability.

Coming to the next submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the Circular issued by the High Court on December 24, 1992 vide Annexure 8 to the writ petition should be taken as the date of decision for regularisation of ad hoc employees including the petitioner who were appointed prior to the issue of this Circular, I do not find that the petitioners can derive any benefit from this Circular of the High Court. This Circular has already been reproduced above. It is apparent on its perusal that the High Court has only given administrative directions to the District Judges as how to proceed in the matter of the consideration of ad hoc appointees for regularisation. This Circular clearly refers to the rules under which the ad hoc appointees can be considered for regularisation. It also provides that those who are not covered by the rules, will be allowed to continue subject to their appearing at and passing the competitive test held for selection of Class 111 employees of the subordinate courts. This Circular has also called for the explanation of the District Judges for making irregular ad hoc appointments and also for submission of list of such ad hoc appointees. It is quite clear that the High Court has not taken any decision to regular the ad hoc employees working on December 24, 1992 ignoring the rules applicable to such employees. Mere ad hoc appointment does not confer any right on the appointee for consideration of his case for regularisation either on completion of three years of continuous service or two years of continuous service. It is, in fact, the rule promulgated by the Governor on 7889 that confers the right on the ad hoc appointee continuing on that date for consideration of his case for regularisation in accordance with the rules. The High Court does not have that power to make any such rule regarding the employees of the subordinate courts. This Circular does not purport to be any rule made by the High Court in this regard. It is only an administrative letter issued by the High Court giving necessary executive directions to the District Judges to comply. Therefore, I repel this submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the ad hoc appointees appointed prior to the Circular dated 24121992 are entitled to be considered for regularisation.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner has also contended that the District Judge, Unnao has made further ad hoc appointments of four persons mentioned in the supplementary affidavit, and they are being retained in service even though they have not appeared at the competitive examination like the petitioners. Even if this contention is factually correct, this does not confer any right on the petitioners for consideration of their case for regularisation. It can be considered only an irregularity to be taken due care of by the High Court only in the administrative side. The question that some juniors have been indefinitely retained in service, does not also create any right to the petitioners to continue indefinitely in service. Every appointee has to continue only in terms of the conditions of appointment and in accordance with the rules applicable to him. This submission also does not have any substance.

In view of the findings recorded hereinabove, I find that only three petitioners, namely, Arvind Kumar Yadav, Ashok Kumar Srivastava and Jai Prakash Vishwakarma in Writ Petition No. 6219 (SS) of 1993 who were appointed on January 31, 1989 prior to the date of the rule on 7899. are eligible to be considered for regularisation in accordance with the rules, but all other petitioners having been appointed in the year 1990, 1991, 1992 and 1993 fall outside the purview of the rules and are not eligible, to be considered for regularisation under the rules. The learned Counsel for the petitioners referred to an order dated August 5, 1993 passed by the District Judge, Allahabad regularising 30 employees of the Judgeship of Allahabad, enclosed as Annexure SA3 to the supplementary affidavit of Arvind Kumar Yadav in Writ Petition No. 6219 of 1993 (SS). He contended that similar approach should be adopted by the District Judge, Unnao because there cannot be two different criteria obtaining in the District Courts. I have carefully perused this Annexure SA1 containing the order of District Judge, Allahabad and find it well reasoned and consistent with the finding recorded by me in these petitions as herein above that the crucial date for consideration of the case of ad hoc appointee for regularisation will be 7th August, 1989, the date of the commencement of the rule, and as such he has considered the cases of those ad hoc employees only who were appointed prior to the date of the enforcement of the rule. I notice that ad hoc appointees who joined from 6th August, 1986 to 21st March, 1989, alone have been considered and regularised by the District Judge, Allahabad under the rule. This order is consistent with the finding recorded hereinabove, but no assistance can be derived by the petitioners Bachchey Lal Yadav and Navin Kumar of Writ Petition No. 6219 of 1993 (SS) and of the four petitioners in Writ Petition No. 6220 of 1993 (SS).

For the aforesaid reasons, I come to the conclusion that the cut of date mentioned as 1st October, 1986 in the rules is void, and the cut of date will be the date of the commencement of the rules, i.e., 7th August, 1989, and all those ad hoc employees appointed on or before 7th August, 1989, the date of the commencement of the rules are eligible to be considered for regularisation strictly in accordance with the rules, and those ad hoc employees who are found suitable on the basis of the service record by the duly constituted selection committee under the rules are entitled to be regularised in the substantive vacancies, and those ad hoc employees who are not found suitable by the selection committee constituted under the rules, are not entitled to be regularised in the substantive vacancies. On the basis of the aforesaid findings, only three petitioners, namely, Arvind Kumar Yadav, Ashok Kumar Srivastava and Jai Prakash Vishwakarma of Writ Petition No. 6219 (S/S) of 1993 are eligible to be considered for regularisation under the rules, and the other petitioners of Writ Petition No. 6219 (S/S) of 1993 and all other petitioners of Writ Petition No. 6220 (S/S) of 1993 are not eligible to be considered for regularisation under the rules.

In the result, the writ petition No. 6219 (S/S) of 1993 is partly allowed to the extent noted above, and the writ petition No. 6220 (S/S) of 1993 is hereby dismissed. The opposite party No. 3 in Writ Petition No. 6219 (S/S) of 1993 is hereby directed to consider the above named three petitioners for their regularisation under and in accordance with the rules within a period of six weeks from the date of the receipt of the copy of this judgment.