Ashish Grover vs The State Of Punjab and others

Swatanter Kumar, J.—The Petitioner - Ashish Grover has filed the present writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India praying that the Respondents be directed to grant admission to the Petitioner in the government polytechnic/institution for the year 1995-2000 against 15% quota reserved for the candidates, who were domicile/residents of Punjab, but have passed their qualifying examination i.e. matric from an institution located outside the Punjab.

The Petitioner had passed his matric examination from C.B.S.E. Board from Shishu Niketan Senior Secondary Model School, Sector 22-D. Chandigarh. Thereupon, he appeared in the Joint entrance test-1999, which was held on 16th May. 1999 for various diploma courses available in different technical education and industrial training centres under the control of the Board or in government polytechnic. This joint entrance test is conducted for admission to 37 government and private institutions in the State of Punjab. On 7.7.1999, schedule for admission was published by the government. The Petitioner got 406 marks with provisional rank 6263 in the joint entrance test. The Petitioner was not able to get admission in any course and he approached the court on the averments that he satisfies all the eligibility conditions and is entitled to be considered for admission under 15% quota, as provided under Clause 5 of the brochure. The Respondents i.e. the Punjab State Board of Technical Education and Industrial Training as well as the other Respondents opposed the claim of the Petitioner. It was stated that the Petitioner could not be considered under 85% quota and this had been duly clarified by the advertisement, the copy of which has been placed on record by the Petitioner himself, as Annexure P/6. It was also averred that as per the practice of the Board they have given interpretation to Clause 5 of the brochure that the candidates like the Petitioner will always be placed under 85% quota of the said clause.

It may be noticed at the very out set that even earlier a petition was filed by the Petitioner for the same relief being Civil Writ Petition No. 10673 of 1999. which was dismissed by the Division Bench, while giving liberty to the Petitioner to file a fresh petition. The order of the Division Bench dated 4.8.1999 reads as under:

Learned Counsel states that the Petitioner is not really claiming the reserved category seat for backward classes or backward areas, but is claiming consideration for admission only in 15% quota made for the residents of Punjab, living out side. Since the pleadings are not clear, he prays for permission to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to ascertain the facts and file fresh petition, if so advised, on the same cause of action. Leave and liberty granted. The writ petition is dismissed as withdrawn. 4.8.99 Sd/- C.J.

Sd/- V.K. Bali. Judge

The Petitioner has referred in this petition that he is entitled to reservation under 15% quota as per the terms of the brochure. The Petitioner has annexed the extract of the brochure in that regard as Annexure P/6 to the petition. Annexure P/6 reads as under:

Academic Session 1999-2000

CATEGORY WISE RESERVATION OF SEATS

(for institution located in Punjab other than Central Pool Room Ludhiana.

85% of the total seats shall be filed out of the candidates who are bonafide residents of Punjab State and who have passed their qualifying examination from recognised institutions located in Punjab. This also includes the wards of employees of Punjab State/Government of India who are otherwise domiciled residents of Punjab but their wards on account of their posting may have passed their qualifying examination from any place in India.

Remaining 15% of the seat shall be filed out of candidates who are residents of Punjab but are living outside Punjab. These candidates shall produce Punjab residence certificate and certificate in support of their reserved category if applicable.

Code Category Seats.

Open/General Seats

50%

Seats reserved for Schedule Case/ Schedule Tribes

25%

Seats reserved for backward classes

5%

Seats reserved for wards of political sufferers/Freedom Fighters

2%

Seats reserved for Backward area

5%

Seats reserved for Border area

4%

Seats reserved for Sportsmen/women

2%

Seats reserved for wards of the

defence personnel/para military personnel

4%

Seats reserved for Terrorist/Riot Victims

Sikh migrants and internal/external migrants/army deserters/children of policemen/para military forces who are decorated with Gallantry medals

1%

Seats reserved for wards of police Personnel/ paramilitary force personnel/civilian Action.

1%

Seats reserved for physically handicapped/Blind personal and their wards.

1%

It is true that reading of the above clause is somewhat ambiguous and does not make a definite or explicit distinction between the two classes sought to be differentiated.

Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contends that the Petitioner satisfies the eligibility condition and as he has done his matriculate from outside Punjab, the Petitioner is entitled to be considered under 15% quota reservation. As ready noticed, the stand of the Respondents is that the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief.

The controversy has primarily arisen because of employment of the father of the Petitioner. The Petitioner''s father is an employee of the State Bank of Patiala and is posted at Chandigarh. An employee of the State Bank of Patiala would be an employee of the government of India or not would have to be answered at the very outset.

As per the practice adopted by the Board, all the employees of the banks are covered under the first part of the afore-noticed clause, while the employees of the private or semi private sectors are covered under 15% quota. This has been followed by the Respondent-board and institutions for the last number of years and students of various public undertaking bank etc. have been included under 85% quota, as they are treated state or Central employees for all purpose and intents and for the purpose of securing this benefits. In the case of C. V. Raman v. The Management of Bank of India and Anr. 1988 (2) SLR, 758. while the Hon''ble Supreme Court was construing the expression "establishment under the control of the Central government" in relation to the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 expressed the view that such banks may not be owned by the Central Government and its employees may not be the employees of the Central Government, but they would be covered within the expression "under the Central Government." The deep and pervasive control of the Central Government over the bank would safely place such employee as an employee of the Central Government, through not in its strict terms and application.

Once such rule or instruction has been interpreted and applied by the authorities concerned over a reasonable span time, such rule or interpretation would be accepted as correct, in view of the practice adopted, unless such practice was utterly opposed to some granted constitutional protection or to public policy. In the present case, there appears to be reasonable explanation rendered by the Respondents on record as to in which manner they have been construing this clause for all this years and have implemented the same without exceptions. Under these circumstances, the interpretation given by the Respondents cannot be said to be so perverse as to attract the rigorous of disturbing the admission already granted for years including the last years by a judicial pronouncement. A reasonable well accepted practice normally is not disturbed by the Court, unless it had compelling circumstances before it to do so.

I see no serious error on the parl of the Respondents in considering father of the Petitioner as Central government servant and treating the Petitioner or the candidates like the Petitioner in the same category.

Another argument, which has been pressed on behalf of the Respondent, is that the admission was granted to the candidates as back in July, 1999 and now more than a year had elapsed and substantive period of the diploma course is already over. According to the Respondents, thus, it will not be fair to grant admission to the Petitioner midstream. For this purpose, learned Counsel for the Respondents had relied upon the cases C. Tulasi Priya v. A.P. State Council of Higher Education and Others 1998 (3) R.S.J. 611, and Swaran/it Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Ors. (1997)117 P.L.R. 691 (F.B.).

I find some substance in this submission. Certainly, the Petitioner had approached the court earlier but no interim order was granted in favour of the Petitioner by the Hon''ble Division Bench, while issuing notice of this petition, vide order dated 16th August, 1999. This writ petition was amended in September, 1999. Further more, this also cannot be disputed that the Petitioner has not attained good merit in the entrance test so as to fall in the merit list prepared under 85% reserved quota.

At this stage, it may be relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and others Vs. Dr. Anupam Gupta, etc., where the Hon''ble Supreme Court of India held as under:

Considering from this point of view, to maintain excellence the courses have to be commenced on schedule and to be completed within the schedule, so that the students would have full opportunity to study full course to meet their excellence and come at par excellence. Admission in the midstream would disturb the course and also works an handicap to the candidates themselves, to achieve excellence. Considering from this pragmatic point of view we are of the considered opinion that vacancies of the seats would not be taken as a ground to give admission and direction by the High Court to admit the candidates into those vacant seats cannot be sustained.

It is also relevant to refer to the judgment of Hon''ble the Supreme Court in the in the case of Dr. Ku. Nilofar Insaf Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, , where the court held as under

Another important consideration which prevents us form giving any relief to Dr. Jain even if we accept all his contentions is this. The M.D. course, admission to which is the bone of controversy, started in August. 1989 and is coming to a close shortly.

Thirdly, if any direction of the above nature is given by us, it will operate to the prejudice of some other candidate who is eligible for admission to that course in the normal course. Fourthly, it would not also have been possible for us-even if we had come to the conclusion that Dr. Jain and not the Appellant should have been admitted in 1989 to direct the University to carry forward that vacancy and grant him admission to it now. We therefore, refrain from giving any directions to the authorities in the matter as had been mooted in the course of the hearing.

If the relief prayed for by the Petitioner is granted to him, at this stage, it may have the effect of disturbing admission of number of candidates, who would be resultantly affected. The candidates whose parents are similarly placed like the Petitioner''s father would necessary have to be treated under 15% reserved quota and thereupon they may also ask for better preference in the course on merit whereas the candidates under 85% may ask for afresh admission and even ask for change of their subject. Thus, it is bound to effect the rights of a person who is not party before this Court and as such, the court should normally prevent to adjudicate upon an issue which is likely to effect the large section of students without hearing them.

For the reasons afore-stated. I find no merits in this writ petition and the same is dismissed without any order as to costs.

However, before parting with this file. I consider it necessary to direct the Respondents to word the relevant clauses more appropriately and with greater definite expression so as to indicate beyond ambiguity the two clauses sought to be covered under the above noted clause of the brochure in the coming year.