High CourtsSingle Bench

Ashish Gurjar vs State of M.P.

Madhya Pradesh High Court · Decided on 22 July 2014 · Citation: (2014) 07 MP CK 0215

HON’BLE JUDGES
Sheel Nagu, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 397 · Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Section 3(1)(x)
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Criminal Revision No. 357/2014
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Judgment

23 paragraphs · 1,062 words

Sheel Nagu, J.—This revision filed u/s 397, Cr.P.C. seeks quashment of the order dated 24.01.2014, by which charge has been framed against the petitioner inter alia for offence punishable u/S. 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 ("Act" for brevity) by the Special Judge, Bhind.

2.

Learned counsel for the rival parties are heard on the question of admission.

3.

Learned counsel for petitioner primarily contends that necessary ingredients required for constitution of an offence punishable u/S. 3(1)(x) of the Act do not exist in the instant case and, therefore framing of charge by the trial Court is untenable.

4.

A perusal of the FIR bearing Crime No. 01/2013 dated 27.02.2013 reflects that the same is founded upon a written complaint by complainant Rajveer Jatav dated 19.02.2013. The FIR further discloses that on the issue of installation of banners, an argument took place between the petitioner/accused and the complainant, where the petitioner/accused objected to the action of the complainant in installing the banners of one of the political parties. During the course of arguments, the petitioner/accused abused the complainant, who is said to be member of SC/ST community, by uttering the words "chamar hadda".

5.

Learned counsel for petitioner in the aforesaid factual background, on the basis of which the allegations are made, contends that there is no allegation that the insult and intimidation were extended with an intent to humiliate a member of SC/ST community. It is further contended that there is no mention in the FIR about the complainant being the member of SC/ST community.

6.

For convenience, reproduction of Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is necessary and, therefore the same done as under:-

3.

Punishments for offences of atrocities.-(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,-

(x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;

7.

A perusal of the abovesaid provision discloses that there are four basic ingredients, which should exists together to constitute the offence punishable u/S. 3(1)(x) of the Act. These four ingredients are as follows:-

1.

an intentional insult or intimidation;

2.

the insult and intimidation is with intent to humiliate;

3.

the said humiliation is to be directed towards a member of SC ST community; and

4.

the entire act of humiliation should take place within public view.

8.

So far as the first ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation is concerned, it is seen from the allegations contained in the FIR that threat and abusive words have been extended by the petitioner towards the complainant and, therefore on prima-facie assessment the complainant has been subjected to insult and intimidation. Whether the said insult or intimidation is intentional or not, is a question to be decided by adducing of evidence and, therefore cannot be answered at this preliminary stage.

9.

As regards the second ingredient, the FIR though discloses that insult and intimidation has been extended, but whether it is with an intent to humiliate a member of SC ST or not, is not clear from the allegations. The FIR does not spell out any clear terms that insult and intimidation was directed towards the complainant only because he was a member of SC/ST community. Though the allegation clearly spell about insult and intimidation being extended, but the same were extended towards the caste status of the complainant and not by being enraged by the fact of the complainant installing banners, deserves to be decided in evidence. The establishment of this particular ingredient of the offence deals exclusively with the state of mind of the accused/petitioner, which cannot be known at the preliminary stage of charge and for which adducing of evidence is necessary. So long as insult and intimidation are made towards a member of SC/ST community, the second ingredient stands prima-facie made out.

10.

The question that the petitioner/accused did actually utter the offending words with an intent to humiliate the member of SC/ST is a matter of evidence and cannot be decided at the stage of framing of charge. Para 35 of the Apex Court''s decision in the case of Swaran Singh (Supra) is profitably reproduced hereinbelow:-

35.

The High Court in the impugned judgment has observed (in Paragraph 16) that the question whether the appellants indeed uttered the offending words with intention to humiliate the complainant, are matters of evidence. We fully agree with this view.......

11.

Learned counsel for petitioner has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Gorige Pentaiah Vs. State of A.P. and Others, to contend that in the said case, the Apex Court in the given facts and circumstances of the case found that no offence u/S. 3(1)(x) of the said Act was made out. A perusal of this decision of the Apex Court discloses that the very foundation of the incident was found to be non-existent. Thus the verdict of the Apex Court in the abovesaid case is based on a distinct set of facts and is thus not applicable to the present case.

12.

So far as ingredient no. 3 is concerned, the FIR discloses that accused/petitioner has uttered the term "chamra hadda" for the complainant. The said term "chamra hadda" prima-facie appears to be derogatory in the present social setup of Hindu community. The judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Swaran Singh and Others Vs. State through Standing Counsel and Another, is worthy of reference. Thus, the third ingredient of the said offence is also made out.

13.

The fourth ingredient is obviously made out on a prima-facie basis since the FIR alleges that insult and intimidation were extended in the presence of Lokendra Jatav, Rajesh Jatav, Ajmer and Ranjeet and, therefore offence appears to have been committed on a prima-facie basis in public view.

14.

In view of the above, the trial Court was well within its powers vested by law to frame the impugned charge in question.

15.

Accordingly, no fault can be found in the impugned order of framing of charge against the petitioner/accused inter alia u/s 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

16.

Accordingly, no interference is made out in the revision and hence it is hereby dismissed.