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Judgment
11 paragraphs · 634 wordsNirmal Singh, J. (Oral)
This is a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing FIR No. 96 dated 12.5.1997 under Sections 406/498A/506/323 IPC registered at Police Station, Division No. 6, Ludhiana and consequent proceeding.
The petitioners have sought quashing on the ground that the parties have settled their dispute amicably.
The learned Counsel for both the parties submitted that the parties have settled their dispute, therefore, the parties may be allowed to compound the offence as the offence under Sections 406/498A/506 IPC are noncompoundable.
I have considered the submission made by the learned Counsel for the parties. The offence under Sections 406/498A/506 IPC are noncompoundable but taking into consideration the circumstance of each case, the High Court exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can allow the compounding of the offence in noncompoundable offences. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, AIR 1977 SC 1489, their Lordships had held as under :
"In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court''s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seems to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between the State and its object it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction."
In Mahesh Chand and another v. State of Rajasthan, 1990(3) RCR 332 , the accused were acquitted by the trial Court and were convicted by the High Court for the offence under Section 307 IPC, the Apex Court allowed the parties to compound the offence.
In Saud and another v. State of Haryana, 1988(1) CCC 388, this Court allowed the compounding of the offence though the offence was not compoundable. Reliance can also be placed upon Y. Suresh Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, JT 1987(2) SC 361, Kailash and others v. State of Haryana, 1992(1) RCR 198 , Chiranji Lal v. State of U.P., 1982(3) SCC 371, Bharat Singh v. State of M.P. and others, 1990 Suppl. SCC 62.
Ms. Monika Shardacomplainant is present in the Court. She has been identified by Shri Vinod Khunger, Advocate. She made a statement that she has effected a compromise with the petitioners with her free will. She made a statement that petitioner No. 1Ashok Kumar has got a decree of divorce under Section 13B of the Hindu Mariage Act by way of mutual consent. She also stated that the dispute between the parties has been settled amicably.
In view of the above submission, I am of the considered view that it will be in the interest of the parties and in the larger interest of the society that the parties may be allowed to compound the offence.
For the reasons mentioned above, the petition is allowed and FIR No. 96 dated 12.5.1997 and the consequential proceedings are quashed.
