High CourtsSingle Bench

Ashok Kumar Jaiswal vs Smt.Pushpmala Raje Surve

Madhya Pradesh High Court · Decided on 10 January 2018 · Citation: (2018) 01 MP CK 0034

HON’BLE JUDGES
Anand Pathak
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
<a href=3859>Code of Civil Procedure, 1908</a>, <a href=3859-115>Section 115</a> - Revision · <a href=17811>Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961</a>, <a href=17811-23>Section 23</a>
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
40 of 2017

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Judgment

95 paragraphs · 2,098 words
1.

The present civil revision under Section 23-E of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 has been preferred by the revisionist / tenant against

the order dated 7/2/20917 passed by Rent Control Authority; whereby, the application preferred by the respondent/landlord under Section 23-A

of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 has been allowed and petitioner/revisionist has been directed to be evicted from the suit premises.

2.

Precisely stated facts of the case are that in one part of the suit premises, particulars of which are referred in revision memo, the present

petitioner is living as tenant at the rent of Rs. 1600/- per month. Landlady (present respondent) is widow and aged woman and she wanted to have

the suit premises for her personal purpose and therefore, through registered notice dated 26/54/2011,she sought arrears of rent and vacant

possession of suit premises, non-compliance of which, prompted her to file the application under Section 23-A of M.P. Accommodation Control

Act, 1961 (for short ""Act of 1961"") alleging that she requires the tenanted premises for her personal use. Her requirement is bona fide and

therefore, for the bona fide purpose tenant be evicted from the suit premises.

3.

Present petitioner opposed the prayer made by the respondent on the ground that he was inductedas tenant at the rent of Rs. 20/- per month by

Lal Sahab Surve and not by the tenant of present respondent. He further submitted that respondent has a building constructed over an area ad-

measuring 5,000 sq. ft and she has no other family member to live with because her three daughters have already been married and living to

different places and therefore,she does not require the suti premises for bona fide purpose. She has sufficient space available. Earlier the petitioner

preferred a civil suit against the present respondent for not evicting him except due process of law in which permanent injunction has been granted.

He sought rejection of the application.

4.

The Rent Controlling Authority (for short ""RCA"") framed the issues and evidence was led by the parties. After considering the evidence,

documents and pleadings and after considering the submissions advanced by parties, the Rent Controlling Authority allowed the application

preferred by the respondent/landlady. Therefore, petitioner is before this court.

5.

According to learned counsel for the petitioner, the RCA eerred in passing the impugned order of eviction. Notice nowhere indicate that

landlady requires the premises for bona fide reason. The respondent could not prove her case for bona fide requirement. She is living alone in a

mansion over land ad-measuring 5,000 sq. ft. Her three daughters are away from her after their marriages. As such, no relationship exists between

them as landlord and tenant, therefore, she cannot seek eviction of petitioner. It is further submitted that authority below has erred in passing the

impugned order and did not appreciate the evidence available over the record. He relied upon the decisions of this Court as well as Apex Court in

the matter of Kamal Kishore Sharma Vs. Tarabai, 1990 MPJR 127, Karan Lal Kesharwani, Shri Raghunath Pras ad Kesharwani Vs. Sardar

House, Jabalpur & Ors., 2008 (3) MPHT 168, Gyasi Nayak Vs. Gyanchandra Jain, 2010 (3) MPLJ 203, Kailashchandra Tejpal Vs. Vinod

Guljarilal and Ors, 1993 MPLJ 961 and Phiroze Bamanji Desai Vs. Chandrakant N. Patel, (1974) 1 SCC 661 .

6.

On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent opposed the prayer made by the petitioner. He submits that presumption is drawn in

favour of the landlord under Section 23-D (3) of the Act of 1961 and as per the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Heeranand

Murlimal Vaswani Vs. Yashwant Vijay Saxena, 2011 (2) MPLJ 538, burden is on tenant to dislodge the presumption about the bona fide need.

According to him, the relationship between the landlord and tenant (present petitioner and respondent) has been established. Tenant himself filed

the suit against the respondent-landlady for permanent injunction and impliedly accepted the relationship. Even otherwise, the property is received

by the landlady in partition through LR and through litigation, therefore, she is the legitimate owner of the suit property. Her bona fide requirement

cannot be put to doubt and cannot be assessed by the petitioner. He prayed for dismissal of revision petition.

7.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

8.

Before proceeding with the case, the settled legal position needs to be reiterated in respect of scope of revision under Section 23-E of the Act

of 1961. Exercising powers as revisional authority under Section 23-E of the Act although is not like appellate jurisdiction but certainly wider than

jurisdiction under Section 115 of CPC as the power to look into the correctness of the finding and for preventing miscarriage of justice are

available and therefore, certainly instant revisional jurisdiction is wider than the codified revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil

Procedure Code . Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Tmt. Kasthuri Radhakrishnan & Ors. Vs. M. Chinniyan & Anr., (2016) 3 SCC 296 has

explained the jurisdiction in para 33-34 of the judgment, which reads as under:-

33) So far as the issue pertaining to exercise of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court while hearing revision petition arising out of eviction matter

is concerned, it remains no more res integra and stands settled by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited

vs. Dilbahar Singh (2014) 9 SCC 78. Justice R.M. Lodha, the learned Chief Justice speaking for the Bench held in para 43 thus:

43.

We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the

first appellate court/first appellate authority because on reappreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the court/authority below. The

consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts

recorded by the court/authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by court/authority

below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of

the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it is not

treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall

be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself as to the correctness or legality

or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or

propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to reappreciate or reassess the

evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all

questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine

whether the order impugned before it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity.

34) Similarly, so far as the scope and nature of inquiry, which is required to be undertaken to examine the title of the landlord in eviction matter is

concerned, it also remains no more res integra and stands settled in the case of Sheela & Ors. Vs. Firm prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, (2002) 3 SCC

375.

Justice R.C.Lahoti (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Bench held that the concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation

governed by Rent control laws has to be distinguished from the one in a title suit. Indeed, ownership is a relative term, the import whereof depends

on the context in which it is used. In rent control legislation, the landlord can be said to be the owner if he is entitled in his own legal right, as

distinguished from for and on behalf of someone else to evict the tenant and then to retain control, hold and use the premises for himself. What may

suffice and hold good as proof of ownership in landlord6 tenant litigation probably may or may not be enough to successfully sustain a claim for

ownership in a title suit.

9.

Similarly, Division Bench of this Court in the case of Surtyomal Vs. Smt. Chandabai, 2004 (3) MPLJ 438 has held that revisional jurisdiction of

High Court under Section 23-E of the Act is narrower than appeal but wider than power of revision given under Section 115 of CPC.

10.

So far as relationship between the petitioner and respondent as tenant and landlord/lady is concerned, issue No. 1 was framed by the RCA in

this regard. It appears that partition undertook between the parties (inter se respondent and other family members) and thereafter the respondent

received the property from its erstwhile owner Lal Sahab Surve. The same property was earlier owned by Lal Sahab Suvey who inducted the

petitioner as tenant and the same property in partition (through Court) went into the ownership of respondent/landlady. Petitioner did not file any

document to contend that the property still belongs to Lal Sahab Surve. In fact, petitioner filed a suit also against the respondent ( COS NO. 9-

A/11) before the 8th Civil Judge, Class-II, Gwalior seeking relief of permanent injunction against the present respondent because the respondent

orally asked the petitioner to vacate the premises, which means petitioner accepted the relationship impliedly. Therefore, by virtue of partition and

admission on behalf of petitioner, the relationship between the present parties has been established. RCA has discussed the said aspect in detail

and given its findings in affirmative in respect of said issue. Trial Court found the respondent as owner of the suit property also.

11.

Now the question of bona fide requirement comes and it is settled in law that it is always the requirement of landlord which has to be

considered foremost and he cannot be compelled to show how and in what manner he would use the accommodation. Hon''ble Apex Court in the

catena of decisions in respect of suitability of premises to landlord''s requirement mandated that landlord is the best judge and he has a complete

freedom in the matter, right from the decision Smt. Prativa Devi Vs. T.V.Krishnan, (1996) 5 SCC 353 to Raghvendra Kumar Vs. Firm Prem

Machinary and Co., AIR 2000 SC 534 has held that landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. He has a complete freedom in the

matter. It is no concern of the Courts to dictate to the landlord how, and in what manner, he should live or to prescribe for him a residential

standard of their own. Further in the case of Kailash Chand and Anr. Vs. Dharam Das, 2005 SAR (Civil) 595, Hon''ble Apex Court has held that

meaning of bona fide requirement does not mean own occupation by the landlord alone as an individual. The requirement of the family members for

residence is certainly the requirement by the landlord for his own occupation.

12.

Similarly in case of Heeranand Murlimal Vaswani (supra) this court has also had the occasion to dwell upon the bona fide need of special class

of landlord. In the present case, the landlady requires the suit accommodation for bona fide purpose for residential accommodation as she may

need expansion or renovation to suit her age and convenience. Therefore, RCA has rightly passed the order impugned considering said aspect and

given the findings in affirmative in respect of said issue.

13.

One aspect, considered by RCA is alternative accommodation. No evidence has been led in this regard to establish the fact that landlady has

suitable alternative accommodation for residence purpose. RCA has rejected the plea of landlady regarding arrears of rent and done rightly

so.Once the RCA has given specific findings in respect of issues framed and evidence led, then this Court cannot substitute its own findings. RCA

has rightly passed the impugned order.

14.

The judgments relied upon by the petitioner''s counsel move in different factual realm and are not applicable in the present fact situation of the

case as precedents. From fact situation, no case for interference is made out under the scope of revisional jurisdiction. Revision fails and is hereby

dismissed.