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Judgment
K. Raviraja Pandian, J.—The writ petitions in W. P. Nos. 6802 to 6805 of 2004 are filed for the relief of issuance of a writ of certiorari to
call for the records on the file of the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, the fourth respondent in T. A. Nos. 457 of 1997, 456 of 1997 and
353 of 1997 and 47 of 1998 all dated March 12, 1999 confirming the assessment orders of the third respondent in C. S. T. No. 1205/86-87
dated July 31,1992, C. S. T. No. 1205/86-87 dated September 16, 1992 (rectification order u/s 55), C. S. T. No. 1205/87-88 dated December
18, 1996 and C. S. T. No. 1205/88-89 dated December 12, 1997, respectively, and quash the same to the extent confirmatory of the orders of
the third respondent in C. S. T. No. 1205/86-87 dated July 31, 1992, C. S. T. No. 1205/86-87 dated September 16, 1992 (rectification order
u/s 55), C. S. T. No. 1205/87-88 dated December 18, 1996 and C. S. T. No. 1205/88-89 dated December 12, 1997.
In the alternative, it is prayed in W. P. Nos. 6802 to 6805 of 2004 for issuance of writ of mandamus to direct respondents Nos. 5 to 19 to
transfer to the credit of the second and third respondents, the taxes paid by the petitioner herein on their sales to the respective State Transport
Undertakings pursuant to the assessment for the years 1986-87, 1987-88 and 1988-89 in respect of respondents Nos. 6 to 13, 15 and 16, the
assessment for the years 1987-88 and 1988-89 in respect of respondent No. 17, the assessment for the year 1986-87 in respect of respondent
Nos. 14 and 18 and the assessment for the year 1987-88 in respect of respondent No. 19.
The writ petitions in W. P. Nos. 19223 to 19232 of 2004 are filed, for the relief of issuance of a writ of mandamus to direct respondents Nos.
18, 16, 14, 15, 10, 5, 11, 8, 13 and 6 to transfer to the credit of the second and third respondents herein against Central sales tax demands of the
third respondent herein, the taxes paid by the petitioners herein on their sales of vehicles to the respective State Transport Undertakings during the
period April 1, 1986 to March 31, 1989 being the vehicles manufactured in the factories of the petitioners in Tamil Nadu and moved into the
respective regional sales office either from the factories in the State of Tamil Nadu or from other regional sales offices in respect of which the taxes
have been assessed and realised by the authorities of the respondent Nos. 18, 16, 14, 15, 10, 5, 11, 8, 13 and 6, respectively, under the general
sales tax law of the said State.
Inasmuch as the issue involved in these writ petitions, both on law and facts, is identical, the writ petition in W. P. Nos. 6802 of 2004 is taken
up as typical case.
The petitioner twice went up to the Supreme Court in respect of the very same assessment years questioning the jurisdiction of the assessing
officer to reopen assessment, which were originally concluded u/s 6-A after accepting form ""F"" and on facts also.
In the earlier round of litigation in the case of Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. Union of India reported in [1997] 105 STC 152, the two-Judge Bench of
the Supreme Court on law held that Section 6-A of the Central Act did not create a conclusive presumption and that an order accepting form ""F"",
whether passed during the assessment or at any point earlier thereto, was ultimately part and parcel of the order of assessment. Its amenability to
power of reopening and revision depends upon the provisions of the concerned State sales tax enactment by virtue of Section 9(2) of the Central
Sales Tax Act. It was further held that it was not possible to agree that an order u/s 6-A(2) of the Central Act has an independent existence. So far
as the power of reopening is concerned, it was held that if the order accepting form ""F"" was sought to be reopened, it could be done as part of
reopening of assessment or, may be, independently depending upon the language of the relevant provision in the local sales tax enactment. From
the language of Section 16 of the Tamil Nadu Act, it was held that it was possible to reopen an order accepting form ""F"" as true without, at the
same time, reopening the assessment. It was further held that if the reopening was confined to the order accepting form ""F"" as true, the inquiry shall
be confined to the matters relevant thereto. The Supreme Court further directed the Tamil Nadu assessing authorities to first decide the matter
before them. Thereafter, if the orders were against the assessees, they were permitted to file an appeal directly before the Tribunal. If the Tribunal
decided against the assessee by holding that the sale of vehicles to the State Road Transport Undertakings of various States were inter-State sale
and it was found that those very transactions have also been taxed as intra-State sales under the State sales tax enactment of other States, that
would be the stage for considering the advisability of giving appropriate direction if by that time no Central mechanism to meet such situation comes
into existence.
As per the direction of the Supreme Court in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. Union of India [1997] 105 STC 152, the order passed by the Tribunal on
facts has been carried on to the Supreme Court for the second time. The three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Leyland
Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in [2004] 134 STC 473 reversed the finding of the Supreme Court in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. Union of India
[1997] 105 STC 152, by holding that the order of the assessing authority u/s 6-A of the Central Act is conclusive for all practical purposes. It
could only be reopened on a small set of grounds such as fraud, misrepresentation, collusion, etc. The proof required to be furnished in form ""�
is as to whether the goods were factually transferred to the assessee himself or his branch office or his agent and not to any third party. Any other
enquiry is beyond the realm of the assessing officer, however it directed the petitioner to move before this Court for suitable order, in the sense, to
question the correctness of the order of the assessing officer/Tribunal in the light of the law declared in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu
(2004] 134 STC 473. Thus, these petitions are now before this Court.
The facts as culled out from the pleadings are as follows:
The petitioner is a company engaged in the manufacture of automobiles, chassis, oil engines and spares thereof at their factory situated at Ennore
and Hosur (Tamil Nadu), Bhandara (Maharashtra) and Alwar (Rajasthan), and they, inter alia, registered under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax
Act, 1959 (hereinafter called for the sake of brevity as ""the State Act"") as also the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as ""the
Central Act""). The petitioners have several regional sales offices (in short, ""RSO"") throughout the country, wherewith the regional sales offices are
attached for the purpose of receiving, warehousing and selling the vehicles produced by the petitioner. In this case, the dispute relates to the sale of
the chassis to other States'' State Transport Undertakings (in short, ""STUs"") only.
It is the case of the petitioner that they transferred goods vehicle and chassis to their different RSOs for marketing the products which in turn are
registered under the sales tax laws governing the State in question. The stock of vehicles were transferred to the RSOs under the cover of stock
transfer invoices, excise gate pass, and entrusted to the transport contractors for movement and delivery thereof whereupon transfer of such
vehicles'' local sales tax were collected and paid by the different regional sales offices. The petitioner upon transfer of such stocks of vehicles filled
up form ""F"" in terms of Section 6-A of the Central Act and filed the original before the assessing authority of the State of Tamil Nadu for the
assessment year 1986-87. During November, 1990, the assessing authority completed the assessment under the Central Act by accepting the
claim of the petitioner that the goods were transferred to the RSOs by way of stock transfer and not by way of sale to other States by accepting
form ""F"" filed by the petitioner. Likewise, for the assessment year 1987-88, on August 28, 1991, by accepting form ""F"" passed an order treating
the transfer of vehicles as branch transfer.
Despite such assessment orders having been passed as stated above, the assessing authorities have issued a show cause notice as to why the
assessment orders for the assessment years 1986-87 and 1987-88 could not be revised and the stock of vehicles transferred to the regional sales
offices so far as the sale relates to the State Transport Undertakings were concerned, should not be taxed as inter-State sales taxable in Tamil
Nadu. The petitioner filed objection, inter alia, questioning the jurisdiction of the assessing authority to reopen the assessment on the ground that
the issues stood determined in terms of Section 6-A of the Central Act relying or on the basis of the declarations made by the petitioners in terms
of form F. However, the revisional proceedings was proceeded with and completed u/s 16 of the State Act read with Section 9(2) of the Central
Act. Consequent to the said order the sales by the RSOs in relation to the deliveries made to the State Transport Undertakings of other States
were treated as inter-State sale and tax levied. Penalty for non-disclosure of the turnover as taxable sales in terms of Section 16(2) of the State
Act was also imposed. Similar show cause notices were issued for other assessment years also.
The petitioner filed writ petition contending, inter alia, that having regard to the provisions contained in Section 6-A of the Central Act and the
further fact that the petitioner has paid tax to other States in respect of the very same transaction, the reassessment orders were illegal. The other
States where the local sales tax has been paid by the petitioner were impleaded as parties therein. This Court by its judgment dated June 13, 1996
in Venkatagiri Spinning Mills P. Ltd. v. Union of India reported in [1996] 103 STC 57, upheld the jurisdiction of the Tamil Nadu assessing
authorities to reopen the completed assessment despite acceptance of the declaration in form ""F"" and thus dismissed the writ petition. Thereupon
the matter was carried to the Supreme Court as stated above in the petitioner''s own case reported in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. Union of India
[1997] 105 STC 152. The Supreme Court also upheld the jurisdiction of the Tamil Nadu authorities u/s 16 of the State Act to revise the
completed assessment by accepting the form ""F"". As stated in the preamble, certain directions were also given to the petitioner to approach the
Tribunal directly in order to cut-short the time-limit in passing the assessment order. As such, the appeals were filed before the Tamil Nadu Sales
Tax Appellate Tribunal and the Tribunal upheld the order of revisional assessment on facts.
Again the petitioner as against the order of the Tribunal moved the Supreme Court in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu [2004] 134
STC 473. As stated earlier, the Supreme Court held that the order of an assessing authority u/s 6-A of the Central Act is conclusive for all
practical purposes, however, carving out certain situations such as fraud, misrepresentation, etc., as exception to such conclusiveness. The
Supreme Court further observed that the petitioner would be entitled to move this Court for ventilating their grievances. As such, the present writ
petition is filed before this Court.
Mr. C. Natarajan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, strenuously contended that both the assessing authority as well as the
Tribunal, which confirmed the reassessment orders, did not deal with form ""F"" declaration, which has been originally inquired into and accepted as
true. The exercise of jurisdiction by the assessing authority, which has been confirmed by the Tribunal without a decision on the preliminary
jurisdictional fact of the form ""F"" declaration, vitiates the entire proceedings. The correction pointed out in the form ""F"" declaration to deny the
claim of the assessee is made only at the instance of the assessing authority for the reason that the original form ""F"" declaration related to number of
vehicles transferred each month to different RSOs, whereas in assessments prior to and up to 1987-88 form ""F"" declarations were furnished by the
RSOs on the basis of the number of vehicles received into the RSOs. So, the corrections were made as directed by the assessing authorities. To
explain the same, a compilation, which has been marked as R-9 has been filed before the Tribunal. That aspect of the matter has been lost sight of
and has not been dealt with by the Tribunal. He further submitted that in the matter of declaration in form ""F"" originally presented came to be
inquired into and accepted as the corrections set out therein were made with the direction of the assessing authority. The reason of the assessing
authority for revision of assessment was that incriminating documents were recovered from the place of business of the petitioner, which clinches
the issue, particularly, the direction issued by the petitioner to destroy the documents connected with so called pre-determined sale, is totally
incorrect. In the course of business, several instructions would have been issued to the RSOs and other subordinate offices by the Head Office for
maintaining files and paper discipline and such instructions cannot be conclusive or cannot be put against the petitioner. Such directions are internal
matters to increase the sale and part of sale strategy as there is competition in the field from other leading manufacturers. That cannot conclude the
issue. Likewise, the tour programme of the petitioner''s officer to Pondicherry would also cannot be regarded as a conclusive proof. The tour
programme and other material with which reliance has been placed by the respondents for reopening the assessment and to treat those transactions
as inter-State sale are totally extraneous to the issue as found by the Supreme Court, particularly as to the nature of inquiry which the assessing
officer has to be made after filing the form ""�"" declaration. Learned Senior Counsel also filed page-war submission, which has been placed
before the assessing officer as well as the Tribunal by the petitioner and concluded that the non-consideration of those documents and
consideration of which, not in consonance with the decision of the Supreme Court in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu [2004] 134 STC
473, vitiates the entire proceedings.
On the other hand, Mr. Muthukumaraswamy, learned Additional Advocate-General appearing for the respondent-authorities, argued with
equal vehemence and with much clarity by filing counter-affidavit sustaining the reassessment. He contended that the question raised in this writ
petition is primarily a question of fact and the revising authority as well as the Tribunal, the final fact-finding authority, recorded its categorical
finding against the assessee. The correctness of which cannot be gone into by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He further
contended that the documents recovered from the place of business of the petitioner clearly indicate that the RSOs are only acting as a conduit,
that the other State STUs have directly placed orders on the petitioner. Hence, the movement of goods from Tamil Nadu to other RSO is only an
inter-State sale coming within the sweep of Section 3(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act.
The Additional Advocate-General has pointed out that one of the documents dated December 31, 1990 and the averment contained in the
affidavit filed by the Assistant Manager, Sales Tax, of the petitioner-company dated July 14, 1992 before the assessing authority and contended
that this document clinches the issue and proved that the sales were only an inter-State, sale rather a pre-determined sale to the RSO at
Maharashtra. Hence, all the sales by the petitioner to the other RSOs could very well be presumed to be inter-State sale. Both the revisional
authority as well as the Tribunal in an elaborate and a very lengthy order have considered each and every transaction of the petitioner and came to
the conclusion that the transactions were inter-State transactions and Central sales tax could be leviable by the State of Tamil Nadu only as the
movement was occasioned by pre-determined sale and as such he further contended that the submission made by the petitioner has to be
eschewed and the revisional order of the authorities in respect of assessment years and confirmed by the Tribunal has to be confirmed as there is
no illegality in those orders.
In order to resolve the issue, I am of the considered view that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil
Nadu [2004] 134 STC 473, has to be looked into in the way the Supreme Court has interpreted the relevant provision of Section 6-A of the CST
Act.
Having regard to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Central Sales Tax Act vis-a-vis the recommendations made by the Law
Commission, the Supreme Court in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu [2004] 134 STC 473 has held in paragraph Nos. 34 and 35 as
follows:
The liability to tax on inter-State sale as contained in Section 6 is expressly made subject to the other provisions contained in the Act. Sub-
section (2) of Section 9, on the other hand, which is a procedural provision starts with the words ''subject to the other provisions of this Act and
the Rules made thereunder''. Section 6-A provides for exception as regard the burden of proof in the event a claim is made that transfer of goods
had taken place otherwise than by way of sale. Indisputably, the burden would be on the dealer to show that the movement of goods had
occasioned not by reason of any transaction involving sale of goods but by reason of transfer of such goods to any other place of his business or to
his agent or principal, as the case may be. For the purpose of discharge of such burden of proof, the dealer is required to furnish to the assessing
authority within the prescribed time a declaration duly filled and signed by the principal officer of the other place of business or his agent or
principal. Such declaration would contain the prescribed particulars in the prescribed form obtained from the prescribed authority. Along with such
declaration, the dealer is required to furnish the evidence of such dispatch of goods by reason of Act 20 of 2002. In the event, if it fails to furnish
such declaration, by reason of legal fiction, such movement of goods would be deemed for all purposes of the said Act to have occasioned as a
result of sale. Such declaration indisputably is to be filed in form F. The said form is to be filled in triplicate. The prescribed authority of the
transferee-State supplies the said form. The original of the said form is to be filed with the transferor-State and the duplicate thereof is to be filed
before the authorities of the transferee-State whereas the counterfoil is to be preserved by the person where the agent or principal of the place of
business of the company is situated.
When the dealer furnishes the original of form F to its assessing authority, an enquiry is required to be held. Such enquiry is held by the
assessing authority himself. He may pass an order on such declaration before the assessment or along with the assessment. Once an order in terms
of Sub-section (2) of Section 6-A of the Central Act is passed, the transactions involved therein would go out of the purview of the Central Act. In
other words, in relation to such transactions, a finding is arrived at that they are not subjected to the provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act. It is
not in dispute thereunder no appeal is provided thereagainst.
In paragraph No. 37 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court has stated that on an analysis of Section 6-A(2) of the CST Act, the following
propositions of law emerge:
(i) The initial burden of proof is on the dealer to show that the movement was occasioned by reason of transfer of such goods which is otherwise
than by reason of sale. The assessee may file a declaration. On a declaration so filed an inquiry is to be made by the assessing authority for the
purpose of passing an order on arriving at a satisfaction that movement of goods was occasioned otherwise than as a result of sale.
(ii) Whenever such an order is passed, a legal fiction is created. Legal fiction, as is well-known, must be given its full effect.
Thereafter, the Supreme Court after referring to the finding of the two-Judge judgment of the Ashok Leyland''s case [1997] 105 STC 152 to
the effect that ""section 6-A does not create a conclusive presumption and that an order accepting form F, whether passed during the assessment or
at any point earlier thereto, is ultimately a part and parcel of the order of assessment. Its amenability to power of reopening and revision depends
upon the provisions of the State sales tax enactment concerned by virtue of Section 9(2)"", ultimately held that the aforesaid view was not correct.
After referring the various other judgments, both English and Indian Law on that subject, to name a few, such as The State of Madras Vs.
Radio and Electricals Ltd. etc., , Balabhagas Hulaschand Vs. State of Orissa, , which has been referred to in the two-Judge judgment of the
Supreme Court in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. Union of India [1997] 105 STC 152 and after approving the judgment in C. P. K. Trading Company v.
Additional Sales Tax Officer, III Circle, Mattencherry [1990] 76 STC 211, the apex court has finally given a finding to the effect that the order of
an authority u/s 6-A is conclusive for all practical purposes.
Again, in paragraph No. 61, while considering Section 6-A of the Central Act, and analysing the same, the Supreme Court has held as follows:
In the case at hand it has to be determined whether the sale in question is an inter-State one. If through the means of a legal fiction it is determined
that this is not an inter-State sale, then it amounts to a transfer of stock. This finding is made by a statutory authority who has the jurisdiction to do
so and there is no provision for appeal. Therefore, the order made by such authority is conclusive in that it cannot be reopened on the basis that
there had been a mere error of judgment. It also cannot be reopened under another statute, for examples, the Sales Tax Act of the State
concerned, when the order had been made under the Central Act. Section 9(2) of the Act is subject to the other provisions of the Act which
would include subsection (2) of Section 6-A of the Act. ''Subject to'' is an expression whereby limitation is expressed. The order is conclusive for
all purposes. It can only be reopened on a small set of grounds such as fraud, misrepresentation, collusion, etc.
The Supreme Court further held that there is no presumption when movement of goods has taken place in the course of inter-State sales in the
case of standard goods but the same is not conclusive. It is only one of the factors which is required to be taken into consideration along with
others. In a case, however, where the purchaser places order on the manufacturer for manufacturing goods which would be as per this
specifications, a presumption that agreement to sell has been entered into may be raised. In the said judgment, the Supreme Court further held that
the situs of sale cannot conclude the issue by referring to 20th Century Finance Corpn. Ltd. and Another Vs. State of Maharashtra, which placed
reliance on The Bengal Immunity Company Limited Vs. The State of Bihar and Others, .
The Supreme Court in paragraph No. 67 of the judgment has held thus:
It has not been disputed before us that all the requisite particulars are to be stated in form F. Once a determination is made that such statements are
correct, the curtain is drawn keeping in view the expression ''thereupon''. The said word is of great significance and must be given its full effect.
24 In paragraph No. 80 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court further held thus:
... An order passed by the statutory authority who has jurisdiction therefor, the same would amount to a part of substantive and not procedural
law. In addition to this, there is no provision for appeal. Thus, it is only in the limited cases of fraud, misrepresentation, etc., that reassessment can
be directed and not if there had been a mere error of judgment.
Then, the crucial issue as to the nature of enquiry by the statutory authority has been stated in paragraph No. 83 to the following effect:
The particulars required to be furnished in form F clearly manifest that the proof required is as to whether the goods were factually transferred to
the assessee himself or his branch office or his agent and not to any third party. Any other enquiry is beyond the realm of the assessing authority.
The purpose of verification of the declaration has been dealt with by the Supreme Court at paragraph No. 91 to the following effect.
The purpose of verification of the declaration made in form F, therefore, is as to whether the branch office acted merely as a conduit or the
transaction took place independent to the agreement to sell entered into by and between the buyer and the registered office or the office of the
company situated outside the State.
There again the Supreme Court held that the observation made by the Supreme Court in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. Union of India [1997] 105
STC 152 to the effect that an order passed under Sub-section (2) of Section 6-A can be the subject-matter of reopening of a proceeding u/s 16 of
the State Act was not correct. While concluding so, the Supreme Court has added that the conclusion would not mean that even wherein such an
order has been obtained by commission of fraud, collusion, misrepresentation or suppression of material facts or giving or furnishing false
particulars, the order being vitiated in law would not come within the purview of the aforementioned principle. Discovery of a new material
although may be a ground but that itself may not be a ground for reopening the proceedings unless and until it is found that by reason of such
discovery, a jurisdictional error has been committed. In other words, when an order passed in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 6-A is found to
be illegal or void ab initio or otherwise voidable, the assessing authority derives jurisdiction to direct reopening of the proceedings and not
otherwise. From paragraph No. 95 onwards of the judgment, the fraud, collusion, misrepresentation and concealment of facts has been dealt with.
From a reading of the abovesaid paragraphs of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu [2004] 134
STC 473, the following could be deducible:
The assessing officer should ensure while making the assessment that the form F declaration obtained from other States is valid and genuine;
whether the particulars contained in form ''F'' declaration are true and correct or not; whether the branch office/agent or principal has the facility to
carry on business activity in other States; whether the goods sent to the branch office/agent or principal has reached the branch or agent or
principal and not to the customer directly; and whether the assessee has sales tax registration in other States and taxes which are due have been
paid for the sales effected from the branch offices/agent. In order to satisfy that, the assessing authority can verify whether the proper accounts and
records are maintained showing details of receipt and disposals of the goods; whether the particulars furnished in form ''F'' prove as to whether the
goods were factually transferred to the assessee himself or his branch office or his agent and not to any third party. Any other enquiry is beyond the
realm of the assessing authority. Once the assessing authority found that the form ''F'' is true and correct and passed an assessment order, then the
curtain is drawn and conclusive presumption operates. The exceptions for reopening the assessment are that there must be a jurisdictional error
committed by the assessing officer, that the assessment has been obtained with fraud, collusion or misrepresentation. Any discovery of new
materials after the due acceptance and completion of assessment is not a ground for reopening the proceedings, unless a jurisdictional error is
committed. The supression, misrepresentation or fraud should relate to the particulars furnished and incorporated in the form ''�'' declaration. A
non-disclosure of fact, which is not required by law to be disclosed does not amount to misrepresentation. The non-disclosure of fact not required
by statute to be disclosed may not amount to fraud.
By keeping in mind the abovesaid principles, the orders impugned are tested, I am of the view that the authorities deviated from the guiding
principles. On an entire reading of the assessment order and the order of the Tribunal confirming the assessment, it is clear that the authorities have
not exercised the jurisdiction and conducted enquiry as enunciated by the Supreme Court in the. abovesaid judgment, the essence of which has
been extracted above. But certain facts, which are otherwise clinching the issue, have been unearthed by the assessing authorities (referred to at
para No. 127 of the Tribunal order), which cannot be lost sight of by this Court. Hence, I am of the considered view that the claim of the Revenue
cannot be brushed aside in total by following the judgment of the Supreme Court as contended by the counsel for the assessee. The assessing
officer has to be given another opportunity to re-do the exercise as per the exposition of law on this subject by the Supreme Court in Ashok
Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu [2004] 134 STC 473. Furthermore, the decision of the Supreme Court in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of
Tamil Nadu [2004] 134 STC 473 was not available when the exercise has been done, i.e., the reassessment and the issuance of notices in respect
of the assessment for the assessment years 1986-87 and 1987-88 and the further proceedings of taking up the matter up to the Tribunal. In order
to safeguard the interest of the Revenue and balance the hardship stated to be caused to the assessees, I am of the view that the matter has to be
remitted back to the assessing authorities to re-do the exercise after giving due opportunity to the petitioner.
Hence, the impugned orders of the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, the fourth respondent herein in the preamble, i.e., in T.A. Nos.
457, 456 and 353 of 1997 and 47 of 1998 all dated March 12, 1.999 confirming the assessment orders of the third respondent in C.S.T. No.
1205 of 1986-87 dated July 31, 1992, C.S.T. No. 1205 of 1986-87 dated September 16, 1992 (rectification order u/s 55), C.S.T. No. 1205 of
1987-88 dated December 18, 1996 and C.S.T. No. 1205 of 1988-89 dated December 12, 1997 are hereby set aside and the matters are
remitted back to the assessing authorities to consider the issue afresh as per the law enunciated by the Supreme Court in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v.
State of Tamil Nadu [2004] 134 STC 473. As already stated, nearly two decades have passed and the petitioner has approached the Supreme
Court more than once, the assessing officer is hereby directed to re-do the assessment as expeditiously as possible by giving reasonable
opportunity to the petitioner, so as to avoid any unnecessary further litigation. The petitioner is also directed to co-operate with the assessing
officer to conclude the issue as expeditiously as possible.
As the issue is still alive on remittal before the assessing officer and the relief of certiorari has been granted, there is no need to consider the
alternative relief sought for by way of mandamus in the above writ petitions. All the writ petitions filed seeking the relief of mandamus have thus
been dismissed as not arising for consideration in the above-stated factual situation of the case.
Accordingly, the writ petitions are disposed of. No costs. Consequently, the connected W.P.M.Ps. and W.V.M. Ps are closed.