Asjit Singh Chawla and Others vs Land Acquisition Collector Urban Estates

G.C. Garg, J.—Land of the petitioners'' was acquired by the State of Haryana for public purpose and a notification u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (for short ''the Act'') in this regard was issued on 6.5.1988 whereas the notification u/s 6 of the Act was issued on 1.2.1989. The award pertaining to the said acquisition was announced by the respondent on 29.1.1991.

The case of the petitioners is that they came to know about the announcement of the award on 8.5,1992 and they collected the compensation on 12.5.1992. Being dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation, the petitioners filed a reference application praying that the same be forwarded to the District Judge and this application, was received by the respondent on 4.6.1992. Since no action was taken on the application of the petitioners by the respondent;, the petitioners made a representation which was received by the respondent on 21.1.1994. Still nothing was done in the matter by the respondent and this compelled the petitioners to file a writ petition in this Court. Accordingly 1994 CWP 6060 filed by the petitioners was disposed of by this Court with a direction to the Land Acquisition Collector to pass appropriate orders on the application u/s 18 of the Act moved by the petitioners within three months from the-communication of the said order, which was passed on 22.8.1994.

The petitioners were thereafter informed vide letter dated 2.12.1994 that their reference application has been consigned to the record as the same had been moved after the expiry of period of limitation as envisaged by Section 18(2) of the Land Acquisition Act (for short ''the Act''). It is how the petitioners have filed the present revision against the order dated 2.12.1994 passed by the respondent.

On notice of motion having been issued, the respondent has put in appearance.

Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the learned Collector had no jurisdiction to go into the question, whether the application made by the petitioner was or was not within limitation and it was mandatory for the Collector to forward the reference application for adjudication to the learned District Judge. Learned counsel further submitted that no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioners and if it had been done, they would have shown to the satisfaction of the Collector that reference application was within time. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent while refuting the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that no opportunity of hearing was required to be affored to the petitioners as the reference application was decided on facts available on the record of the learned Land Acquisition Collector and even other-wise affording of such application is not the requirement of law.

I have heard the learned counsel for the parties perused the record.

On a consideration of the matter, I am of the opinion that this revision deserves to succeed. A perusal of the impugned order shows that the reference application moved by the petitioners has been dismissed by the learned Collector as barred by time. Reasons have not been recorded in the order to come to the conclusion that the application is barred by time. From a reading of the order it scents apparent that the petitioners were not afforded an opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned order though it records that an opportunity was provided. Even if it be so, the order passed by the Collector is not a speaking order. It is clearly a non-speaking order. The contention whatsoever that may have been raised on behalf of the petitioners before the Collector has been discussed in the impugned order. An order passed on the reference application by the Land Acquisition Collector is revisable in view of the provisions of Section 18(3) of the Act, which reads as under :-

"18(3) Any order made by the Collector on an application under this section shall be subject to revision by the High Court, as if the Collector were a court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure."

An order passed u/s 18 of the Act determines the rights of the parties and is revisable u/s 18(3) of the Act. It is thus inherent that such an order is a quasi-judicial order and has to be passed after affording heard to the landowner or the persons interested, of being heard. The order being revisable by the High Court it must contain reasons in support of the conclusion so as to enable the revisional court to examine the same and appreciate the points involved. The Collector is thus expected to pass a speaking older while disposing of the application u/s 18 of the Act seeking reference. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that an opportunity of hearing was not required to be afforded, thus cannot be accepted. The Collector while declining to refer the matter to the learned District Judge for adjudication, in my view, is required to hear the landowner/persons interested and pass a speaking order. The matter can be examined from another angle also. The Collector cannot be said to be merely or simply letter box. He, in my view, is not bound to refer all the applications filed before him u/s 18 of the Act for adjudication to the District Judge and leaving the parties to raise objections to the maintainability of the reference application there. It could not have been the intention of the Legislature at all that in such like matters the Collector is only a forwarding authority and nothing more and once a reference application is moved before the Collector, he is under a legal duty to forward the same to the District Judge leaving it open to the State to raise any objection that may, be available to it in law including the one of limitation and locus standi of the applicants to file the application. If that had been the intention, the provisions of Section 18(3) would not have been brought on the statute book. To me it appears that in the presence of the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Act, It is incumbent, upon the Collector to see, whether the application has been made within the period prescribed by law and whether the applicants making such an application have a legal right etc. to do so or not. It is only after satisfying himself on all such questions, the Collector is supposed to forward the reference application to the District Judge for adjudication. Once the, Land Acquisition Collector to whom the application is made Comes to the conclusion that the application is barred by time or the applicant has no locus standi in such other matters, without touching the merits of the controversy raised in the application and in which the District Judge is liable to opine, can decline to make a reference to the District Judge and the only course open to the applicant is to file a revision against the order, of the Collector in view of the provisions of Section 18(3) of the Act. Any other interpretation would fender the provisions of Section 18(3) of the Act otiose. The provision made in the statute has to be harmoniously construed and in a manner that all the provisions made can operate in the given situations. A provision made in the statute cannot be rendered redundant by judicial interpretation. The mere fact that the order has been made revisable, the jurisdiction vests in the Collector to dismiss an application in a given situation, The office of the Land Acquisition Collector cannot thus to be said to be merely a letter box for the purpose of forwarding the applications to the Court of District Judge. The contention if accepted will lead to a curious situation. In the given situation, the District Judge will be called upon then to determine whether the applicant had a right to tile the application or not which is not his function in view of the provisions of Section 18(1) of the Act. The points referable to the District Judge u/s 18(1) of the Act are as to the measurement, of land, amount of compensation, persons to whom the compensation is payable or the apportionment of compensation amongst the persons interested. In the light of the above discussion, it cannot be said that the order of the Collector is without jurisdiction. Reference regarding appointment of compensation and the person or persons to whom it is payable can be sought by a claimant or the dispute in that behali may be referred to the Court for decision by the Collector in view of the provisions of Section 30 of the Act.

In all fairness to Mr. Sarin, learned counsel for the petitioners, two cases cited by him deserve to be noticed :

In Jit Singh v. Land Acquisition Collector, PWD & B & R Branch, Hissar 1991 1 P.L.R, 519, the application seeking reference was dismissed on the ground that it was barred by time. The award in that case was made on March 27, 1987 and the application seeking reference was moved on May 11, 1987. It was held in the said case that it was not for the Collector to decide whether the application for reference was within time or not and he should have referred the matter to the District Judge leaving the said question open. Primary reliance for this view was placed on Dharam Pal v. The Collector Land Acquisition Urban Development Punjab 1987 P.L.J.263. In Chander Dutt Sharma and Ors. v. The State of Hatyana and Anr. 1991 2 P.L.R. 5 the Land Acquisition Collector gave his award on January 12, 1973 and the application seeking reference was filed on February 15, 1972. The application was not referred to the District Judge though some other applications were referred to him for adjudication. The application was not referred as the applicants failed to produce title of ownership regarding the acquired land despite many opportunities given to them. In this situation, it was the duty of the Collector to refer the same to the District Judge for decision, as according to the learned Judge there is no provision in the Act which authorities the Land Acquisition Collector to hold an inquiry as to the rights of the parties.

It may be noticed at this stage that the judgments referred to above do not help the petitioners for the contention that the Collector is bound to refer all applications moved u/s 18 of the Act for adjudication to the District Judge. In none of the cases referred to above and relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the provisions of Section 18(3) of the Act were brought to the notice of the Bench deciding the said cases. If it had been brought to the notice of the Bench that the order passed by the Collector is subject to revision, the view taken in the above decided cases may have been different. As already noticed, the order passed by the Collector is revisable. If it is taken that the Collector is not competent to pass any order and has just to forward the application for adjudication, the provisions of Section 18(3) of the Act as already observed will be rendered otiose, a situation which cannot be allowed to stand. I am thus, clearly of the opinion that the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners do not in terms subscribe to the view that the Collector cannot take a decision at all in any situation.

For the reasons recorded above, this revision is allowed and the impugned order is set aside but with no order as to costs. The parties through their counsel are directed to appear before the learned Land Acquisition Collector, Urban Estates, Sector 12, Faridabad on 5.1.1996 who shall dispose of the application u/s 18 of the Act filed by the petitioners, afresh in accordance with law, by passing a speaking order and after affording an opportunity of being heard to the petitioners and having regard to the observations made herein above.