Atava Akkulamma (died) vs Gajjela Papi Reddy

The order of the learned Sub-Judge, Madanappalle (Sri R. Bayapu Reddy) in I.A. No. 417/1974 in O.S. No. 35 of 1969 dated 16-7-1981 is the subject-matter of this appeal. The author of it is the unsuccess-ful transferee of the decree from the decree-holder Smt. Atava Akkulamma in the suit. The respondents are the judgment-debtors under the decree. The convenience warrants the reference to the parties as the transferee (appellant), decree-holder (plaintiff in the suit O.S. 35/69) and the defendants (Respondents). A preliminary decree dated 15-11-73. was passed in O.S. No. 35/69 in favour of Smt. Atava Akkulamma for partition and for possession of l/4th share in the plaint schedule properties except the one covered by the sale deed in favour of defendant No. 2 Kannemadugu Venkataswamy with a direction to defendant No. 1 to account to the plaintiff in regard to the income from the suit schedule properties from the year 1957 till the plaintiff was put in possession of her 1/4th share, for costs etc. He filed a petition under O. 20, R. 18 of C.P.C. for a final decree. A Commissioner was appointed to effect the division of the share and he filed separate reports both regarding the shares and the profits in terms of the preliminary decree. In the meanwhile, the decree-holder transferred the decree in favour of the appellant and he came on record as the second petitioner by filing I.A. No. 597/77 which was allowed on 30-10-1978. The appellant settled the claims out of the Court for mense profits with respondent No. 1. (defendant No. 1) by accepting Rupees 15,000/- towards full satisfaction and it was recorded by the Court in its order dated 7-12-78 in I.A: 711/78. But he pursued the relief of partition and separate possession of 1/4th share in the suit properties. The decree-holder died in the year 1979 and the appellant-transferee continued the. proceedings. A memo was filed on behalf of defendant No. 1 contending that in view of the decree-holder having limited interest or right in the suit properties both from the admitted facts and from the decree, the execution petition was no more maintainable and was liable to be dismissed. The learned Sub-Judge after hearing both the sides and with the materials before him came to the conclusion that the transferee derives only the limited rights of the decree-holder in order to take possession and enjoy the suit properties during her lifetime and on the death of the limited owner, the transferee is no more entitled to prosecute the proceedings for allotment of l/4th share in the suit ppoperties and consequently dismissed the petition for final decree directing the parties to bear their respective costs. These are the admitted facts.

Mr. Pattabhi Rama Rao, learned Advocate for the transferee, has raised two specific contentions namely:-- (1) the decree did not actually confer limited interest on the decree-holder in the suit properties and (2) even assuming that the decree-holder has only a limited interest in the suit properties, she became the absolute owner by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and thereby the transferee got the whole right and title to the 1/4th share of the plaint in the suit properties on the transfer of the decree.

Sri Sunder Rajan, the learned Advocate for the contesting respondents has argued to the contrary and further added that even from her own stand throughout, the decree-holder got limited rights under the decree and the previous proceedings. It is further argued by him that the rights of the decree-holder are governed by Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act and not Section 14(1) of the said Act to enlarge her limited rights into absolute rights and thus she transferred only with that limited right to the appellant and, therefore, his co-existence rights with the decree-holder extinguishes with her death. Thus, these points pose themselves for determination in this appeal :

(1) Whether the decree-holder Atava Ak-kulamma

(a) acquired l/4th share in the suit properties as a limited owner either before or after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956?

(b) If so, whether she acquired it on the death of her husband or

(c) under a decree or order of a civil court.

(2) Whether Atava Akkulamma was possessing the

(a) suit properties as a limited owner within the meaning of Section 14(1) of the Act.

(b) If so, whether she became the full owner thereof and not as a limited owner in view of Section 14(1) of the Act.

(c) If not whether she continued to be the limited owner of her share in the suit properties by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Act.

(3) Whether the transferee of the decree got limited right or absolute right in the decree transferred by the decree-holder.

(4) Whether the learned Sub-Judge was in error in holding that the decree-holder had only limited right or interest in the suit properties to the extent of her share and on her death, the petition for final decree was not maintainable.

Both from the order of the learned Sub-Judge which is in appeal and from the submission made on behalf of both the sides by the learned Advocates, it appears that there is no controversy at all regarding several facts leading to the decree and the result in the dismissal of the petition for final decree and thereby rejecting the claim of the transferee to continue the preliminary decree proceedings. One Attava Nagi Reddy is the husband of the decree-holder. He was the original owner of the suit properties. On his demise in pre 1925 he left behind him his wife decree holder, his daughter Gajjela Yerramma and his mother Buddamma. Gajjela Yerramma (defendant No. 5) was married to Gajjela Papi Reddy (respondent No. 1) who thus became the spuin-law of Atava Nagi Reddy. It appears that the decree-holder and her mother-in-law Budemma executed a registered settlement deed dated 5-1-1925 in favour of defendant No. 1. Defendant No. 5 filed O.S. No. 11/1935 against defendant No. 1 by impleading the decree-holder as defendant No. 2 in the suit, and sought for declaration that the settlement deed was not valid and binding on her since no provision was made for the maintenance of herself and also the present decree-holder. It appears that the parties to the suit entered into a compromise on 3-8-1937 wherein the plaintiff and defendant No. 5 were given life interest in half the share out of the suit properties on their death that should devolved on defendant No. 5 and his heirs. The remaining share was left to him. in pursuance of the same, the decree-holder and defendant No. 5 took possession of their respectivt shares through the Court in the year 1939, It appears that defendant No. 1 trespassed into the lands and removed the crops as per the allegations, and therefore, the decree-holder filed O.S. No. 539/49 against defendants 1 and 5 who were defendants 1 and 2 in the suit for declaration of title, for permanent injunction and possession; and that suit came to be decreed on 27-2-1951 declaring that the decree-holder was entitled to remain in possession of 1/4th joint share in the suit property covered by the compromise decree in O.S. No. 11/35 for her life without any right of alienation and a permanent injunction was issued against defendant No. 1 from interfering with her enjoyment of her share. The matter was taken in appeal to the District Court, Chittoor in A.S. No. 128/ 1951 and that came to be dismissed on 22-10-1951. The plaintiff was getting her share of crops from the suit lands from defendant No. 1 who was allowed to cultivate the lands till the years 1957. Since the decree-holder fell ill, she could not effectively control defendant No. 1 and, therefore, she thought of separating her undivided 1/4th share in the suit properties and demanded from defendant No. 1 to give it. Because he did not respond arid evaded, the plaintiff had to file O.S. No. 35/ 69 for the reliefs stated above and that came to be decreed. Defendants 2 to 4 and 6 to 48 are the alienees of some portions of the suit properties from defendant No. 1. In addition to the admissions of these facts, the Court has given a clear finding regarding the same based on the evidence in the case.

Although at one stage, it was contended that the executing Court is bound by the decree and cannot go behind it, it was conceded that the proceedings before the learned Sub-Judge was part of the same suit and a continuation of the preliminary decree in order to lead to final decree. It is also clear that preliminary decree is a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) of C.P.C. But it is not capable of execution normally till a final decree is passed. In that sense, the Court dealing with a preliminary decree before passing a final decree may not be designated in law as an executing Court within the meaning of Section 37 of C.P.C. In that sense, the questions to be determined by a Court dealing with a preliminary decree before passing a final decree may not be the one u/s 47 of C.P.C. But still, the transfer of decree by assignment in writing is. covered by Order 21, Rule 16 of C.P.C. for the purpose of execution. Therefore, in that context the contention that the Court when confronted with the transfer of the decree is debarred from going behind the decree as an executing Court has no merit. Even assuming that the Court was acting as a Court executing the decree, the law will not debar from interpreting the decree by looking into the pleadings and the judgment and other materials placed before it. The Privy Council in AIR 1944 46 (Privy Council) , held that where the decree is ambiguous it is the duty of the executing Court to consider the decree and for that purpose it Would be certainly entitled to look into the pleadings and the judgment. The Supreme Court relied upon this with approval in Topanmal Chhotamal Vs. Kundomal Gangaram and Others, . In Bhavan Vaja and Others Vs. Solanki Hanuji Khodaji Mansang and Another, , the Supreme Court took the same view to be read in para 19 as:

".....It is true that an executing Court can not go behind the decree under execution. But that does not mean that it has no duty to find out the true effect of that decree. For construing a decree it can and in appropriate cases, it ought to take into consideration the pleadings as well as the proceedings leading up to the decree."

Thereby the learned Advocate for the transferee has well fortified to his contentions. Here is a case wherein there is a controversy whether the decree-holder had the absolute right or title in the suit properties to the extent of 1/4th share so as to legally transfer it to the transferee or whether it was only a limited interest which Came to an end on her death. So many facts stated above, for over decades have provided the basis to determine such controversies. The consequences of a finding of such controversies are also serious, affecting the rights and liabilities of the parties to the proceedings. Therefore, the learned Sub Judge was bound to interpret the decree by making use of all such materials including the pleadings, judgments etc., which were the basis to lead to the decree in question. That should be in addition to the rights and liabilities enjoyed by the parties under Hindu Law both before and after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as they are admittedly governed by them.

Admittedly, one Atva Nagi Reddy was the original owner of all the suit properties including the 1/4th share of the plaintiff therein which is declared as such. Admittedly, defendant No. 1 is a stranger to the family except with the status of a son-in-law married to Yerramma, defendant No. 5. There is no finding that he is the illatom-son-in-law having any right to share under any agreement between him and Atava Nagi Reddy, None has put him in the status of a rever-sioner. Atava Nagi Reddy left behind him only his legal heirs -- the decree holder who is his wife, his. mother Buddamma and his daughter Yerramma the 5th defendant. Presumably, he left behind him no male as his legal heir. In other words, he left behind him only the three legal heirs stated above. Having due regard to AtaVa Nagi Reddy pre-decgas-ing the three female legal heirs before the first quarter of the 20th century, the succession or inheritance to the properties of the deceased and the rights and liabilities flowing therefrom were to be governed by the corpus juris of the Sastric Hindu Law codified by Dharma Sastras and the commentaries thereon and also the judicial decisions in addition to any Central or State legislations existing then. The three female heirs including the decree-holder and defendant No. 5 were entitled to inherit to the suit properties left by Atva Nagi Reddy as the deceased died before Hindu Law of Inheritance Amendment Act, 1929 came into existence, (pages 215 and 216 of Hindu Law by Mulla, 15th Ed.). The properties s~o inherited by them are popularly called as ''women''s estate'' in general for all of them and more appropriately ''widow''s estate'', in so far as the decree-holder is concerned. The definitive expression of women''s estate and widow''s estate'' is the result of the Sastric law codified through judicial precedents. Thus the term ''women''s estate'' in its larger connotation means:

"All property which has given to a women by any means and from any source whatsoever and includes both properties in which she has absolute estate stridhana and property in which she has only a limited interest and the term is used in the context only later sense of property in which she takes only a limited or qualified interest. Such property is either property inherited by woman, or property which has been allotted to her in a partition in her husband''s family."

(Devi Mangala Prasad v. Mahadev Prasad 1934 PC 234 and Kamala Devi Vs. Bachu Lal Gupta, .

Such a property may be either inherited from a male or a female. To that generic expression ''woman''s estate'' the decree-holder qualifies within ''widow''s estate''. The meaning and implication of ''widow''s estate'', can be thus read as here''under:

"A widow or other limited heir is not a tenant-for-life, but is owner of the properly inherited by her, subject to, certain restrictions on. alienation, and subject to its devolving-upon the next heirs of the last full ownerupbn her death. The whole estate is for the time vested, in her, and she represents it completely. As stated in a Privy Council caes (Janaki Ammal v. Narayaha Samy (1916) 43 IA 207, her right is of the nature of a right of property; her position is that of owner; her powers in that character are however, limited; but, so long as she is alive no one has any vested interest in the succession."

(Pages 222 and 223 Item 176 of Mulla''s Hindu Law supra).

In Jaisri Sahu Vs. Rajdewan Dubey and Others, the Supreme Court added to such a dimension in its expressions:

"When a Hindu widow succeeds as heir to her husband, the ownership in the properties both legal and beneficial vests in her. She fully represents the estate, the interest of the reversioners therein being only spes succes-sionis. The widow is entitled to the full beneficial enjoyment of the estate and is not accountable to any one. It is true that she cannot alienate the properties unless it be for necessity or for benefit to the estate, but this restriction on her powers is not one imposed for the benefit or reversioners but is an incident of the estate as known to Hindu law."

Thus the suit properties were the widow''s estate of the decree-holder to the extent of her share having acquired the vested right with full ownership subject to the restriction of alienation except for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate. She was not answerable to account for any reversioner much less to defendant No. 1 a total stranger to the family till he married defendant No. 5 to gain the status of a son-in-law and nothing more than that. Because defendant No. 5 was hardly two years old when her father died, wherein defendant No. 1 could never be in the picture at all. In fact both the decree-holder and defendant No. 5 stood in the same position or status in regard to the estate inherited by them along with Buddemma the mother of the deceased. Therefore, the decree-holder became the owner of the suit properties to the extent of 1/3rd share subject to certain restrictions on alienation and subject to its devolving upon its next heir as the last full owner upon her death and it was the whole estate for the time being vested in her and she represented it completely. Her right was in the nature of a right to property that of a son, the powers of dispossession or alienation restricted and so long as she was alive, no one had any vested interest in the succession.

The decree-holder and her mother-in-law Buddamma are said to have executed a registered settlement deed dated 5-1-1925 in favour of defendant No. 1. The documents marked during the trial of the suit do not find a place for the said settlement deed and there is no discussion or finding about the nature and the contents of such a document. The only finding is that there was a settlemeht deed between the parties. The settlement as a mode of transfer of property is not known under the Law of Properties. The Transfer of Property Act finds no place for such a transaction. Because defendant No. I had no share or right to share in the it properties such a settlement can never be a partition or division of shares or the arrangement among the members of the joint family of which defendant No. I was an outsider. He had no pre-existing right or share in the suit properties to get it separated or allotted. There is no plea of relinquishment of the rights of decree-holder and Buddamma under the document in favour of defendant No. 1. Dictionaries have provided the meaning of ''settlement'' as:

''the terms of which property is given to a person.''

(Page 1110 of Concise Oxford Dictionary New Edition of 1990 reprinted in 1992).

The law appears to have given a texture or structure to a settlement under a settlement deed in the taxation laws u/s 2 of the Gift Tax Act as "settling the property right or claim, conveyance or dispossession of property for the benefit of another" Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Ram Chandra Gupta and Co., Calcutta, and as "dispossession and transfer including dispossession of trust, covenant, agreement or arrangement so as to. use the transfer". Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat Vs. Keshavlal Lallubhai Patel, . Some times it can be construed as a gift for taxation having due regard to the contents of the document to style it as a settlement of Immovable property Rajah Raghavaraju Subbarajugaru Vs. Controller of Estate Duty, . Taking the guidance from such implications of a ''settlement'', the worst or the best which can be put upon the consequences of the settlement in favour of defendant No. 1 could be an agreement or arrangement between the parties for the benefit of the owners perhaps, with some responsibilities to defendant No. 1. That is how such a settlement came to be challenged by defendant No. 5 in O.S. No. 11/35 on the ground that no provision was made for her maintenance and that of the decree-holder. The fact that defendant No. 5 is not a party to the settlement deed signifies that the arrangement or agreement was not consensus or conclusive or binding on her. In other words, the pre-existing rights of the three ladies remained intact notwithstanding such a settlement. Even assuming that the settlement deed intended to transfer the properties held by the three ladies, it was repugnant to their restricted power of alienation conferring no right or title in defendant No. 1. Such an embargo against alienation could be relaxed only in the case of legal necessity or benefit of the estate or with the consent of the rever-sioner so as to pass absolute estate to the alienee to the same extent as an alienation made by a full owner (page 223 of Mulll''s Hindu Law supra). Even assuming that by virtue of the settlement deed, the rights of the decree-holder were lost in favour of defendant No. 1, they came to be restored to her in view of the compromise decree in O.S. No. 11/35 wherein half the share in the suit properties were given to the decree-holder her daughter and defendant No. 5, to be enjoyed by them without the powers of alienation for them, the remaining half being left to defendant No. 1. However, there was a stipulation that such a share given to them would revert back to defendant No. 1 after her death. There is a finding of the court and as is evident from Ex. B.19, that half the share of the plaintiff and defendant No. 5 together was partitioned and they We''re put into their possession as per the report of the Amin Ex. A2 during the month of March, 1959. In other words, the decree-holder and defendant No. 5 were in joint possession of half the share in the entire suit properties by virtue of the compromise decree in O.S. 11/35. In other words, such a factum is traceable at least up to March, 1959.

There was one more litigation between the parties. The decree-holder alleging that defendant No. 1 was trespassing into the suit properties, filed O.S. No. 534/49 for declaration of title and permanent injunction and also for possession and that came to be decreed on 27-2-1951 in the court of District Munsif, Madanapalle the decree of which is extracted by the learned Sub Judge in the judgment in O.S. No. 35/69 as follows:

"...... in the result, there will be a decree in favour of the plaintiff declaring her right to remain in possession of one fourth joint share in the properties covered by the compromise decree in O.S. No. 11 of 1935 on the file of the Subordinate Judge''s Court, Chittoor for her life without any right of alienation. A permanent injunction shall issue against the first defendant from interfering with the plaintiff''s enjoyment of this joint share...."

Her joint 1/4th share was necessarily along with 1/4th share of defendant No. 5 in view of the compromise decree in O.S. 11/35. The appeal -- A.S. No. 128/1951 filed by defendant No. 1 came to be dismissed on 22-10-1951 in the Sub Court, Chittoor. Therefore, the learned Sub Judge recorded a finding in O.S. No. 35/69 as follows:

"Thus the right of the plaintiff to a 1/4th share in the suit property covered by the compromise decree in O.S. No. 11/35 on the file of this Court, with a limited interest therein was established."

The difficulties for the decree-holder did not end there and, therefore, she had to file O.S. No. 35/69 for partition and separate possession of her 1/4th share in the suit properties for mesne profits etc., as against the defendants in which the operative portion of the judgment and the decree has directed the partition and separate possession of 1/4th share in the suit properties to be given to the plaintiff except the one covered by Ex. B.18 sale deed in addition to the mesne profits to the extent of 1/4th share. There is a clear finding in para 31 of the judgment in 0-S. 35/69 in favour of the decree-holder as follows:

"I, therefore, find that plaintiff has got 1/4th joint right and possession of all the suit items except those covered by Ex.B.18 and she is entitled to partition and separate possession of her 1/4th share in the same."

Such a finding leading to the decree has become final and conclusive. Therefore, in whatever manner the parties litigated and described the right of the decree-holder to the suit properties, she contended in possession of the same till she transferred the decree in favour of the appellant-transferee. The facts and circumstances of the case are very clear that the possession of the decree-holder in addition to her right to the suit properties to the extent of her share ever since the date of the death of her husband was never disturbed, till the date of transfer of the decree in favour of the appellant-transferee. At any rate, she had such a right or possession whether limited or otherwise, continued both from and after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, hereinafter referred to as the Act --viz., 17th June, 1956 and even thereafter. Her rights are thus determinable by virtue of Section 14 of the Act which reads:

"14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property :-- (1) Any property possessed by a feamale Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.

Explanation:-- In this sub-section ''property'' includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase Or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.

(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property."

With the definite finding that the decree-holder had acquired the suit properties and possessed it both before and after the commencement of the Act she was entitled to hold it as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act and could effectively transfer the same to the decree-holder.

Mr. Sunderraj, the learned Advocate for the contesting respondents strived hard to bring home his contention that Section 14(1) of the Act is not applicable to the rights of the decree-holder and whereas they are operated by Section 14(2) of the Act. He has strongly based on the admitted settlement deed between the parties which according to him extinguish the rights of the decree-holder if any including the right of maintenance and only by virtue of the decree in O.S. 11 /1935 which came to be compromised on 3-8-1937, she got her 1/2 joint share along with defendant No. 1, that too as a limited owner. The discussions and the finding already made above, rejects such a contention since the decree-holder had no right of alienation in favour of defendant No. 1 and it is not his case that the transfer was for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate. In fact if we go by the implication of the finding supra, the settlement deed did not create any right in favour of defendant No. 1 nor destroyed all or any of the rights of the decree-holder in the suit properties. Even assuming that it had the effect of transferring all the rights to defendant No. 5 along with others to limited owners, admittedly it was reverted back to her and defendant No.5. The reverted right was a pre-existing right and not a newly created right. The Supreme Court in Jagannathan Pillai Vs. Kunjithapadam Pillai and Others, has rejected such a contention. In that case a Hindu acquired the property by virtue of the death of her husband as a widow''s estate and she lost the possession of the same whereby she transferred it in favour of an alienee by virtue of a document. Furthermore, the property which was alienated or transferred was re-transferred to her by the said alienee after the Act came into force. In other words, the right and possession which she had lost under the original transaction was reverted to her. In view of the conflicting views in this regard by several precedents including the precedent of this court in Venkataratnam v. Palemma 1970 (2) AnWR 264, the Supreme Court by overruling such precedents, authoritatively declared in its words:

"The case of the widow who had temporarily lost the right in the property by virtue of the transfer in favour of the alienee or the donee cannot be equated with that a stranger by forgetting the realities of the situation. Surely the act was intended to benefit her. And when the widow becomes possessed of the property, having regained preciously that interest which she had temporarily lost during the duration of the eclipse. Section 14(1) would come to her rescue which would not be the matter in the case of a stranger who cannot invoke Section 14(1)."

Therefore, in this case the pre-existing rights which the decree-holder had the domain over the suit properties which were lost by virtue of the alleged transfer under the settlement was regained by her to continue the same till the date of the present suit and subsequently thereby became an absolute owner with the operation of Section 14(1) of the Act.

10, Mr. Sunder Rajan, the learned counsel for the contesting respondents contended that although notionally the compromise decree gave her the possession of the share in the suit properties it was subsequently litigated again, the defendant No. I was in actual possession cultivating the same wherein the decree-holder got only the produce and in that sense she cannot be said to have held the possession over the suit lands both in law and fact. He in particular points out that in a later suit although along with the declaration of her title, permanent injunction was sought and the possession of the properties was also sought and, therefore, her possession was in jeopardy to gain the advantage of Section 14(1) of the Act. The contention on the face of it has no force. Notwithstanding such innocuous or immaculate expression were made, it must have been actually found that the decree-holder was in actual possession of the same and that is how O.S. No. 539/49 was decreed declaring her right to remain in possession of 1/4th joint share in the properties covered by the compromise decree in O.S. No. 11/35 in addition to granting permanent injunction restraining defendant No. 1 from interfering with such enjoyment of the share of the plaintiff. It was on that basis the present suit O.S. No. 35/69 was filed for partition and separate possession of her 1/4th share which came to be decreed. Even in such a situation the Supreme Court settled the position in Gulwant Kaur and Another Vs. Mohinder Singh and Others, that:

"..... Where a Hindu wife gets lands in lieu of maintenance from her husband and she enjoys the produce therefrom, her right becomes absolute by virtue of S. 14(1) of the Act."

Because the enlargement of such a limited right for maintenance is said to be sufficient title to enable the ripening of possession into full ownership u/s 14(1) of the Act. Therefore, in spite of the suspended animation the future enlargement of the limited right of the decree-holder was being claimed by defendant No. 1 which was to be resisted by her in several suits that could never come in the way of her becoming the absolute owner of the suit property by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act.

Mr. Sunder Rajan, the learned Advocate appears to think that since the decree holder got the suit properties by virtue of the compromise decree in O.S. No. 11/35 which was only affirmed in the subsequent decree in O.S. 539/1949 her rights were to be governed only by Section 14(2) of the Act. While dealing with such a question, the Supreme Court in Gulwant Kaur and Another Vs. Mohinder Singh and Others, , has already observed in the negative. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is said to be in the nature of exception to sub-section (1) of Section 14 and provides for a situation where properties acquired by a female Hindu under a written instrument or a decree of a court and not where such an acquisition is traceable to any antecedent right. Here is not a case wherein the right or possession of the decree holder was created for the first time under the compromise decree in O.S. No. 11/35 and that only confirmed her pre-existing or antecedent right to come within Section 14(1) and not u/s 14(2) of the Act. The matter has not stood there. Even where a Hindu female acquires property under compromise in lieu of her right of maitenance prescribing a limited interest, still subsection (I) of Section 14 of the Act applies and not sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act as laid down in Vaddeboyina Tulasamma v. Vaddeboyina Sesha Reddi AIR 1977 SC 1944. In a matter which arises out of a case of this court in Vaddaboyina Sesha Reddi Vs. Vaddaboying Tulasamma and Others, which came to be overruled by the Supreme Court, a widow while enforcing her right of maintenance in the properties of her husband as against the brother of her husband, got a decree and in the execution the matter came to be compromised between them allotting the properties in question to her for her maintenance giving her limited interests in such properties, even then it was held that it is Section 14(1) of the Act which is attracted and not 14(2) of the Act because her right or possession was based upon the pre-existing right although reverted by a subsequent compromise. The facts of the present case are almost similar to the one in Veddeboyina Tulasamma and, therefore, squarely covered by the same. In that view of the matter, there is no gainsaying in contending otherwise than the legal principle which has been already settled by the Supreme Court more than once.

It is further contended by the learned Advocate for the defendants that throughout '' the decree-holder Used the word ''limited right'' or ''limited interest'' including the latest plaint in the present suit O.S. 35/69 and that compromise decree in O.S. 11/35, the decree in O.S. 539/1949 also made an emphatic expression that the plaintiff was entitled to only a limited interest without any right of alienation and, therefore, her transferee is estopped from contending to the contrd. It is also pointed out by the learned Advocate that such expressions are also made in the registered document transferring the decree by the decree-holder to the transferee. However, such an expression is not there in the affidavit of the decree holder filed in support of the petition to come on record as a transferee of the decree. The learned Advocate for the transferee appears to be right in saying that the decree in question does not mention anything about the limited right or the restricted right in the suit properties given to the decree holder. It must be confirmed that the decree in simple has clearly directed the partition and separate possession of 1/4th share of the decree-holder in the suit properties in addition to the mesne profits.

The legal principles which are already examined and found to be affirmed against such a contention at the outset. It is true that such expressions were made throughout and even in the plaint of the latest suit and with categoric expressions in paras 3, 6 and 9 of the plaint and also the deed of transfer of the decree. Mr. Pattabhi Rama Rao, the learned Advocate for the appellant-transferee appears to be right in explaining away such expressions having due regard to the implications of Hindu Law about a women''s or widow''s estate as it prevailed and understood till the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force and in view of several precedents holding such a view including some precedents of this Court which were ultimately set at rest by the pronouncements of the Supreme Court as above. The learned Advocate styles them as habituated expressions in the light of the Shastric Hindu Law. His explanations appears to bear reality or at least probability. Perhaps not only the decree-holder, defendant No. 5 or even Buddamma were conscious of such limited right but also defendant No. 1 was very much conscious about it while enterting into compromise with them in O.S. No. 11/35 as he had the advantage of the settlement deed in his favour, Obviously, the Court had to record such a compromise with such expressions and it was repeated in the subsequent suits also. The draftsmanship of the legal expertise should be an additional factor in echoing such understanding and expressions in the proceedings. It cannot be forgotten that such expressions which are used in the proceedings before the court were all prior to 17-6-1956 when the rights of Hindu women were some thing different than what was codified in S. 14(1) of the Act. The last of the decree prior to the present suit was passed on 27-2-1951 in O.S. 539/49 which came to be affirmed in A.S. No. 132/1951 on 22-10-1951. It is on such basis, such expressions were made in the plaint in O.S. 35/69 and as rightly put by Mr., Pattabhi Rama Rao, the learned Advocate for the plaintiff, they should be taken as statements of facts and not statements of law. There appears to be lot of force in such an explanation under the circumstances stated above. In Vaddeboyina Tulasamma''s case, the Supreme Court while relying on S.S. Munna Lal v. Raj Kumar AIR 1966 SC 1493 pointed that:

"The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is a codifying enactment and has made far reaching changes in the structure of the Hindu law of inheritance and succession. The Act confers upon Hindu females full rights of inheritance and sweeps away the traditional limitations on her powers of disposition which were regarded under the Hindu law as inherent in her estate. Sub-section (1) of Section 14 is wide in its scope and amplitude ....................

Whatever be the kind of property, movable or immovable, and whichever be the mode of acquisition, it would be covered by subsection (1) of Section 14, the object of the Legislature being to wipe out the disabilities from which is Hindu female suffered in regard to ownership of property under the old Sastric law to abridge the stringent provisions against proprietory rights which were often regarded as evidence of her perpetual tutelage and to recognize her status as an independent and absolute owner of property.

While interpreting Section 14(2) of the Act as a proviso to Section 14(1), the Supreme Court in the same precedent continued to lay down:

"This provision is more in the nature of a proviso or exception to sub-section (1) and it was regarded as such by this Court in Seth Badri Prasad Vs. Srimati Kanso Devi, . It excepts certain kinds of acquisition of property by a Hindu female from the operation of sub-section (1) and being in the nature of an exception to a provision which is calculated to achieve a social purpose by bringing about change in the social and economic position of women in Hindu society, it must be construed strictly so as to impinge as little as possible on the broad sweep of the ameliorative provision contained in sub-section (1). It cannot be interpreted in a manner which would rob sub-section (1) of its efficacy and deprive a Hindu female of the protection sought to be given to her by subsection (1)."

Under the circumstances stated above, all expressions were made both by human beings of ignorance and learning and cannot form a basis to decide the rights of the parties on the basis of the true and correct interpretation of law. It is the law which declares the law of rights and liabilities and not the expressions of lawmen or laymen. If the law confers absolute rights, there is no gainsaying in understanding or nomenclaturing it as a limited right. The battered women with shattered hopes of their rights like the decree-holder may use expressions of which they are habituated to matter no legal consequence. The legal men and draftsmen may add to them. That cannot operate as an estoppel against the affirmative law as it really exists as in the present case.

The learned Sub Judge had either no opportunity to consider all these serious implications as they might not have been urged in the true and correct perspective or that he has landed in error in not applying the correct law to the facts of this case and, therefore, his decision which is under appeal deserves to be set aside. In view of the law settled in Vulsa Laxminarayana Vs. Vulsa Bhoodamma and Another, and in view of the similar share of defendant No. 5 to the extent of 1/4th in the suit properties as in the case of the decree-holder and although no such direction is made in the decree, it is open to defendant No. 5 to get her share allotted to her On paying requisite court fee etc. if so advised. It is for the learned Sub Judge to dispose of the matter in the final decree proceedings in the light of the observations made above so as to derive the true result of the preliminary decree which is transferred by the decree-holder to the transferee who is the appellant in this case. The matter thus requires to be remitted back to the trial court for disposal according to law.

For the reasons afforded above, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and order of the teamed Sub Judge which are in appeal are set aside. The matier is remitted back to the trial court for disposal according to law in the light of the observations made, after affording reasonable and necessary opportunities to all the concerned. Defendant No, 1 shall pay costs of the appellant incurred in this appeal. The other parties shall bear their respective costs in this appeal.

Order accordingly.